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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF
CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
SEPTEMBER 2015
HYUN WOONG PARK
B.Sc., HANDONG GLOBAL UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., YONSEI UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerald Epstein and Professor Deepankar Basu
This dissertation contributes to the growing literature on macroeconomic models
with a financial intermediary sector. The first two chapters use the circuit of cap-
ital modeling methodology to study the relation between growth and profitability
in capitalist economy where credit is essential, and the third uses a more standard
macrodynamic model to investigate how securitized banking, which relies on short–
term collateralized borrowing, as opposed to traditional commercial banking, gener-
ates procyclical bank leverage, which in turn leads to supply–led fluctuation in credits
and ultimately to a boom–bust cycle of asset prices.
In chapter 1, I extend the baseline model of circuit of capital to incorporate a
profit–making financial capitalist sector and the associated financial variables. The
extended model is examined to see how the main findings of the existing literature
regarding growth, profitability, and credits are modified. It is shown that once finance
v
is explicitly incorporated, the Cambridge equation–type result is modified in a way
that relates growth to net return on equity of a firm sector, not to the latter’s gross
profit rate; hence, leverage ratio of the firm sector and the bank profitability, which
is determined in line with interest rates, become crucial variables.
In chapter 2, by relying on the extended circuit of capital model, I propose a
new categorization for growth theory that characterizes financial aspects of growth,
i.e. firm leverage–led vs. bank leverage–led growth. When the growth is led by firm
leverage, on the one hand, growth does not face any upper bound while it stimulates
excess demand for bank credits and hence is accompanied by a rise in the interest
rates. On the other hand, when the growth is led by bank leverage, growth faces
some upper bound but it stimulates excess supply of bank credits and consequently
is accompanied by a fall in the interest rate.
Chapter 3 draws upon the recent empirical finding on procyclical bank leverage
and makes a contribution to the related literature in two directions. First, I build a
one–period banking model of repurchase agreement to show that repo transactions
motivate borrowers to manage their leverage procyclically due to counter–party risks
and collateral value risks involved in the transactions. Second, with this result as a
microfoundation, I build a macrodynamic model, which reveals the logic underlying
persistent boom–bust cycles observed in the securitized banking system.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
Mark Gertler wrote in 1988 that “Most of macroeconomic theory presumes that
the financial system functions smoothly – and smoothly enough to justify abstract-
ing from financial considerations”(Gertler, 1988). And in 1995 Marc Lavoie wrote
that “one of the surprising aspects of the evolution of Cambridge theory is that,
starting from Keynes’s General Theory which described a monetary production econ-
omy, the Cambridge post–Keynesians have failed to incorporate money [and finance]
into their models of growth and distribution” (Lavoie, 1995). The status of finance in
macroeconomic theory summarized in these statements did not changed substantially
until very recently despite of a few exceptions such as financial accelerator models
by Bernanke and his various coauthors (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al.,
1996; Bernanke, 1999) and Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1975,
1982, 1986).
The 2008 financial crisis has changed this and now macro models that include a
financial sector are now exponentially growing in number. Most notable examples
are New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with a
banking sector and financial frictions (Gerali et al., 2010; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010)
and the Post Keynesian stock–flow consistent (SFC) modeling framework (Pilkington,
2008; Passarella, 2012; Le Heron and Mouakil, 2008). In broad, the present disserta-
tion lies in this trend and contributes to building a macro model that incorporates a
financial intermediary.
Alternatively to a DSGE model and SFC model, I use the circuit of capital macroe-
conomic model first developed in Foley (1982, 1986a,b). The circuit of capital model
is based on the analysis in Volume II of Capital and rigorously formalizes the diagram
1
M−C−M ′. It is a macroeconomic representation of the essential aspects of Marxian
economic theory. In comparison to the existing macro models, the circuit of capital
model is distinctive in several ways.
First, having the labor theory of value as its theoretical foundation, the circuit of
capital model describes capitalist economy from the perspective of circular flows of
value and valorizing movement of capital. Note that at the core of the DSGE model
lies households’ consumption and saving behavior aimed at utility maximization. In
terms of the M−C−M ′ diagram, households’ decision–making is oriented towards
larger C, i.e.t more consumption. In this sense, the DSGE model describes capitalist
economy as C−M−C ′ with the initial C representing endowments and the last C ′
representing consumption. The model is ultimately driven by consumption deter-
mined in a way that satisfies Euler equation, and hence one of the deep parameters
of the model is time preference of the representative household.
In contrast, the central economic agent in the circuit of capital model is a capi-
talist firm that engages in production and accumulation motivated by a pursuit for
profits, i.e. M ′(>M), and as will be seen below, the model’s deep parameters include
exploitation rate and organic composition of capital, both of which reflecting class
struggle and technical condition in the production process.
Second, related to the first, the circuit of capital model is based on a distinctive
theory of profit and growth where a central determinant is the creation of surplus
value through exploitation of workers. The class–centered approach is unique to the
circuit of capital model. On the one hand, Post Keynesian theory of growth and
distribution and SFC framework do not provide a substantive explanation of the
source of profits, but are concerned only about distribution between profits and wage
and about how it affects growth as can be seen in the literature on wage–led versus
2
profit–led growth.1 In DSGE models, on the other hand, even the income distribution
is not on the agenda in the first place as earnings of each economic agent merely reflect
its contribution to production.2.
Third, the circuit of capital model is a dynamic model and so are DSGE model and
SFC model. However, there is a significant difference on how to model the dynamics.
While the standard dynamic macroeconomic models primarily concern the volume of
variables of the model at each period synchronically, a central focus of the circuit of
capital model is to trace a movement of monetary value in historical time from one
form — e.g. investment — to the other — e.g. outputs — diachronically. In this
framework, the question how long it takes for the monetary value to traverse, to use
the same example, from investment to outputs becomes crucial.
The diachronic approach of the circuit of capital model is represented by lag
variables, which are a mathematical formalization of the concept of turnover time
discussed in the second volume of Capital. Turnover time is a very unique concept
in economic theories which allows to distinctively characterize economic processes
as inherently dynamic. Similarly, lag variables are one of the major innovations of
the circuit of capital model, enabling the latter to describe the capitalist economy in
historical time in a way that is not possible in the other standard models.
Fourth, by tracing an evolution of balance sheet and income statement of each
sector of the model over time, the circuit of capital model allows to formalize the
capitalist economy in a stock–flow consistent way. While the stock–flow consistency
features crucial in the other macroeconomic models as well — e.g. Godley and Lavoie
(2007) — the circuit of capital model is distinctive in modeling the formation of stock
variables in relation to the lag variables. Stocks emerge as a logical consequence of
1See Dos Santos (2013) for a critique of the Post Keynesian theory of wage–led versus profit–led
growth from the perspective of the circuit of capital model.
2This explains why the mainstream literature hardly paid attention to this topic before the
publication of Piketty (2014)
3
lag variables. As it takes time for the monetary value to proceed from one form to
the other, e.g. from inputs to outputs, it accumulates into a stock, i.e. inventories,
to use the same example, during that time period.
Lastly, related to the fourth, the structure of the circuit of capital model makes it
open to various behavioral stories, which enhances the model’s applicability. Equa-
tions constituting the circuit of capital model are accounting identities that necessarily
hold by definition. A substantive character of the system is captured by parameters
of the model including exploitation rate, organic composition of capital, recapital-
ization rate, and lag variables, which are all treated as a fixed constant. Adding
behavioral specifications for these deep parameters, which summarize institutional,
structural, and socioeconomic character of the system, will make the content of the
model analytically richer.
Despite of these merits, however, there are some issues that need to be addressed
in order to make the model more widely applicable and practically accessible. One
of them regards the lag variables.3 While the lag variables are what make the circuit
of capital model innovative and distinctive, they at the same time render the model
very difficult to deal with in a mathematical sense. For this reason, in many cases,
simplifying assumptions are adopted regarding the lag variables as is done in this
dissertation. The existence of the lag variables is a major challenge facing the circuit
of capital model. As the DSGE modelers adopt log linearization as a way to solve
the model which otherwise would have been almost impossible mathematically, the
circuit of capital model needs a technical tactic to address this issue.
Having the above–discussed merits and demerits in mind, probably the most im-
portant contribution of the circuit of capital model in the macro–finance literature
3There are four different ways to mathematically define the lag variables, i.e. fixed time lag, vari-
able time lag, finite distributed lag, infinite distributed lag (Basu, 2013). For the sake of simplicity,
I adopt fixed time lag, which is the simplest one.
4
lies in proving the necessity of credit for growth of the capitalist economy by showing
that the capitalist economy without exponentially growing net credits will not be
able to stay on a positive steady–state balanced growth path. This result makes it
essential to explicitly incorporate credits and the associated financial variables such as
financial assets and liabilities and interest earnings and payments whenever modeling
the capitalist economy, rather than treating finance as a secondary that may or may
not be added at a later stage of analysis.
Duncan Foley’s work on the circuit of capital model has been followed by a small
number of papers. First, there are papers that develop the model’s proposition on the
necessity of credit in various directions. Using a different modeling approach, Kotz
(1991) derives a stronger result that the new capital investment must be financed
entirely by credit. Basu (2013) shows that the steady–state growth rate is negatively
related to the share of consumption credit in total net credit. Dos Santos (2011, 2014)
further demonstrates that consumption credit contributes to intensifying credit risk
by lowering total wage and profit incomes relative to interest payments.
Second, there are papers that tackle the widely discussed topic of wage–led growth
versus profit–led growth in the recent Post Keynesian literature from the perspective
of the circuit of capital model. Basu (2013), on one hand, shows that the circuit of
capital model allows those two types of growth regime in relation to income distri-
bution. On the other hand, Dos Santos (2013) criticizes the Post Keynesian growth
theory of wage–led vs. profit–led categorization from the perspective of the circuit of
capital model.
Third, the financial circuit that can additionally emerge in relation to, and as
opposed to, the industrial circuit is another topic in the literature. Loranger (1989)
analyzes a divergence between capital investment and financial investment and studies
an inflationary effect of the latter. Satoh (2012) adds the circuit of bank capital to
the baseline model, which can be characterized as the circuit of industrial capital, and
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examines how interest rate is determined in the model. Satoh (2012) is an exception
compared to the rest of the papers in explicitly formalizing the banking sector and
the associated financial variables.
First two essays of this dissertation contribute to the above–discussed literature
on the circuit of capital model by further specifying the banking sector and examining
its profitability and the impact of its leverage behavior on growth and interest rate.
In chapter 1, in order to introduce the basic methodology of the model, I start with
presenting the baseline model, which then is extended to incorporate a banking sector
with the related financial variables. I use the extended model to study the steady–
state growth rate of the system and profit rates of both industrial capital and financial
capital by relying on comparative static analysis and simulation exercise. In chapter
2, I use the extended circuit of capital model to propose a new categorization of
growth regimes that characterizes financial aspects of growth, i.e. firm leverage–led
vs. bank leverage–led growth. On the other hand, chapter 3 uses a more standard
approach to present a macro model with a securitized banking system and examines
how procyclical bank leverage aggravates an asset price cycle driven by supply–led
credit expansion and collapse.
Chapter 1 examines how the main findings of the existing literature of the cir-
cuit of capital model regarding growth, profitability, and credits are extended and
modified when a banking sector and the associated financial variables are explicitly
accounted for. The existing papers show how the steady–state growth rate and the
rate of profit are determined by the parameters of the model such as exploitation
rate, organic composition of capital, and investment and consumption behaviors of
firms and households with the relation between growth rate and profit rate being
established in the Cambridge equation–type result. In addition, it has been proved
that the economy without exponentially growing net credits will not be able to at-
tain a positive steady–state growth rate. However, these findings are derived from
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the model without finance. In chapter 1, I present an extended model of circuit of
capital that includes a banking sector and use it to see how the above findings are
extended and modified when financial variables, such as financial assets and liabilities
and interest payments and earnings, are explicitly incorporated.
The main results are the following. First, the extended model allows to investigate
the growth impact of financial variables. It is shown that while the bank lending
rate negatively affects the steady–state growth rate, borrowing rate of the firm has
a positive impact on the growth rate when the lending rate is low and a negative
impact when the rate is high. Second, once the rate of profit is measured to reflect
both asset side and liability side of balance sheet and the related financial variables,
thereby being redefined as net return on equity, the Cambridge equation–type result
continues to hold even when the baseline circuit of capital model is extended to
include a banking sector. The extended model further allows to measure profitability
of banks as well as that of nonbank firms and to show how both are related to the
other financial variables such as leverage ratio and margin of safety.
Third, a simulation of the extended model shows that the established result on
the necessity of credits for growth is modified when finance is explicitly considered.
In contrast to the finding of the existing literature that the exponentially growth
net bank credits allow the system to be on a positive steady–state growth path, the
simulation result in this chapter exhibits that the system could possibly collapse to
zero growth state even when bank credits grow exponentially under the condition that
the consumption lag of the banker household is larger than any other expenditure lags
in the model and that the interest rate is sufficiently large.
A theoretical interest in the relation between growth rate and profit rate has
recently been revived by Piketty (2014). Note that the latter points as the main
determinant of an inequality of wealth and income the fact that the profit rate is
larger than the growth rate. However, r > g is suggested as a historically observed
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fact rather than being supported by a rigorous theoretical foundation. A contribution
of this chapter, which provides a theoretical framework for understanding growth
and profitability in a generalized model of circuit of capital with finance, can be
appreciated against this background.
The model in chapter 1 considers only the goods market equilibrium condition
and interest rates are taken as given. On the other hand, chapter 2 examines equilib-
rium condition in bank credit market along with that in the goods market, thereby
endogenizing both growth rate and the interest rate. In this setup, chapter 2 studies
growth in relation to demand and supply of credit, which allows to identify distinctive
growth impact of leverage of the firm sector and leverage of the banking sector.
It is found that while the firm leverage–led growth is unbounded, the growth
in this case takes place through facilitating credit demand, thereby tightening the
bank credit market and hence raising the interest rate spread alongside the growth
rate. Bank leverage–led growth, on the other hand, has an upper bound, but under
the condition that the banking system has attained a developed financial technology,
the growth could possibly take place by facilitating credit supply, which creates the
slack in the bank credit market, consequently enabling the system to experience high
growth and low interest rate.
The main focus of Post Keynesian growth theory has been on income distribution
and its growth impact. See the literature on wage–led vs. profit–led growth (Bhaduri,
2008). And more recent papers in this tradition, especially after the recent financial
turmoil, pay attention to financial aspects of growth; e.g. debt–led vs. debt–burdened
growth (Hein, 2007; Nishi, 2012). In most cases, debts refers to liabilities of nonfinan-
cial sectors such as nonfinancial firms or households. However, historical data show
that leverage ratio of the financial sector is much higher and more volatile than that
of the nonfinancial sectors (see figure 2.1). By explicitly incorporating the leverage
ratio of the bank, chapter 2 allows to see that growth led by the bank leverage can
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differ from growth led by the nonbank firm leverage in two respects: i) existence of
upper bound of growth, ii) correlation between growth and interest rate.
While the financial intermediary modeled in the first two chapters is highly sim-
plified, the intermediary sector in chapter 3 is dealt with in a more concrete detail;
it is divided into three sub–sectors, i.e. commercial banks, investment banks, and
asset–managing firms. Chapter 3 is motivated by Adrian and Shin (2010)’s empirical
finding that the leverage ratio of an investment banking sector is procyclical. Two
main purposes of the chapter are to provide a theoretical explanation of the procycli-
cal leverage of the investment bank and to examine a macroeconomic consequence of
it.
First, using a banking model of repo transaction, it is shown that an optimal lever-
age of the investment bank is positively related to asset prices. The main mechanism
underlying this relation is a movement of repo rate, which reflects counter–party
risks and collateral value risks repo lenders are facing. Second, based on this result,
I develop a dynamic macroeconomic balance sheet model with a securitized banking
system characterized by loan securitization and collateralized short–term borrowing.
The main analytical result suggests that under plausible condition the model exhibits
a limit cycle behavior. A vulnerability of the repo market to asset price fluctuations
leads to procyclical bank leverage, which aggravates asset price cycles driven by the
supply–led credit expansion and collapse. It is also found that as the procyclicality of
bank leverage becomes stronger the financial cycles also get more intense and severe.
The model in chapter 3 allows to see how different leverage behaviors between
nonfinancial sectors and a financial sector can have an aggravating effect on an asset
price cycle. Since the nonfinancial sectors demand credits while the financial sector
supplies credits, the fact that the financial sector borrows more in the case of asset
price appreciation and less in the case of asset price depreciation in a more responsive
way than the borrowings of the nonfinancial sectors implies that during upturns of
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cycles with asset price appreciation there will be excess supply of credits and during
downturns of cycles with asset price depreciation there will be excess demand of
credits. This ultimately will aggravate the financial cycle.
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CHAPTER 1
GROWTH AND PROFITABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT OF
CAPITAL WITH A FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY
1.1 Introduction
The existing literature on the circuit of capital model produced two fundamental
macroeconomic results regarding growth, profitability, and credit (see Foley, 1982,
1986a,b; Kotz, 1991; Basu, 2013). First, it has been demonstrated that an equality
exists between the rate of profit and the growth rate divided by recapitalization rate;
formally,
r = g
p
(1.1)
where r is the rate of profit, g growth rate, and p recapitalization rate. Second, it
has been shown that exponentially growing net bank credits resolve the problem of
insufficient demand, which would have plagued the system without bank credits, and
guarantee that a system expands on a positive steady–state growth path. That is,
without exponentially growing net credits the economy will not be able to be on a
positive steady–state balanced growth path.
Unless we are interested in a simple reproduction with zero growth, the latter
result regarding the necessity of credits for growth implies that the credits and the
associated financial variables, such as financial assets and liabilities and interest pay-
ments and earnings, are not something that may or may not be added at a later stage
of analysis depending on authors’ interests but something that must be explicitly ac-
counted for from the very start. However, most of the existing models in the literature
ignore them. In order to fill this gap, in this chapter, I extend the baseline model of
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the circuit of capital to incorporate a profit–earning banking sector and examine how
the above–mentioned two fundamental results are modified when finance is explicitly
considered.
First of all, in the circuit of capital model g in equation (1.1) is endogenously
determined by parameters of the model such as exploitation rate, organic composition
of capital, and investment and consumption behaviors of firms and households (see
section 1.3.1.1). By using the extended model presented in this chapter, I further
examine how financial variables such as interest rates and leverage behaviors affect
growth. It is shown that while the bank loan rate has a negative effect on the steady–
state growth rate, borrowing rate of the firm has a positive effect on the growth rate
when the loan rate is low and a negative effect when the rate is high.
Regarding the rate of profit, on the other hand, I suggest that its definition needs
to be reconsidered in two respects once it is recognized that finance is an essential
character of a capitalist economy. First, in measuring capital in the denominator of
the profit rate, financial assets need to be included since financial capital is one of the
essential forms capital takes during the process of the circuit of capital M−C−M ′
and since, as a consequence, at any moment in time there always exists financial
capital along with various forms of nonfinancial capital.
Second, not only the asset side of the balance sheet of capitalist firms but also the
liability side of it needs to be considered regarding both numerator and denominator
of the rate of profit. Accordingly, the denominator is measured by the difference
between assets and liabilities, i.e. equity, and the numerator is measured by the
difference between the rate of aggregate profits and the net interest payments. What
results is net return on equity.
In this context, it is shown that equation (1.1) continues to hold even when the
baseline model is extended to incorporate financial variables as long as profitability
is measured by net return on equity. That is, while in the model without finance
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an equality exists between the rate of gross profit and the steady–state growth rate
divided by recapitalization rate, in the extended model with finance the same equality
holds with the rate of gross profit replaced by the net return on equity.
Furthermore, the extended model with a banking sector allows to measure both
profitability of industrial capitalists and that of financial capitalists.1 A decompo-
sition of the net return on equity of industrial capitalists demonstrates that it is
positively related to gross profit rate, leverage ratio of the firm, and margin of safety
whereas a decomposition of the net return on equity of financial capitalists shows
that it is positively related to interest rate and leverage ratio of the bank.
Lastly, by simulating the extended model, I show how the established result on
the necessity of credits for growth is modified when financial variables are considered.
The extended model presented in this chapter exhibits that even with exponentially
growing net bank credits, the system could possibly be unable to overcome the prob-
lem of insufficient demand and thus collapse to zero growth state even when bank
credits grow exponentially.
An important factor driving this result is a consumption behavior of the banker
household, which earns dividends out of bank profits, which are interests paid by
firms to banks. As the banker household’s consumption expenditure constitutes an
additional source of effective demand, if the banker household’s marginal propensity to
save is sufficiently small, a sufficient portion of the interest payments will return back
to, instead of being drained from, the circuit. If not, however, the interest payments
will be a drainage of the value from the system, which will definitely undermine the
growth capacity of the system. In this context, a simulation result shows that when
the consumption lag of the banker household is larger than any other expenditure
1While there are a small number of papers that study measuring the nonfinancial firm sector’s
profit rate in relation to finance (Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Bakir and Campbell, 2013; Norfield,
2013), a theoretical work on the bank’s the rate of profit is almost nonexistent.
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lags in the model and when interest rate is sufficiently large, both growth rate and
profit rate collapse to zero.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the baseline
model, introducing the circuit of capital model methodology, which is then extended
to incorporate a banking sector and the related financial variables. In section 1.3,
steady–state growth rate, profit rate of industrial capitalists, and profit rate of finan-
cial capitalists in the extended model of circuit of capital are examined. In section
1.4, the extended model is simulated to examine the necessity of the bank credits.
Section 1.5 is a conclusion.
1.2 A model of the circuit of capital
In this section, the baseline circuit of capital model without finance is presented
first and then it is extended to include financial variables. The model is in a discrete–
time framework. For the sake of simplicity, time description is omitted from the
notation for a endogenous variable in time t. Most of the variables will have a sub-
script in their notation and therefore time description is added as a superscript in
order to avoid notational confusion. For example, net bank credits of nonfinancial
firms, denoted by Bk, in time t and those in time t + τ are each denoted by Bk and
B+τk instead of Btk and Bt+τk . A list of the notations can be found in appendix A.
The model is a two–class economy. Capitalist class is subdivided into industrial
capitalist (nonfinancial firms) and financial capitalist (banks). Each group of capi-
talists consists of entrepreneurs or bankers and their households. Overall, the model
consists of enterpreneur (k), entrepreneur’s household (s), banker (b), banker house-
hold (m), and worker household (w). Bankers and their households do not appear in
the baseline model but only in the extended model.
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1.2.1 Baseline model
The circuit of capital macroeconomic model is based on the analysis in Volume II
of Capital and formalizes the diagram
· · · −M − C(LP,MP )− P − C ′ −M ′ − · · ·
The circuit starts with money capital (M) which is advanced to purchase inputs (C) —
labour power (LP ) and means of production (MP ) — and the process of production
(P ) begins. Output commodities (C ′) embodying surplus value are produced and are
sold in the market to realize the surplus value as profits (M ′−M). Part of these profits
is recommitted to finance capital outlays and the entire process starts anew. Each of
these processes — production, realization, and finance processes – takes time during
which flows of value are accumulated and hence stocks of money capital, productive
capital, and commodity capital are built up before they can proceed to the next
process.
The circular movement of value just described can be formalized by the following
stock–flow consistent relations:
P = Z−τP (1.2)
R = P−τR (1.3)
Z = (1 + pkq)R−τF (1.4)
∆U+1 = Z − P (1.5)
∆X+1 = P −R (1.6)
∆F+1k = (1 + pkq)R− Z (1.7)
where ∆ refers to an increment of the variable from the previous period to the current
one. Z denotes the flow of capital outlays on constant capital and variable capital.
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Share of variable capital out of total capital outlays is a with 0 < a < 1. Hence aZ is
used in paying wages while (1− a)Z in purchasing non–wage inputs. P is the flow of
finished commodities measured at cost. τP is a time delay for production. Equation
(1.2) demonstrates that it takes τP periods of time for the capital outlay to emerge
as finished product.
R is the flow of sales revenue measured at cost. τR is a time lag for realization of
finished commodities. Equation (1.3) states that the finished products are realized
into final sales after τR periods. Since final sales are financed by effective demand, τR
reflects the conditions of effective demand. In this sense, taking τR as constant implies
presupposing that there always emerges a sufficient volume of effective demand so as
to maintain the realization lag at a certain level. On the other hand, an approach
alternative to taking τR as exogenous is to account for effective demand by explicitly
identifying it within the model. In this case, the realization lag would be endogenized
and resolved into lags associated with spending behaviors of firms and households.
This will be discussed more in detail below.
With q denoting markup, total sales revenue can be expressed as (1 + q)R, and
aggregate profits, which are realized surplus value, would be qR. q is determined as
a product between a organic composition of capital — or, more precisely, its inverse
— and exploitation rate, denoted by e, i.e. q = ae. This reflects that profits are
created by surplus labor. Aggregate profits qR are divided into retained earnings
and dividends to capitalist household according to recapitalizaiton (retention) ratio,
denoted by pk. Consequently, pkqR expresses retained earnings of firms. τF is the
finance lag which describes time delay during which internal funds lie idle before being
invested on capital outlays. Equation (1.4) shows that investments are financed by
the retained earnings pkqR and revolving funds R of τF periods ago.
U denotes the stock of productive capital and equation (1.5) states that it increases
by the inflow of capital outlays and decrease by the outflow of finished products. X is
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the stock of commodity capital and, by the same logic, equation (1.6) describes that
it increases by the inflow of finished products and decreases by the outflows of sales
measured at cost. Fk is the stock of financial capital which, as stated in equation
(1.7), increases by the inflow of revolving funds and retained earnings while decreasing
by the outflow of investments on capital outlays.
As mentioned earlier, the realization lag τR can be endogenized by explicitly for-
malizing effective demand. In the baseline model, there are three sources of demand:
capitalist firms’ investment expenditure on constant capital (1 − a)Z, and worker
households’ consumption expenditure financed by wage revenues aZ, and capitalist
households’ consumption expenditure financed by dividend earnings (1−pk)qR. Simi-
larly to modeling capitalist firms’ financing process, households’ financing process can
be formalized as taking time. Use τw and τs to denote time delay for consumption fi-
nancing by revenues of worker household and capitalist household, respectively. Then
aggregate demand is expressed as
D = (1− a)Z + aZ−τw + (1− pk)qR−τs (1.8)
One of the major results that emerges from the circuit of capital model outlined
above is that in the steady–state balanced growth setting, the system will not be
able to achieve a positive steady–state growth rate without exponentially growing
credit (see section 1.3.1.1). Accordingly, it is suggested that the existence of credit
is a necessary condition for growth in capitalist economy. Therefore, in order to
further understand the implications and consequences of credit, the model needs to
be extended to include a banking sector and associated financial variables.
1.2.2 Extended model
In this section, the baseline circuit of capital model is extended to add the banking
sector. Accordingly, a business sector includes industrial capitalists (entrepreneurs
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or nonbank firms) and financial capitalists (banks) while household sector includes
entrepreneur household, banker household, and worker household. For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that only nonbank firms and worker households borrow from
banks.
Let us define net bank credits as aggregate bank credits minus principal repay-
ments.2 Then net bank credits of nonbank firms and those of worker households are
denoted by Bk and Bw, respectively. Futhermore, denoting by Lk and Lw stock of
liabilities of each of these sectors, the following will hold by accounting identity.
∆Lk = Bk
∆Lw = Bw
(1.9)
Suppose nonbank firms finance a share of capital outlays by net bank credit.
Denoting this share by bk with (0 < bk < 1)3 yields
Bk = bkZ (1.10)
Similarly, worker households finance a share of their consumption expenditure by net
bank credits. Denote this share by bw with (0 < bw < 1) and the worker household’s
consumption expenditure by Dw. Then it yields
Bw = bwDw (1.11)
Interests are paid on liabilities and earned on financial assets at the bank loan
interest rate iL and deposit rate iD, respectively. Accordingly, net profits of nonbank
2Net bank credit appears as one of the central variables in Foley (1982, 1986a,b) and Basu (2013),
but the definition is ambiguous in these papers.
3If the assumption that borrowed funds are used only for real investments is relaxed, then bk > 1
would be of possibility with an implication that some portion of the borrowed funds is used in
financial investments.
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firms are obtained by subtracting net interest payments from gross profits,
Πk = qR− (iLLk − iDFk) (1.12)
When the net interest payments are taken into account, capital outlays in equation
(1.4) will be modified into
Z = R−τF + pkΠ−τFk +Bk (1.13)
which states that capital outlays are financed by a combination of past flows of re-
volving funds and retained earnings — expressed in the first two terms on the right
hand side — and the current net bank credits. As a consequence, the law of motion
of the nonbank firm’s financial assets in equation (1.7) is also modified as follows.
∆F+1k = R + pkΠk − (Z −Bk) (1.14)
which states that financial assets increase by the inflow of revolving funds and retained
earnings — expressed in the first two terms on the RHS— and decrease by the outflow
of capital outlays net of net bank credit.
Unless the worker household spends wage income immediately in the contempo-
raneous period it will build up financial assets and earn interests. Since workers also
pay interests on their outstanding debts, their net income, denoted by Yw, will be
expressed as
Yw = aZ + iDFw − iLLw (1.15)
The worker household’s consumption expenditure, denoted by Dw, is financed by a
combination of past net income flows and the current net bank credits,
Dw = Y −τww +Bw (1.16)
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As a consequence, the worker household’s financial assets will evolve by the following
law of motion,
∆F+1w = Yw − (Dw −Bw) (1.17)
which states that the financial assets increase by the inflow of wage income net of net
interest payments and decrease by the outflow of consumption expenditure net of net
bank credit.
The same logic can be applied to the entrepreneur household’s income Ys, con-
sumption Ds, and financial assets Fs. This group of households does not borrow and
hence its consumption expenditure is financed solely by past income,
Ds = Y −τss (1.18)
As a result, the entrepreneur household’s income amounts to
Ys = (1− pk)Πk + iDFs (1.19)
i.e. a sum of dividend income from the nonbank firms and interest earnings on
financial assets. The entrepreneur household’s financial assets increases by the inflows
of income and decrease by the outflows of consumption expenditure,
∆F+1s = Ys −Ds (1.20)
Now let us incorporate the banking sector consisting of bankers and their house-
holds. While only nonbank firms and worker households incur debts, nonbank firms
and all the three types of the household accumulate financial assets through saving,
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which is reflected in their consumption lags. In this setup, bank profits, defined as
net interest earnings, is
Πb = iL(Lk + Lw)− iD(Fk + Fw + Fs + Fm) (1.21)
with Fm denoting financial assets of banker household. Similarly to the nonbank
firms, banks make dividend payments out of the profits to their owners, i.e. banker
households, and keep the rest as retained earnings. Analogously to the firm’s re-
capitalization rate pk, let us denote the bank’s recapitalization rate by pb. Since
the retained earnings accumulate into net worth according to accounting principle, if
bank equity is denoted by Eb, ∆Eb = pbΠb holds.4 The bank uses equity, along with
debts, i.e. deposit funds, in financing loans to firms and worker households, which
constitute its assets. Hence, Eb = Lk+Lw−Fk−Fw−Fs−Fm holds as an accounting
identity.
The banker household’s income Ym, consumption Dm, and financial assets Fm can
be obtained in the following way. The banker household does not borrow and hence
its consumption is financed solely by past income,
Dm = Y −τmm (1.22)
where τm denotes the banker household’s consumption lag. As a result, its revenues
is determined as a sum of dividend income from banks and interest earnings,
Ym = (1− pb)Πb + iDFm (1.23)
4Throughout this dissertation, I will use net worth and equity interchangeably. To this, the
literature adds capital as well and uses the three interchangeably.
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remembering that pb denotes retention ratio of the bank. The banker household’s
financial assets increase by the inflows of income and decrease by the outflows of
consumption expenditure,
∆F+1m = Ym −Dm (1.24)
Now, the banker household’s consumption expenditure is an additional source of
demand in this extended model. Consequently, the aggregate demand in equation
(1.8) is modified into
D = (1− a)Z +Dw +Ds +Dm (1.25)
where Dw, Ds, and Dm are specified in equations (1.16), (1.18), and (1.22), respec-
tively.
Lastly, for the sake of simplicity, let us take productive capital U and commodity
capital X combined together, representing nonfinancial, or real, capital as opposed to
financial assets. From equations (1.5) and (1.6), it readily follows that the nonfinancial
capital increases by the inflow of capital outlays Z and decreases by the outflow of
produced commodities P . Denoting the nonfinancial capital by Q, its law of motion
will be expressed as
∆Q+1 = Z −R (1.26)
which replaces equations (1.5) and (1.6).
1.2.3 Summary of the model
The equations constituting the extended model are collected here. An assumption
is added that all the variables grow at the same constant rate, g.
Real capital (stock)
gQ = Z −R (1.26)
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Financial assets (stock)
gFk = R + pkΠk − (Z −Bk) (1.14)
gFw = Yw − (Dw −Bw) (1.17)
gFs = Ys −Ds (1.20)
gFm = Ym −Dm (1.24)
Credits (flow) and outstanding loans (stock)
Bk = bkZ (1.10)
Bw = bwDw (1.11)
gLk = Bk (1.9)
gLw = Bw (1.9)
Net profits (flow)
Πk = qR− (iLLk − iDFk) (1.12)
Πb = iL(Lk + Lw)− iD(Fk + Fw + Fs + Fm) (1.21)
Household income (flow)
Yw = aZ + iDFw − iLLw (1.15)
Ys = (1− pk)Πk + iDFs (1.19)
Ym = (1− pb)Πb + iDFm (1.23)
Investment and consumption (flow)
Z = R−τF + pkΠ−τFk +Bk (1.13)
Dw = Y −τww +Bw (1.16)
Ds = Y −τss (1.18)
Dm = Y −τmm (1.22)
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Aggregate demand (flow)
D = (1− a)Z +Dw +Ds +Dm (1.25)
The model consists of nineteen variables and nineteen equations. The nineteen
endogenous variables appear on the left–hand side of the nineteen equations presented
above. While g is introduced now as a constant, two approaches to endogenizing it
will be discussed later. The other constant parameters include e, a, pk, pb, τF , τw, τs,
τm, iD, and iL with q = ae.5
The model is well–determined and solutions for the nineteen variables can be ob-
tained by solving the above nineteen equations simultaneously.6 These solutions can
be used in measuring various variables of interest such as rate of profit, income dis-
tribution, leverage ratio, etc. The rest of this chapter will focus on the determination
of profit rate and growth rate in the circuit of capital model.
1.3 Growth and profitability
In examining growth and profitability, let us first consider the case of baseline
model as a reference point. It will be shown that in the model without bank credits
both growth rate and profit rate collapse to zero. On the other hand, regarding the
fully extended model presented in section 1.2.2 and summarized in section 1.2.3, the
solution is complex and analytically intractable. Hence, in order to simplify, in the
5Notice that equations (1.2) and (1.3) and the associated variables and parameters, which describe
the lag processes of production and realization, are omitted. Since I am consolidating productive
capital and commodity capital into nonfinancial, real capital Q — see equation (1.26) — equation
(1.2) is unnecessary. On the other hand, as just mentioned, there are two approaches to obtaining
g endogenously from within the model. One is to presuppose the existence of sufficient volume of
effective demand which guarantees a constant realization lag and the other is to explicitly account
for the effective demand within the model thereby endogenizing the realization lag, in which case
the latter is resolved into the spending lags such as finance lag of firms and consumption lags of
households. As will be discussed below more in detail, the second approach is analytically richer
in content. Hence, this chapter adopts the second approach and this makes equation (1.3) also
unnecessary.
6As it is almost impossible to solve it manually, I relied on Mathematica. Interested readers can
obtain Mathematica code for solving the model from the author upon request.
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second part of this section, the extended model will be analyzed under the Classical
assumption that capitalists do not consume and workers do not save.
1.3.1 Baseline model
The extended model reduces to the baseline model without finance under a set of
assumptions that
Assumption 1. bk = 0; bw = 0; iD = 0
That is, net bank credits are zero and interest earnings on financial assets are zero as
well. In particular, since loans are the only asset of the banking sector in the model,
the assumption of zero net bank credits effectively excludes the banking sector from
the model. The solution of the model under assumption 1 is presented in appendix
B.1.7
1.3.1.1 Growth
There are two ways to endogenously determine the steady–state growth rate in the
circuit of capital model. The first approach is to presuppose that in each and every
period the volume of effective demand emerges sufficiently to guarantee equilibrium
in a way that maintains the realization lag at a constant level along with given
production lag and finance lag. That is, the growth rate is determined by the lag
structure of the circuit of capital, which, for the case of baseline model, is expressed
in equations (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4).
A consecutive substitution of the three equations yields
(τF + τP + τR) ln(1 + g) = ln(1 + pkq)
7Throughout this chapter the model is solved with the help of software program Mathematica.
The code can be obtained from the author upon request.
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which uses the fact Z(t) = Z(0)(1 + g)t. Since ln(1 + α) ≈ α when α is sufficiently
small, the above equation can be simplified into
g = pkq
τF + τP + τR
(1.27)
This result shows that when the existence of sufficient volume of effective demand is
presupposed, the steady–state growth rate of the system is determined by the markup,
recapitalization rate of the firm, and the lag structure of the circuit of capital involving
the processes of production, realization, and finance.
On the other hand, the second approach to determine the endogenous growth
rate is to directly measure the effective demand within the model and to impose
the goods market equilibrium explicitly. Accordingly, the steady–state growth rate
is determined by the requirement that the effective demand that emerges at each
and every period is large enough to realize the final sales, i.e. D = (1 + q)R. This
equilibrium condition requires that aggregate demand is at the level which realizes
the final outputs at a markup q. A normalization by R rearranges the equation into
D′ = 1+q where D′ is D normalized by R. Substituting the solution for D′ presented
in appendix B.1 into the equilibrium condition yields
(1− pk)q
(1 + g)τs +
(1− a)(1 + pkq)
(1 + g)τF +
a(1 + pkq)
(1 + g)(τF+τw) = 1 + q (1.28)
Note that the effective demand in the two–class model of circuit of capital con-
sists of the firm’s investment expenditure and households’ consumption expenditure
and that the realization lag τR reflects these investment and consumption behaviors.
Consequently, explicitly considering the goods market equilibrium by measuring the
effective demand has an effect of resolving τR into the finance lag τF and the con-
sumption lag of the worker household and entrepreneur household, i.e. τw and τs in
the case of baseline model, and additionally into the consumption lag τm of banker
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households in the case of extended model as will be discussed below. Consequently,
τR is endogenized. For this reason, while τR appears in equation (1.27), it does not
in equation (1.28); instead, τs and τw appear along with τF in the latter equation.
The second approach summarized in equation (1.28) does not generate the steady–
state growth rate in a closed form as in the case of the first approach in equation
(1.27). However, it allows to explicitly see how investment behavior of firms and
consumption behaviors of the two types of households, reflected in τF , τs, and τw,
affect growth in a way that is not possible for the first approach. Furthermore, since
spending behaviors of all of those three different types of agents are different from one
another, as would be reflected in the difference among the values of τF , τs, and τw,
it matters how the capital outlays are divided between constant capital and variable
capital. This division is captured by the organic composition of capital, which in the
model is reflected in a. Hence, a appears only in equation (1.28). In these respects,
the analysis of the steady–state growth rate by the second approach that endogenizes
the realization lag is richer in content.
Most importantly, it enables to see that the central assumption of the first ap-
proach that there exists a sufficient volume of effective demand is invalid when net
credits are zero. With given ranges of the parameters, i.e. 0<q<1, 0<a<1, 0<pk<1,
τF>1, τw>1, and g>0, a closer inspection of the equilibrium condition in equation
(1.28) reveals that the equality holds only when g = 0 or when all the expenditure
lags, i.e. τF , τw, and τs, are zero; otherwise, it will hold that
(1− pk)q
(1 + g)τs +
(1− a)(1 + pkq)
(1 + g)τF +
a(1 + pkq)
(1 + g)(τF+τw) < 1 + q (1.29)
which implies D < (1 + q)R, i.e. the aggregate demand is insufficient to realize final
outputs at any level of markup. Since the condition that all the expenditure lags are
zero is unrealistic as it implies that revenues are spent instantaneously, it is concluded
27
that in the baseline model without zero net bank credits the steady–state growth rate
collapses to zero, i.e. g = 0.
1.3.1.2 Profitability
One of the crucial issues in the study of the profit rate regards its definition. When
the literature on either theoretical and empirical studies of the rate of profit defines
it as a ratio between the flow of profits and the stock capital, in most cases the latter
refers to real capital, or, more precisely, productive capital, which is constant fixed
capital (Duménil and Lévy, 1993; Weisskopf, 1979). As highlighted in the circuit of
capital model, however, it is an essence of capital that it constantly changes its form
throughout its circular movement of self–valorization. Due to the lag structure of the
circuit of capital, capital necessarily takes the form of financial assets and inventories
as well as the form of productive capital. Hence, at any moment in time capital always
exists in all of these three forms. Consequently, a more proper way to measure capital
as a stock is to include them all.
In this context, using the notations of the model, the definition of the rate of aggre-
gate profit, denoted by r, is expressed as gross profit divided by a sum of productive
and commercial capital and financial capital:
r ≡ qR
Q+ Fk
(1.30)
Dividing both numerator and denominator of the right hand side by R and substi-
tuting the solution for the normalized Q and Fk in appendix B.1 yields
r ≡ q
Q′ + F ′k
= g
pk
(1.31)
The result in equation (1.31) demonstrates the rate of profit of the economy on a
steady–state balanced growth path. Since the circuit of capital model is based on the
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labor theory of value, equation (1.31) can be interpreted as stating that if the system
is to expand at a steady–state balanced rate of g with a given recapitalization rate
of pk, the rate of profit has to be determined at a level equal to g divided by pk. In
this sense, r in (1.31) is an equilibrium rate of profit.
Note that g itself is an endogenous variable which is determined as a function of
the parameters of the model as in (1.27) when the realization lag is constant or as in
(1.28) when the realization lag is endogenous. Hence, a complete illustration of the
determination of the rate of profit is obtained by combining (1.31) with either (1.27)
or (1.28) depending on the assumption regarding the endogeneity of the realization
lag. In the case of exogenous realization lag, on the one hand, the rate of profit is
determined by substituting the expression of g in (1.27) into (1.31), thereby yielding
r = q
τF + τP + τR
(1.32)
In the case of endogenous realization lag, on the other, the rate of profit cannot
be obtained in a closed form as in (1.32); but by comparative statics with respect
to equations (1.28) and (1.31), how r will change in response to changes in the pa-
rameters can be known. Since g = 0 is the case from equation (1.28), r = 0 follows
according to equation (1.31). This leads to a conclusion that in the baseline model
with zero net bank credits the growth rate and profit rate collapse to zero, i.e. g = 0
and r = 0. Again, the fact that not only the growth rate but also the profit rate
is zero when net bank credits are zero is revealed only in the second approach with
endogenous realization lag.
The discussion so far on profitability and growth in the circuit of capital model
can be compared to a Post Keynesian model of growth and distribution. First of
all, it can be readily seen that the expression in equation (1.31) is identical to the
key result of the Post Keynesian model as summarized in the Cambridge equation,
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which states that the rate of profit is determined by growth rate divided by the
saving propensity of capitalists, i.e. r = g
s
with s denoting the saving propensity of
capitalists (Pasinetti, 1962)8. The existing literature of the circuit of capital model
approvingly quotes the Cambridge equation and highlights that the latter can also
be derived from the circuit of capital model. However, the difference between the two
model is insufficiently recognized and particularly the causality between r and g in
the circuit of capital model literature is not always clear.9
First of all, both r = g
s
of the Cambridge model and r = g
pk
of the circuit of capital
model hold as an equilibrium condition. However, in the Cambridge model, on the one
hand, the rate of accumulation is exogenously determined by the population growth
and technical progress. g as well as s is exogenous and hence r is an endogenous
variable that is determined by both g and s. Hence, the causation runs from g to
r. On the other hand, in the circuit of capital model g is not a constant parameter
but is an endogenous variable that is determined as in equation (1.27) in the case of
exogenous realization lag or as in equation (1.28) in the case of endogenous realization
lag. In either case, g is determined as a function of the model parameters.
For this reason, the causality from g to r that holds in the Cambridge model does
not hold in the circuit of capital model. Rather, the Cambridge equation–type result
of the circuit of capital model, along with the endogenous determination of g, reveals
8According to Pasinetti’s original interpretation, the Cambridge equation analysis is “a logical
framework to answer interesting questions about what ought to happen if full employment is to
be kept over time, more than as a behavioral theory expressing what actually happens” (Pasinetti,
1962). For an extensive study of the Cambridge equation, see Bortis (1993). After identifying
three characteristics of classical growth theory as opposed to neoclassical models, Michl (2009, p.7)
writes “In particular, the Cambridge theorem is a cynosure that provides the classical approach with
distinctive explanatory powers”.
9For instance, an inconsistent understanding on the causality between r and g in the circuit of
capital model literature is most notable in the fact that the relation between the two variables is
presented as r = gp in one case and as g = pr in the other without a clear discussion on the difference
of the two different expositions.
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how r and g are determined by the deep parameters of the model along an equilibrium
steady–state growth path.
1.3.2 Extended model under the Classical assumption
In reference to the above discussion on growth and profitability in the baseline
model without finance, let us now consider the case of the extended model with
finance. To begin with, it turns out that the solution of the extended model is too
complex. In order to make the rate of profit and the steady–state growth rate of
the extended model more analytically tractable, the model — summarized in section
1.2.3 — is considered under a set of assumptions that
Assumption 2. τw = 0; pk = 1; pb = 1; bw = 0; iD = 0
The first three imply the Classical assumption that capitalists do not consume
and workers do not save; τw = 0 implies that workers spend their wage income
immediately in the contemporaneous period; pk = 1 and pb = 1 imply industrial
capitalist household and financial capitalist household do not earn any revenues and
hence cannot consume. In order to further simplify the model, it is supposed that
only the nonbank firms borrow for production purpose; hence bw = 0. Since this
chapter does not aim to compare the two different types of credits, i.e. production
credits and consumption credits, it is enough to consider one type of credit only. On
the other hand, as bank liability is the only type of money in the model economy, it
is effectively cash and hence riskless. So it is reasonable to assume that interest rate
on it is zero; hence iD = 0.
Eventually, parameters of the extended model under assumption 2 include q, a, τF ,
bk, and iL. Notice that since the two types of capitalist households, i.e. entrepreneurs’
and bankers, all do not earn any revenues, their consumption lags τs and τb are
effectively excluded. The solution of the extended model under assumption 2 is
presented in appendix B.2. Using the solution, profit rate and growth rate of the
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extended model of circuit of capital can be examined in a way similar to the case of
baseline model as discussed above.
1.3.2.1 Growth
In examining growth in the extended model, I will focus on the second approach
with an endogenous realization rate as it allows to specify components of the effective
demand and see their growth impact. When τR is endogenous, the steady–state
growth rate is obtained by the requirement that the volume of aggregate demand is
sufficient to realize total final sales, i.e. D = (1 + q)R which, by a normalization by
R, is rearranged into D′ = 1 + q, where D′ denotes D normalized by R. Substituting
the solution for D′ presented in appendix B.2 into the equilibrium condition yields g
as an implicit function Γ of the four parameters, q, τF , bk, and iL.
Γ(g; q, τF , bk, iL) = (1 + q)
(
g
g(1− bk)(1 + g)τF + bkßL − 1
)
= 0 (1.33)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂g
∂α
= − ∂Γ∂α∂Γ
∂g
where ∂Γ
∂g
6= 0, comparative
static analysis generates the following results, which are all mathematically clear and
economically intuitive. First, ∂g
∂iL
< 0: a larger interest rate leads to a lower growth
rate. This result corresponds to the IS relation of the Keynesian IS–LM model.10
Second, ∂g
∂τF
< 0: a faster use of own funds by industrial capitalists in financing capital
outlays leads to a higher growth rate. This result is based on the assumption that
capital outlays are used only for productive investment, not for financial investment.
Relaxing this assumption could produce a different result which might highlight a
negative impact of financial investment on growth.11
10While the interest rate is taken as a constant parameter in this chapter, it will be endogenized
and hence determined simultaneously with the growth rate in chapter 2.
11In the early draft of this paper, I included an additional parameter for a share of financial
investment in total capital outlays. A comparative statics result shows that the larger the parameter
the lower the growth rate, implying a negative growth impact of financial investment.
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Third, ∂g
∂bk
> 0 if iL is sufficiently small and ∂g∂bk < 0 if iL is sufficiently large: a
larger borrowing ratio of the firm is conducive to growth only when the interest rate
is sufficiently low. A more interesting result would be obtained if an intensification
of financial fragility due to a rise in the borrowing ratio is explicitly modeled and
an investment function that negatively responds to a rise in the financial fragility
is introduced. In this case, bk will have a nonlinear impact on g, and in order to
properly capture this result, the model will need to be modified within a non–steady–
state growth setting.
On the other hand, the above result regarding the sign of ∂g
∂bk
can be interpreted as
reflecting, in some sense, such dynamics. The loan interest rate can be considered as
being determined in a way that reflects financial status of a borrower, an increase in iL
reflecting an intensification of the firm’s financial fragility while a fall in iL reflecting
an enhancement of the firm’s financial health. In this context, when the firm is in
a good financial status — reflected in a sufficiently low iL — a more borrowing will
lead to a higher growth — ∂g
∂bk
> 0 — and when the outstanding debt of the firm is
already too large, which makes it financially fragile — reflected in a sufficiently high
iL — a more borrowing will lead to a lower growth — ∂g∂bk < 0.
Fourth, ∂g
∂q
> 0 if τF is sufficiently small and ∂g∂q < 0 if τF is sufficiently large: if
own funds of the firm are used in capital outlays sufficiently fast, a larger markup is
conducive to growth; otherwise, it undermines the system’s rate of expansion. Since
q is a product of e exploitation rate and a organic composition of capital, with a
given, the former case corresponds to profit–led growth regime while the latter case
to wage–led growth regime.12
12Basu (2013) also shows that the circuit of capital model allows both profit–led and wage–led
growth regimes. In contrast, Dos Santos (2013) criticizes the literature on profit–led vs. wage–led
growth from the perspective of the circuit of capital model.
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1.3.2.2 Profitability of industrial capitalists
When finance is explicitly considered, the appropriate definition of profitability
needs to be reconsidered further than merely adding inventories and financial assets in
measuring capital as done in section 1.3.1.2. While such broader measure of capital
is closer to the concept of capital as defined in the circuit of capital than is the
conventional measure that only includes fixed capital, both are, from an accounting
perspective, insufficient as they relate only to the asset side of the balance sheet
and not to the liability side. If the question of how capital is financed is crucial in
understanding capital, then a proper measure should account for the liability structure
of the balance sheet.
Compare the following two cases; first, capital consisting of fixed capital of $70
and inventories of $30 financed exclusively by own funds of $100, and second, capital
consisting of the same combination of fixed capital and inventories financed by a
mixture of own funds of $50 and debt of $50. Are the capitals in these two cases the
same capital? More conventional approaches are treating the two as the same and,
if not, they are at least implicitly assuming that capital is financed entirely by own
funds, thereby excluding the possibility of the second case and ignoring the issue of
finance. In this respect, there is an ironic similarity with the neoclassical financial
theory à la Modigliani–Miller theorem, which states that capital structure does not
matter for the value of the firm (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).
However, the recent New Keynesian literature is producing theoretical and empir-
ical works that depart from Modigliani–Miller theorem, by drawing primarily upon
the relatively recent experience of the financial turmoil in 2008 (e.g. Shin and Shin,
2011). Accordingly, leverage ratio has become a central variable in the recent macro–
finance literature. Moreover, the Post Keynesian literature has a long tradition which
highlights that how economic activities are financed do matter for macroeconomic
performance of the economy. This tradition, in particular, has generated two related
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approaches. One is monetary circuit theory by Graziani (2003) according to which
production is initiated by, and hence cannot be examined without a consideration
of, firms’ borrowing; the other is the stock–flow consistent modeling methodology by
Godley and Lavoie (2007), which sheds light on the source of funds vis–à–vis the use
of funds.
Most importantly, one of the central results of the circuit of capital model, i.e. that
in a steady–state setting capital accumulation could not possibly take place when net
credits do not grow, makes a strong case that debts are an essential aspect of capital.
Informed by these various approaches, I suggest to account for capital structure when
measuring capital, i.e. subtracting liabilities from total assets.
On the other hand, regarding profits that appear in the numerator of the rate of
profit, Marxian economic theory recognizes a division of capitalist class into industrial
capitalists and financial capitalists and a consequent division of aggregate profits into
profit of enterprise and interests between the two groups of capitalists. Furthermore,
once financial assets are considered as an essential part of capital as is done in this
chapter according to the logic of the circuit of capital, interest earnings need to be
taken into account when measuring profit of enterprise.
Reflecting the above discussions on capital and profits, an alternative measure of
the rate of profit would be as follows:
rk ≡ qR− iLLk
Q+ Fk − Lk (1.34)
The denominator is equity or net worth as own funds which is defined as a difference
between total assets and liabilities. The numerator is profit of enterprise which is ob-
tained from subtracting net interest payments from aggregate profits.13 The resulting
13Notice that while net interest payments of the firm would be expressed as iLLk − iDFk, since
iD = 0 is assumed in this section iLLk becomes net interest payments.
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ratio is net return on equity, denoted by rk, while r in equation (1.30) is the rate of
aggregate profits. Norfield (2013), one of the few recent theoretical works on the rate
of profit in relation to finance, suggests that return on equity is a more appropriate
measure of profitability.
As a comparison, let us first measure the rate of aggregate profit of the extended
model under assumption 2, using the solution for Q′ and F ′k presented in appendix
B.2.
r ≡ q
Q′ + F ′k
=
g
(
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + iLbk
)
q
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk)q + bk
(
g(1 + q)− iL
) (1.35)
The net return on equity rk can be obtained in the same way, first by normalizing the
numerator and denominator of the definition of rk by R and substituting the solution
for Q′, F ′k, and L′k:
rk ≡ q − iLL
′
k
Q′ + F ′k − L′k
= g
pk
(1.36)
While the expression for r is quite complicated, the expression for rk is much simpler
and exactly the same as the Cambridge equation–type result in (1.31) except that
the rate of gross profit is replaced by the net return on equity.
In order to see the relation between the two different measures of profitability, i.e.
r and rk, the definition of rk can be decomposed in the following way:
rk ≡ qR
Q+ Fk︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
Q+ Fk
Q+ Fk − Lk︸ ︷︷ ︸
λk
qR− iLLk
qR︸ ︷︷ ︸
1− 1
η
(1.37)
where λk is the industrial capitalist sector’s leverage defined as a ratio between total
assets and equity, and η = qR
iLLk
is a Minskyan concept of margin of safety, which
measures cash inflows of the firm against its cash outflows for debt service. Both
leverage ratio and margin of safety are a proxy for the financial health of an entity.
On the other hand, r reflects aggregate profitability of capital with the liability side
of the balance sheet assumed away. Similarly to Duménil and Lévy (2004), which is
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one of the first papers that studies the rate of profit with a consideration of financial
variables, the above decomposition describes the net return on equity in relation to
real and financial components.
Notice that r, λk, and η as well as rk are all endogenous variables; they are a
function of model parameters. A change in any of the parameters will bring about
a change in some or all of these variables. Hence, the decomposition gives us an
important insight that a change in the model parameters is transmitted to the net
return on equity of industrial capitalist sector through affecting both real and financial
components of profitability, i.e. the sector’s gross profit rate, leverage ratio, and
margin of safety.
For instance, Duménil and Lévy (2004) identify two opposing effects of debt on the
rate of profit; first, negative effect by raising interest costs, and second, positive effect
by decreasing net worth, i.e. denominator of the profit rate. This can be verified from
the decomposition in equation (1.37). A change in the parameters that raises Lk leads
to a rise in the leverage ratio λk, which is a positive effect, and a fall in the margin of
safety, which is a negative effect operating through the third component. An ultimate
result of this depends on the relative strength of the two opposing effects which is
reflected in the relative change of the second and third ratios of the decomposition.14
In this context, it would be helpful to obtain an expression for λk and η in the
same way as r in (1.35). Substituting the solution of the model presented in appendix
B.2 into the definition of λk yields
λk ≡ Q
′ + F ′k
Q′ + F ′k − L′k
= 1 + g(1 + q)bk
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk)q − iLbk (1.38)
14For a future empirical study of the profit rate in relation to financial variables, the decomposition
in (1.37) can be rearranged using the log differentiation as follows:
grk = gr + gλk + g1− 1η
where gx is a growth rate of x.
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and, similarly, an expression for η can be obtained as
η ≡ q
iLL′k
= g(1 + g)
τF (1− bk)q + iLbkq
iLbk(1 + q)
(1.39)
where it should be reminded that in both of the above two expressions g is endoge-
nously determined by equation (1.33).
Now, by using the expressions for r, λk, and η in (1.35), (1.38), and (1.39), it can be
more concretely investigated how a change in the model parameters is transmitted to
the net return on equity through affecting these three real and financial components.
1.3.2.3 Profitability of financial capitalists
Explicitly incorporating the banking sector and the associated financial variables
allows us to examine profitability of the bank as well. The profit rate of the bank
is defined as a ratio between net interest earnings, which are bank profits, and net
worth of the banking sector. Since in the extended model under assumption 2, only
the nonbank firms incur debts and accumulate financial assets in the form of bank
deposits,15 the banking sector’s total assets are Lk and its liabilities are Fk. Hence
by an accounting identity, the bank equity is Lk − Fk. Consequently, the profit rate
of the bank is obtained as
rb ≡ iLLk
Lk − Fk ≡ iL
Lk
Lk − Fk︸ ︷︷ ︸
λb
(1.40)
which is the net return on equity of the bank. λb is the financial capitalist sector’s
leverage ratio, i.e. bank leverage, defined as a ratio between total bank loans (total
assets of the bank) and equity (bank capital). The above expression demonstrates
15More precisely, the bank also incurs debts by accepting deposits and, due to the assumption of
pb = 1, accumulates financial assets. But the undistributed profits of the bank are accumulated into
the equity, which funds its asset holdings in loans.
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that the bank profit rate is determined as the interest rate multiplied by bank leverage.
For a given iL, a change in the parameters that increases (decreases) the bank leverage
will enhance (undermine) the bank profitability.
Normalizing the variables in the leverage ratio by R and substituting the solution
for L′k and F ′k presented in B.2 into the definition of the bank leverage gives
λb ≡ L
′
k
L′k − F ′k
= bk1− (1− bk)(1 + g)τF (1.41)
where g is endogenously determined by equation (1.33). In this way, the bank profit
rate can be obtained as a function of the model parameters. Particularly, it can be
concretely examined how a change in the parameters is transmitted to the bank profit
rate through affecting the bank leverage ratio.
1.4 The necessity of credits
Lastly, this section investigates how the existing literature’s finding on the neces-
sity of the bank credits for growth is modified when finance is explicitly considered.
For this purpose, I rely on simulation exercises which enable to examine the extended
model presented in section 1.2.2 and summarized in section 1.2.3 without any simplify-
ing assumption. Two distinct cases regarding the net bank credits will be considered.
In the first case, net bank credits for both nonbank firms and worker households are
taken as exogenously given. In the second case, they are endogenously determined as
in equations (1.10) and (1.11).
1.4.1 Extended model with exogenous bank credits
Let us take the net bank credits for nonbank firms and worker households, i.e. Bk
and Bw, as a constant parameter, replacing equations (1.10) and (1.11). First, figure
1.1 displays the simulation result for the model under assumption 1 as discussed in
section 1.3.1, i.e. the baseline model with zero net bank credits, Bk=0 and Bw=0,
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and no interest earnings on financial assets, iD=0. The result confirms that in these
conditions the growth rate and the profit rate all collapse to zero.
Figure 1.1: Baseline model: the model under assumption 1
(Parameter values: a=0.3, q=0.3, pk=0.8, τF=2, τw=1, τs=3)
Now relax the assumptions Bk=0, Bw=0, and iD=0, and consider the extended
model with Bk and Bw growing exponentially at 6%. Figure 1.2 shows that the
steady–state growth rate of the system converges to the growth rate of net bank
credit, i.e. 6%. The profit rate also converges to a positive value at 7.5% (see
parentheses in the figure). These results support the main result established in the
literature that exponentially growing net credits guarantee the system to be on a
positive steady–state growth path. In particular, it does so in a more generalized
setting with finance explicitly considered.
Figure 1.2: The extended model with bank credits exponentially growing at 6%
(Parameter values: a=0.3, q=0.3, pk=0.8, pb=0.9, τF=2, τw=1, τs=3, τm=5, iL=0.04, iD=0.02;
numbers in parentheses are the steady–state value the variable converges to.)
On the other hand, the extended model also allows to see that under certain
conditions the exponentially growing credits are not enough to guarantee a positive
steady–state growth rate. Figure 1.3 illustrates that when the interest rate spread is
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large at 500 basis point compared to 200 basis point in figure 1.2, both the growth
rate and the profit rate collapse to zero.16
This result can be explained by the consumption lag, τm, of the banker household
sector being large compared to the expenditure lags of the nonbank sectors. Net inter-
est payments to the banking sector are distributed as dividends to banker households
according to banks’ recapitalization rate pb which are then used for banker house-
holds’ consumption expenditure according to τm. Consequently, when τm is larger
than any other expenditure lags, as more values are flowed into the banking sector
due to a higher interest rate spread, aggregate demand will be pressed down, which
could possible generate insufficient demand and realization problem.
Figure 1.3: The extended model with bank credits exponentially growing at 6% and
a large interest rate spread
(Parameter values: a=0.3, q=0.2, pk=0.8, pb=0.9, τF=2, τw=1, τs=3, τb=5, iL=0.07, iD=0.02)
1.4.2 Extended model with endogenous bank credits
Now let us consider the extended model with endogenous bank credit. This is
the most generalized model in this chapter without any simplifying assumptions and
it is summarized in section 1.2.3. Bk and Bw are now determined as in equations
(1.10) and (1.11) instead of being given exogenously. The first interesting result that
emerges from the simulation results displayed in figure 1.4 is that even when net
16The simulation results show that they even turn negative and continue to fall thereafter. This
is because of the model setup that the net bank credits continue to grow at a constant rate even
when the economy is suffering from a sluggish growth. In real economy, however, bank loans will
stop flowing into the economy when the borrowers’ balance sheet is under water with their net
worth wiped out, which is happening in the second diagram in figure 1.3. This will prevent g and r
exploding to negative infinity and will confine the system to a zero growth state.
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bank credits are endogenous, the system smoothly converges to a steady–state. It
shows that with the parameter values given below the figure, the system converges
to a steady–state growth rate at 7%. By comparing this number with the steady–
state value of the nonbank firm’s net return on equity rk (8.8%) along with a given
parameter value of pk (0.8), we can see that the Cambridge equation–type relation
for the extended model, expressed in equation (1.36), holds; 8.8 ≈ 7/0.8.
Furthermore, using the steady–state values for the other variables, the relation
between profitability and leverage for both industrial capitalists and financial capi-
talists as expressed in equations (1.37) and (1.40) can be confirmed. For instance,
since the nonbank firm’s net return on equity is expressed as rk = rλk(1 − 1η ), from
the convergence values we can see 0.088 ≈ 0.047× 3.76× (1− 11.3).
Lastly, the existing literature’s finding that exponentially growing net bank credits
bring the system to a positive steady–state growth path is modified in the case of
extended model with endogenous credits as well. By the logic similar to the case
of extended model with exogenous credits simulated in figure 1.3, a combination of
sufficiently large interest rate spread and sufficiently large spending lag of banker
households undermine growth capacity of the system, moving it to zero growth. This
is simulated in figure 1.5. Growth rates, profit rates, and margin of safety all keep
falling while the nonbank firms’ leverage explodes.
1.5 Conclusion
Growth rate and profit rate are two central variables in economic theory as high-
lighted in Piketty (2014)’s recent discussion, which has revived an interest in the
relation between the two variables. A few digressing comments: Note that Piketty
points out the fact that profit rate is larger than growth rate as the main determinant
of inequality of wealth and income. In this sense, r > g is at the core of Piketty’s
theory. However, this is suggested as a historically observed fact and there is no the-
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Figure 1.4: Generalized model with endogenous bank credit
(Parameter values: a=0.2, q=0.15, pk=0.8, pb=0.7, τF=2, τw=1, τs=4, τm=6, iL=0.05, iD=0.02,
bk=0.15, bw=0.3; numbers in parentheses are the steady–state value the variable converges to.)
Figure 1.5: Extended model with endogenous bank credits and a large interest rate
spread
(Parameter values: a=0.2, q=0.2, pk=0.8, pb=0.7, τF=2, τw=1, τs=4, τm=6, iL=0.06, iD=0.02,
bk=0.15, bw=0.3)
oretical explanation on how r is determined and on why the inequality holds between
the two variables.
A contribution of this chapter can be appreciated against this context. First of
all, in this chapter the definition of the rate of profit is reconsidered in two regards.
On one hand, it is suggested that when measuring capital as a denominator in the
profit rate, financial assets need to be included since financial capital is one of the
essential forms capital takes during the process of M−C−M ′ the circuit of capital
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and since for this reason financial capital, along with the other two forms of capital,
is observed at any moment in time.
On the other hand, it is further suggested that not only the asset side but also
the liability side of the balance sheet of capitalist firms needs to be considered when
measuring both numerator and denominator in the rate of profit. Accordingly, the
denominator is measured by equity as a difference between assets and liabilities, and
the numerator is measured by gross profits minus net interest payments. This yields
net return on equity. With this result, it is shown that when the gross profit rate is
replaced by the net return on equity, the Cambridge equation–type result continues
to hold, i.e. there is an equality between the net return on equity and the steady–
state growth rate divided by recapitalization rate. Since the recapitalization rate is
bounded by zero and one by definition, r > g automatically follows.17
Second, profitability of nonbank firms (industrial capitalists) and that of banks
(financial capitalists) are examined in the extended circuit of capital model with a
banking sector explicitly incorporated. A decomposition of the net return on equity of
nonbank firms illustrates that it is positively related to the gross profit rate, leverage
ratio of the firm, and margin of safety. A a decomposition of the net return on equity
of financial capitalists shows that it is positively related to interest rate and the bank
leverage.
Simulation results of the model regard the necessity of credits in the capitalist
economy. First, it is shown that with zero net bank credits, both growth rate and
profit rate collapse to zero, which confirms the finding in the existing literature that
17In this sense, in both the circuit of capital model and the Cambridge model r > g necessarily
holds by definition, and hence there is no causal relation between r > g and income inequality. On
the other hand, Piketty characterizes r > g as the main reason for the inequality of wealth and
income. Furthermore, r > g is explained as associated with the nature of capitalism — it is dubbed
as the ‘fundamental contradiction of capitalism’ — but also as something that can be contained and
reversed by external disturbances such as wars and tax policies, which, according to Piketty, were
actually the case from early 20th century until neoliberal period.
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the existence of bank credits is a necessary for accumulation and growth in the capi-
talist economy. Second, however, it is also shown that when the model is generalized
this result is modified; i.e. under the condition that interest rate is sufficiently high
and the saving propensity of banker households is sufficiently large, the exponentially
growing net bank credits could be not enough to guarantee a positive steady–state
growth rate.
While the model explicitly formalizes a banking sector and its profit rate, it treats
interest rates as exogenous. Since economic behaviors of the banking sector, as a
financial intermediary, are reflected in the movement of interest rates, constant in-
terest rates imply that the model highly simplifies the bank behavior. This issue is
addressed in the next chapter where I identify demand and supply of bank credit and
examine the equilibrium condition of the bank credit market along with that of the
goods market, thereby endogenously obtaining the steady–state growth rate and the
interest rate spread.
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CHAPTER 2
LEVERAGE–LED GROWTH IN THE CIRCUIT OF
CAPITAL MODEL WITH A BANKING SECTOR
2.1 Introduction
One of the notable contributions of Duncan Foley’s circuit of capital model (Foley,
1982, 1986a,b) in relation to macro–finance literature lies in providing a formal proof
of the necessity of credit for economic growth. It is shown that exponentially growing
credit is necessary for the system to stay on a positive steady-state growth path;
otherwise, the economy will systematically suffer from the lack of effective demand
and realization problem. In this sense, growth in the capitalist economy described by
the circuit of capital model is essentially credit–led or leverage–led. However, most
of the related papers treat the credit creation simply as exogenous. This chapter is
an attempt to fill this gap by presenting an extended circuit of capital model with a
banking sector, which supplies credit by accommodating demand.
The extended model distinguishes demand and supply of credit within a steady–
state balanced growth setting. This allows to identify growth that takes place through
facilitating credit demand, which thus imposes a pressure on the credit market and
hence raises interest rate, and growth that takes place through facilitating credit
supply, which consequently creates the slack in the market, thereby decreasing the
interest rate. Furthermore, by specifying a firm sector as the main entity that de-
mands the credit and a banking sector as an intermediary that borrows in order to
lend, the model also allows to compare between a growth led by the firm’s leverage
and a growth led by the bank’s leverage. In this setting, the firm leverage–led growth
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and the bank leverage–led growth are compared in regard to two respects; i) whether
they face some growth limit and ii) whether they take place through stimulating credit
demand or credit supply. The main findings are the following.
On the one hand, while growth is unbounded when led by the firm sector leverage,
it takes place by stimulating excess demand for bank credit, thereby tightening the
credit market and and thus pushing up the interest rate alongside the growth rate.
On the other hand, when growth is led by the banking sector leverage, it faces some
limit. But the credit market does not always get tightened as is the case for the firm
leverage–led growth; it depends on the status of the banking system. When leverage
ratio of the banking sector is high, reflecting a developed financial technology, the
bank leverage–led growth produces the slack in the market, thereby pressing down
the interest rate, although this is not the case when the banking sector leverage is
low, reflecting an absence of developed financial technology.
This chapter compares to two strands in post–Keynesian literature that study
various types of growth regime. First, there are papers that identify wage–led vs.
profit–led growth regimes by focusing on the relation between income distribution
and growth (Bhaduri, 2008).1 In the wage–led growth, the economy grows as the
wage share increases whereas in the profit–led growth the economy grows as the
profit share increases. However, this categorization omits financial aspects of growth.
The second strand of papers, on the other hand, focuses on the role of debt in growth
(Hein, 2007; Nishi, 2012). They distinguish between debt–led growth regime, where
debt stimulates capital accumulation, and debt–burdened growth regime, where debt
restrains capital accumulation.
Relying on Minsky’s works (Minsky, 1975, 1982, 1986) that focus on the nonbank
firm’s indebtedness or addressing the issue of stagnant trend of real wage, which trig-
1In Marxian tradition, (Basu, 2013) demonstrates that the circuit of capital model can also
possibly allow the wage–led and profit–led growth regimes.
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Figure 2.1: Sectoral leverage ratio
(Data source: the Flow of Funds Z.1 Release of the FRB.)
gered a spike in consumption debt, the main focus in the second categorization is the
indebtedness of the nonbank sectors, either nonbank firms or households. However,
historical data in figure 2.1 show that leverage of the banking sector is not only incom-
parably higher but also much more volatile than that of the other nonbank sectors;
leverage ratio is defined as total assets divided by equity.
Moreover, there is an ongoing debate on whether credit growth and credit crunch
during the periods before and after the recent financial crisis were due to demand–
side or supply–side factors, and a number of papers have found that the supply–side
factors were the main driver (Holton et al., 2012; Balke and Zeng, 2013), although
some papers have also found a mixed evidence that depends on whether it be normal
times or crisis times (Jiménez et al., 2012). In any case, this debate as well as the the
above flow of funds data highlight the importance of considering financial behavior of
the bank and its leverage in relation to those of the other sectors. Motivated by this,
I extend the baseline circuit of capital model to explicitly incorporate the banking
sector, and introduce bank leverage as a new parameter.
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Some of the developments made in the circuit of capital model literature regarding
the necessity of credit in the macro economy are also worth noting. With a different
modeling approach, Kotz (1991) derives a stronger result according to which the new
capital investment must be financed entirely by credit. Basu (2013) shows that the
steady–state growth rate is negatively related to the share of consumption credit in
total net credit. Dos Santos (2011) further demonstrates that consumption credit
contributes to intensifying credit risk by lowering total wage and profit incomes rel-
ative to interest payments. Loranger (1989) analyzes a divergence between capital
investment and financial investment, which can have an inflationary effect. Park
and Basu (2012) add debt and interest into the baseline circuit of capital model and
derives an extended Cambridge equation with finance, which establishes a negative
correlation between steady–state growth rate and interest rate.
While examining macroeconomic consequences of credit in various respects, these
papers leave out factors that determine credit creation, simply by taking it as exoge-
nous. On the other hand, Satoh (2012) is a notable exception that adds the circuit
of bank capital to the baseline model, which is the circuit of industrial capital. A
negative relation between growth rate and interest rate is derived from the circuit
of industrial capital and a positive relation from the circuit of bank capital. From
these, both the growth rate and the interest rate are endogenized. My model closely
resembles this part of Satoh’s.
However, there are important differences between the two. First, contrary to
Satoh’s model, my model is demand–led and derives the two growth rate–interest
rate relations explicitly from the equilibrium condition in goods market and that in
credit market. Second, which follows from the first, while the growth rate–interest
rate relation derived from the industrial capital circuit is negative in Satoh’s model,
in my model, it is inverted–U shaped, thereby generating nonlinearity. Consequently,
in Satoh’s model, financial innovation, for example, can possibly enhance growth and
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at the same time reduce interest rate, whereas in my model the financial innovation
will have that result only in the economy with a developed financial system; otherwise
growth will be accompanied by a rise in the interest rate.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents an
extended circuit of capital model. In section 2.3, two relations between growth rate
and interest rate are derived from the equilibrium condition in the goods market and
that in the credit market. In section 2.4, firm leverage–led growth and bank leverage–
led growth are examined with comparative dynamic analyses. Section 2.5 summarizes
the main results of the model and applies them in understanding the contrast between
two historical regimes, i.e. the so–called ’golden age’ and neoliberal regimes.
2.2 Extended model of the circuit of capital
The model economy consists of four sectors, i.e. firms, households, private banks,
and central bank. However, the classical assumption will be adopted that workers do
not save and capitalists do not consume. Accordingly, the household sector, either
worker or capitalist, does not play a big role in the model. The central bank will also
be excluded later by making a set of simplifying assumptions when conducting an
equilibrium analysis in section 2.3 and 2.4.
The model is in a discrete-time framework. Similarly to chapter 1, time description
appears as a superscript — instead of subscript — of notations and, for simplicity, t
is omitted. For instance, with ΠK denoting net profits of the nonfinancial firm sector,
the variable in time t and that in time t− τ are each denoted by ΠK and Π−τK instead
of ΠtK and Πt−τK . All the endogenous variables are denoted by upper case letters;
exceptions include profit rate of firms rK , profit rate of banks rB, leverage ratio
of firms λK , steady–state growth rate g, and interest rate spread ω. In particular,
the latter two will be first introduced as a constant parameter and will later be
endogenized. A list of the notations can be found in appendix C.
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2.2.1 The firm sector and its profitability
Z denotes the flow of investment on capital outlays, that include constant capital
and variable capital. a denotes organic composition of capital defined as a ratio of
variable capital over capital outlays. Accordingly, (1 − a)Z is invested on constant
capital (raw materials, equipment, and factory, etc.) and aZ on variable capital
(workers), which is the source of wage income of worker households. All of wage
income is spent in the contemporaneous period without saving. The flow of sales
revenue measured at cost is denoted by R.
The flow of investment on capital outlays undergoes processes of production and
realization. Time taken for these processes is called turnover time as a sum of produc-
tion time and realization time. As a consequence, during the turnover time, the stock
of inventories builds up, consisting of means of production and finished/unfinished
commodities. It increases by the inflow of capital outlays and decreases by the out-
flow of sales revenue measured at cost. Denoting the inventories stock by Q, its law
of motion is obtained as
∆Q+1 = Z −R (2.1)
where ∆ refers to an increment of a variable from the previous period to the current
one.
Besides capital assets, the firm has financial assets and liabilities. In correspon-
dence, interest earnings and payments are made, and net interest payments are sub-
tracted from aggregate profits. What results is net profit, or profit of enterprise,
denoted by ΠK . There is no dividend payments to capitalist household. Hence net
profits are identical to retained earnings and are a source of funding for investment
on capital outlays. Similarly to the case of production and realization processes, in-
vestment takes time, i.e. it takes time for capitalists to make investment decisions.
This is investment time, or investment lag, denoted by τ . Firms have an additional
source of investment funding, i.e. net bank credit, which is used in a contemporane-
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ous period for a capital investment purpose. Let us denote the net bank credit by B.
In this setting, the flow of investment can be expressed as
Z = R−τ + Π−τK +B (2.2)
which states that investment is financed by the past flows of net revenues, i.e. R and
ΠK of τ periods ago, and the current net borrowing.
By the logic similar to the case of inventories stock in equation (1.26), the law
of motion for the stock of financial assets and liabilities can be established. On the
asset side of the balance sheet, due to the investment lag the stock of financial assets
build up, increasing by the inflow of net revenues while decreasing by the outflow of
investment net of bank credit. F denotes the financial asset stock of the firm sector.
Then its law of motion be can expressed as
∆F+1 = R + ΠK −
(
Z −B
)
(2.3)
Suppose firms make financial asset portfolio decisions between non-interest-bearing
central bank liability and interest-bearing private bank liabilities. A fraction of fi-
nancial asset is held in the central bank liability. With this fraction denoted by δ
(0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), δF and (1− δ)F express, respectively, bank deposit and cash balance of
the firm sector.
On the liability side, firms have the stock of loans which accumulates by the net
bank credit:
∆L+1 = B (2.4)
Whereas B is treated as exogenous in the literature (Foley, 1982; Basu, 2013), this
chapter attempts to endogenize it. In doing so, I follow Dos Santos (2014) in deter-
mining B as a share, denoted by b, of investment,
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B = bZ (2.5)
b, a borrowing ratio, is different from the conventional measure of leverage as a ratio
between total assets and equity. But it will be seen below, in proposition 2, that b is
positively related to the firm sector’s leverage. At any rate, B can be conceived as
the realized net bank credit, given the firms’ borrowing ratio b. In section 3.4.5, the
determination of B is analyzed at a more concrete level by identifying demand and
supply of bank credit.
Regarding the profitability of the firm sector, aggregate profits, on the one hand,
are determined as a markup over production cost. Denoting markup by q, profits
can be expressed as qR. By definition, markup is determined as a produce of the
rate of exploitation, denoted by e, and by the organic composition of capital k; hence
q = ek holds. On the other hand, earnings and costs involved in the financial assets
and liabilities are measured according to the interest rate for bank liabilities and the
interest rate for bank loans. Suppose the bank loan interest rate is determined as a
spread over the rate on bank liabilities.2 Denoting the spread and the interest rate on
bank liabilities by ω and i, respectively, the net interest payments of the firm sector
will be expressed as (i+ω)L− i(1−δ)F . Consequently, its net profits are determined
as
ΠK = qR−
(
(i+ ω)L− i(1− δ)F
)
(2.6)
When finance is explicitly considered as in this model, an appropriate measure
of profitability is return on equity, defined as a ratio between net profits and net
worth or equity (Norfield, 2013). The firm sector’s return on equity, denoted by rK ,
is obtained as
2In the recent New Keynesian literature, various attempts are made to include financial frictions
into a DSGE model. One approach is to introduce multiple interest rates and hence interest rate
spread, which reflects costs of intermediation (Woodford, 2010).
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rK =
ΠK
Q+ F − L = g (2.7)
where the last equality easily results from substituting the expression for Q, F , and L
— obtained by equations (2.1), (2.3), and (2.4) — into the definition of rK . The result
in (2.7) corresponds to the Cambridge equation–type result derived in the circuit of
capital model literature.3 However, equation (2.7) is more generalized as it is obtained
with a consideration of finance. Hence, the difference is that the gross profit rate in
the original result is replaced by the net return on equity. In either case, the main
thrust of the Cambridge equation–type result in the circuit of capital model is that
a positive correlation between growth and profitability emerges in long–run.
2.2.2 The banking sector and its profitability
Banks supply credit by issuing liabilities.4 There are two types of private bank
liabilities; deposits which are subject to reserve requirement and publicly insured and
non–deposits which are not, such as money market mutual funds. It is assumed that
no interest is paid on the central bank liabilities. Hence, the private banks have
an incentive to increase the share of non–deposit liabilities in their total liabilities
through financial innovations. This share is denoted by n.
On the asset side of balance sheet, the banks hold loans extended to firms and
required reserves, which are obtained in the open market transactions with the central
bank by selling a portion of the outstanding loans. In this way, some of the bank
loans are shifted to the central bank balance sheet. This volume is denoted by LC .
Consequently, with L denoting the total outstanding bank loans, the loans held in
the private bank balance sheet would be LB = L−LC . On the other hand, since the
3Note that recapitalization rate is assumed to be one.
4Basically, the banking sector combines private banks and central bank. But later, for the
simplification, the central bank will be assumed away. Therefore, to avoid confusions, it will be
convenient to conceive ‘the bank’ or ‘the banking sector’ without any qualification as referring to
the private bank.
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deposits are (1−n)(1−δ)F , denoting the reserve requirement ratio by γ, the amount
of required reserves is γ(1− n)(1− δ)F .
Two simplifying assumptions for the central bank balance sheet are made. Since
the central bank keeps part of the banks loans as a result of open market operation,
some of the borrowers’ interest payments accrues to it. First, it is assumed that the
values transferred to the central bank as interests are permanently parked in its net
worth rather than being distributed or spent somehow. Second assumption is that the
central bank’s earnings are all used in financing its position in international reserves,
which entails that the central bank net worth equals some type of international reserve
such as gold or a key currency. Consequently, from the balance sheet identity for the
central bank it follows
LC = γ(1− n)(1− δ)F + δF (2.8)
the right hand side of which expresses the monetary base, a sum of reserves and
currency held by the firms.5
Equation (2.8) allows to compute LB from its definition LB = L− LC as
LB = L− γ(1− n)(1− δ)F − δF (2.9)
Furthermore, net worth or equity of the private banking sector, denoted by EB, is,
by definition, EB = LB + γ(1− n)(1− δ)F − (1− δ)F , remembering that the second
and third term on the RHS expresses reserves and bank liabilities, respectively. Using
(2.9), it can be shown that the expression for the bank equity is reduced to
EB = L− F (2.10)
5Denoting interest reserves by RI and the central bank equity by EC , the balance sheet identity
of the central bank is expressed as LC+RI = γ(1−n)(1−δ)F +δF +EC . Equation (2.8) is obtained
from this identity under the second assumption RI = EC .
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In order to avoid a degenerate case of nonpositive bank equity the following assump-
tion is made.
Assumption 3. L > F
Banks earn interests on the outstanding loans held in their balance sheet and pay
interests on their liabilities. The net interest earnings of the private banking sector
constitute bank profits, which are denoted by ΠB.
ΠB = (i+ ω)LB − i(1− δ)F (2.11)
Note that while the total interest payments by the firms are (i + ω)L the private
banking sector obtains only (i+ ω)LB. The rest accrues to the central bank.
Similarly to the case of the firm sector, suppose that the entire bank profits are
retained without any dividend payment. In this context, as a measure of bank prof-
itability, the banking sector’s return on equity can be obtained as rB = ΠB(t)EB , which
then, using equations (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11), can be expressed as
rB =
L(i+ ω)− F
(
γ(1− n)(1− δ)(i+ ω) + i+ δω
)
L− F (2.12)
A complete solution for rB would be obtained only when the solution for L and F is
computed first, as will be discussed below, and then substituted into equation (2.12).
However, under assumption 3, equation (2.12) itself is useful in examining how key
financial variables of the model affect bank profitability. For instance, ∂rB
∂ω
> 0 and
∂rB
∂n
> 0 can be easily verified which imply that the interest rate spread and financial
innovation have a positive impact on bank profitability. In particular, financial in-
novation in this model enhances the bank’s return on equity by helping increase the
share of its non–deposit liabilities that are not subject to regulatory constraints.6
6Note that the regulatory constraint in the model is reflected the reserve requirement.
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2.3 Equilibrium condition
In examining an equilibrium of the model, so as to make a model analysis tractable,
it is assumed that
Assumption 4. γ = 0; i = 0; n = 0; δ = 0
Assumption 4 has an effect of assuming the central bank away from the model. Ac-
cordingly, the model economy becomes a pure credit economy without outside money,
i.e. the private bank liabilities become effectively cash. Hence, banks do not have
to pay interest on their liabilities, i = 0; the public’s preference for outside money is
zero, δ = 0; so there is no reasons for the bank to hold reserves and thus the reserve
requirement ratio is zero, γ = 0; consequently, there is no distinction between reserv-
able and non-reservable bank deposits, and hence n = 0. Under these assumptions,
there is no transfer of bank loans to the central bank, hence LC = 0 follows. The
total outstanding loans will be held in the private bank balance sheet, LB = L, which
reflects the size of the bank balance sheet since the bank does not hold reserves any-
more. On the other hand, the entire financial assets, F , of the firm sector are held in
bank liability.
It is assumed that all variables exponentially grow at the same and constant rate
g. In this steady–state balanced growth framework, the reduced model that emerges
under assumption 4 consists of seven equations, i.e. (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5),
(2.6), and (2.11), and eight endogenous variables, i.e. R, Z, Q, F , L, B, ΠK , and ΠB
with constant parameters including steady–state growth rate g, markup q, finance
(investment) lag τ , the firm sector’s borrowing ratio b, interest rate spread ω; later,
bank leverage will be introduced and g and ω will be endogenized. Normalizing the
variables by R, the flow of final sales at cost, renders the model well–determined. The
solution of the model is presented in appendix D.7
7The solution is obtained by simultaneously solving the seven equations with the help of Mathe-
matica. Interested readers can obtain Mathemtica code from the author upon request.
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In this section, goods market and bank credit market are analyzed in turn, and
from the equilibrium condition of each, two parameters g and ω are endogenized. In
the analysis of goods market, ω is taken as exogenous while in the credit market g is
taken as given. In this sense, the equilibrium of each of these markets is partial. A
general equilibrium of the model is obtained by combing the two. Substituting the
consequent solution for g and ω into the solution in appendix D yields a complete
solution of the model.
2.3.1 Goods market equilibrium
The model economy is demand–led; the flow of final sales is financed by the
aggregate demand. Denoting the aggregate demand by D, an equilibrium in goods
market is obtained as
(1 + q)R = D (2.13)
remembering that (1+q)R is total sales revenue. Due to the classical assumption that
workers do not save and capitalists do not consume, the aggregate demand in this
economy consists of firms’ investment on means of production and worker households’
consumption expenditure, which equals wage income. Hence,
D = (1− k)Z + kZ = Z (2.14)
Finally, it follows from the above two equations that
(1 + q)R = Z (2.15)
Using the solution for Z (see appendix D), equation (2.15) can be expressed as an
implicit function Γ with g chosen as an endogenous variable,
Γ(g;ω, b, q, τ) = (1 + q)
(
1− g
g(1− b)(g + 1)τ + bω
)
= 0 (2.16)
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Figure 2.2: GM curve
(Note: GM curve, which corresponds to IS curve, describes the relation between growth rate g and
spread ω as an equilibrium condition of goods market. It is shown that the GM curve is
inverted–U shaped. It scales out as τ decreases or b increases.)
which can be solved for ω,
ω = g − g(1− b)(1 + g)
τ
b
(2.17)
Equation (2.16) or (2.17) can be called GM curve analogously to IS curve in the
textbook Keynesian model (GM indicating goods market equilibrium). In the g−ω
space, the GM curve exhibits an inverted–U shape in a plausible range for g, i.e.
0 < g < 1, so that the curve has a unique local maximum within that range. This
is displayed in figure 2.2. The equilibrium relation between g and ω is positive when
the growth rate lies below g that maximizes ω, after which it turns negative.8
The nonlinearity of the GM curve can be understood in the following way. First,
using the solution for B′, which is net bank credit normalized by R, it can be seen that
B′ is negatively related to ω, i.e. ∂B′
∂ω
< 0. Second, credit has two opposite effects on
the firms’ profits, which are the source of growth (see the equality between growth and
8The slope of the GM curve is obtained as ∂ω∂g =
1−(1−b)
(
1+g(τ+1)
)
(1+g)τ−1
b . From this, it is easy
to see that 1(
1+g(τ+1)
)
(1+g)τ−1
> 1− b, which is identical to ∂ω∂g > 0, requires, for any given b and τ ,
g < g˜ where g˜ satisfies 1(
1+g˜(τ+1)
)
(1+g˜)τ−1
= 1− b. On the contrary, 1(
1+g(τ+1)
)
(1+g)τ−1
< 1− b, i.e.
∂ω
∂g < 0, requires g > g˜ for any given b and τ .
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profitability in equation (2.7)). On the one hand, credit boosts investment (equation
(2.2)), which leads to a rise in growth and hence profitability (equation (2.7)). On
the other hand, an increase in the credit elevates debt accumulation (equation (2.4))
and hence financial burden, which negatively affects profitability (equation (2.6)).
Now, in the economy characterized by weak profitability and sluggish growth
which corresponds to the left half of the GM curve, a rise in the interest payment
caused by an increase in the outstanding loan will be of an excessive financial burden,
which would offset the positive effect of taking more bank credits. In this circum-
stance, a less bank credit, which should result from a higher interest rate spread, will
have an effect of facilitating demand, and in order to maintain an equilibrium, there-
fore, the growth rate of the system has to be higher; hence, the higher the spread,
the higher the growth.
In contrast, in the economy characterized by robust profitability and strong growth,
which corresponds to the right half of the GM curve, the positive effect of borrowing
dominates the negative effect. In this case, a lower interest rate spread, through facil-
itating the firm’s borrowing, will have an effect of stimulating demand, and in order
to maintain in equilibrium the growth rate of the system has to be higher; hence, the
lower the spread, the higher the growth. Overall, in a weak growth regime the equi-
librium relation between growth and interest rate spread is positive and in a strong
growth regime the relation is negative; hence the inverted–U shaped GM curve.
Figure 2.2 also displays the effect of changes in the parameters. Using equation
(2.17) it can be easily shown that the curve scales out to the upper–right direction
with the origin as a pivot when the firms increase the borrowing ratio, raising b, or
when they invest more swiftly, decreasing τ .9 On the other hand, markup q does not
have any impact on the GM curve. This is because of the classical assumption adopted
9Formally, it can be shown from (2.17) ∂ω∂b =
g
(
(1+g)τ−1
)
b2 > 0 and
∂ω
∂τ = − (1−b)g(1+g)
τ log(1+g)
b < 0.
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in the model that worker households do not save. Due to this assumption, in this
demand–led model, the realization problem associated with consumption spending
does not emerge.
2.3.2 Bank credit market equilibrium
In analyzing the bank credit market, as a first approximation, financial frictions
documented in the finance literature of the last two decades or so will be assumed
away. Accordingly, let us suppose the market clears through a change in the interest
rate spread. In this context, the equilibrium condition of the bank credit market
provides a closure of the model to endogenize ω. Recall from section 2.2.1 that net
bank credit is determined as B = bZ. Suppose the demand for bank credit is fully
accommodated by banks. Denoting the demand for bank credit by BD, it holds
B = BD and consequently
BD = bZ (2.18)
Normalizing both sides of the equation by R and substituting the solution for Z ′
yields
B′D =
bg(1 + q)
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω (2.19)
where prime implies the normalization by R. In the B′−ω space, the demand curve
is downward sloping as in figure 2.3.10 From the solution for Z ′, it is known that
∂Z′
∂ω
< 0, i.e. a larger borrowing cost lowers investment. When this result is combined
with equation (2.18), it is readily seen that a higher ω lowers Z ′, which in turn leads
to a smaller B′D; hence the downward sloping demand curve.
In correspondence to the demand for bank credit BD, the supply of bank credit
can be identified both in flow and stock terms, denoted by BS and LS, respectively.
By definition, it follows
10The demand curve can be represented by an inverse function of (2.19) as ω = g(1+q)B′
D
−
g(1−b)(1+g)τ
b .
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∆L+1S = BS (2.20)
In order to specify the supply of bank credit, let us consider bank capitalization and
introduce the banking sector’s leverage ratio as a new parameter. These will reflect
lending capacity of the banking system and credit availability in the economy.
First, bank equity, or bank capital, is a basis for the bank’s lending capacity. Since
it was assumed that banks do not distribute dividends, by the accounting principle,
the bank equity grows by the inflow of bank profits.
∆E+1B = ΠB (2.21)
Second, the banking sector’s leverage ratio is measured as a ratio between the
supply of loan stock over the bank equity and is denoted by λ = LS
EB
. Note that in
this definition LS replaces its realized counterpart L. In this way, the determination
of the supply of loan stock is highlighted,
LS = λEB (2.22)
i.e. by the bank equity multiplied by bank leverage. By implication, λ is a measure
of the leverage ratio the banking sector is willing, and able, to achieve rather than the
leverage actually realized. Hence, λ is a parameter that reflects a potential lending
capacity of the banking sector. In equilibrium, however, the potential bank leverage
and realized bank leverage become identical with each other, i.e. λ = L
L−F , which can
be verified by using the solution for L and F .
In the steady–state balanced growth framework, using the accounting identities in
(2.20) and (2.22), the expression for bank capitalization in (2.21) is rearranged into
BS = λΠB (2.23)
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Figure 2.3: Bank credit market equilibrium
(Note: B′D and B′S are demand and supply of bank credit normalized by the flow of final sales at
cost R. The supply curve pivots out when the bank leverage rises. As a consequence the
equilibrium spread falls and the equilibrium bank credit rises.)
which is one of the key equations of the model. It states that the bank credit supply is
determined by bank profits multiplied by a bank leverage. Normalizing both sizes of
equation (2.23) and substituting the solution for ΠB in appendix D into the equation
yields
B′S =
bλ(1 + q)ω
g(1− b)(1 + g)T + bω (2.24)
In the B′−ω space, the supply curve is positively sloped as in figure 2.3.11 From the
solution for Π′B in appendix D, it is verified that
∂Π′B
∂ω
> 0 holds, i.e. the interest
rate spread has a positive impact on bank profits. When this result is combined with
equation (2.23), it is readily seen that a higher ω raises Π′B, which leads to a larger
B′S; hence the upward sloping supply curve.
The demand and supply of normalized bank credit in (2.19) and (2.24) determine
ω and B′ in equilibrium, with g given along with the other parameters, q, τ , b, λ.
Proposition 1 summarizes the analysis of this partial equilibrium.
11The supply curve can be represented by an inverse function of equation (2.24) as ω =
g(1−b)(1+g)τB′S
b
(
λ(1+q)−B′
S
) .
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Proposition 1. A partial equilibrium and comparative static analysis of the bank
credit market:
i) B′∗ = λb(1+q)
λ(1−b)(1+g)τ+b , ω
∗ = g
λ
ii) ∂B′∗
∂g
> 0, ∂B′∗
∂q
> 0, ∂B′∗
∂τ
< 0, ∂B′∗
∂b
> 0, ∂B′∗
∂λ
> 0
iii) ∂ω∗
∂g
> 0, ∂ω∗
∂q
= 0, ∂ω∗
∂τ
= 0, ∂ω∗
∂b
= 0, ∂ω∗
∂λ
< 0
First of all, the comparative static analysis results in (ii) and (iii) are mathemati-
cally evident and economically intuitive.12 For instance, as shown in figure 2.3, a rise
in λ results in the supply curve pivoting clockwise. A higher bank leverage implies
an enhancement of the banking system’s lending capacity which allows to supply a
given amount of credit at a lower interest rate. A consequence of this is a rise in the
normalized bank credit, ∂B′∗
∂λ
> 0, and a decrease in the spread, ∂ω∗
∂λ
< 0.
The other comparative static analysis results can be understood in the similar
way. The results in (ii) are intuitively clear. Higher growth, larger markup, faster
turnover, higher borrowing ratio of firms, and higher leverage of banks all increase
the amount of net bank credit. The results in (iii) show that a change in the firm
sector’s parameters, i.e. q, τ , and b, has no impact on ω∗ while they affect B′∗. This is
because these parameters impart an impact on both the demand and supply of bank
credit in the same degree so that there is no price effect but only quantity effect.
Most importantly, the expression for the equilibrium spread in (i) describes the
relation between g and ω as an equilibrium condition for the bank credit market.
First, note that ω∗ depends only on λ, given g, i.e. an equilibrium spread depends
on the leverage ratio the banking sector is willing, and able, to achieve. Second, in
correspondence to the GM relation which describes the g−ω relation as an equilibrium
condition for the goods market, let us call the equation ω = g
λ
the BM relation
12These are comparative static analysis in the sense that the growth rate is taken as constant.
Later, in a comparative dynamic analysis in proposition 1 g will be endogenized, and some of the
results in (ii) and (iii) will be modified accordingly.
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analogously to LM curve in the textbook Keynesian model (with BM standing for
bank credit market equilibrium).
Lastly, in comparison to the bank leverage being a constant parameter, the firm
sector’s leverage is obtained endogenously as λK = Q+FQ+F−L by definition. It will be
informative to see how the firm sector leverage is related to the model parameters.
See proposition 2
Proposition 2. With λK = 1+ gb(1+q)gq(1−b)(1+g)τ−bω ,
∂λK
∂g
< 0, ∂λK
∂q
< 0, ∂λK
∂τ
< 0, ∂λK
∂b
> 0,
and ∂λK
∂ω
> 0 hold.
The expression for λK is yield by using the solution for Q′, F ′, and L′ in appendix D.
On the other hand, the partial derivative results can be easily proved and intuitively
evident. A stronger growth of the economy and a larger markup lead to a smaller
leverage of the firms, whereas a faster investment (smaller τ) and a more reliance on
debt financing in investment (larger b) raises the firm leverage.
2.3.3 General equilibrium
The GM relation and the BM relation, which are reproduced below, constitute two
characteristic equations of the model, thereby allowing g and ω to be be determined
endogenously.
ω = g − g(1− b)(1 + g)
τ
b
(GM relation)
ω = g
λ
(BM relation)
While the GM curve is inverted–U shaped, the BM curve is linear and positively
sloped. An equilibrium of the model is obtained at the intersection of the two curves.13
This is stated in proposition 3 and illustrated in figure 2.4.
13The number of general equilibrium of the model is τ + 1. But given the boundaries of the
parameters, i.e. 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, 0 ≤ τ , 1 ≤ λ, 0 ≤ g ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, the number of non–trivial solution
is two, one of which is (0, 0). The rest is either negative or complex.
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Figure 2.4: General equilibrium of the model
Proposition 3. General equilibrium of the model:
g∗ =
( λ− b
λ(1− b)
) 1
τ − 1, ω∗ = 1
λ
[( λ− b
λ(1− b)
) 1
τ − 1
]
Substituting these endogenously determined g and ω into the solution in appendix
D yields a complete solution of the model.
2.4 Comparative dynamic analysis
The extended circuit of capital model, simplified under classical assumptions and
assumption 4, reduces to a model which is solved to generate the steady–state growth
rate g, the interest rate spread ω, and the stock and flow variables as a function four
parameters, i.e. markup q (as a product between exploitation rate and an inverse of
organic composition of capital), investment lag τ , firms’ borrowing ratio b, and bank
leverage λ.
In this section, with comparative dynamic analyses two types of growth, i.e. firm
leverage–led and bank leverage–led, are identified and their distinctive impact on the
interest rate spread is examined.
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2.4.1 Bank leverage–led growth
In essence, the bank borrows in order to lend and hence the banking sector’s
indebtedness, reflected in its leverage ratio, implies credit flows into the real economy.
Proposition 4 summarizes how the leverage behavior of the banking sector imparts
an impact on growth and interest rate spread in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Impact of bank leverage:
i) if λ = 1, then g∗ = 0 and ω∗ = 0,
ii) ∂g∗
∂λ
> 0,
iii-a) ∂ω∗
∂λ
> 0 if 1 < λ < λ¯,
iii-b) ∂ω∗
∂λ
< 0 if λ > λ¯,
where λ¯ is λ that maximizes ω∗ given q, τ , and b.14
The first two statements (i) and (ii) of proposition 4 can be easily proved by
examining the expression for g∗ and ω∗ in proposition 3. First of all, note that if a
negative net worth is ruled out then λ ∈ [1,∞) would be the case by definition. Now,
(i) in proposition 4 suggests that when the bank leverage is at its lower bound the
growth rate and the interest rate spread in equilibrium will be at their lowest as well,
i.e. zero; here, negative growth rate and negative spread are ruled out as well. This
situation is depicted in figure 2.5a.
The bank leverage being unity implies the banking system is not issuing any
liabilities, which in turn implies that in the model economy, which is a pure credit
14Formally, λ¯ is such that
max
λ
1
λ
[( λ− b
λ(1− b)
) 1
τ − 1
]
The first–order condition is obtained as( λ− b
λ(1− b)
) 1
τ − (λ− b)τ(λ− b)τ − b = 0
λ¯ is implicitly determined in a way that satisfies the above F.O.C. For graphical representation of
λ¯, see figure E.1 in appendix E.
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Figure 2.5: General equilibrium and the bank leverage
(a) λ = 1 (b) λ = 1 and λ = λ¯
(Note: (a) The bank leverage being one, i.e. zero bank indebtedness, yields g∗ = 0 and ω∗ = 0. (b)
There exists λ = λ¯ where the equilibrium spread is maximized at ω¯.)
economy under assumption 4, there is no money supply and hence the nonbank sector
does not hold any money balance. No economic activity can possibly take place and
consequently the economy cannot grow. Furthermore, there is no bank lending and
hence no interest earnings, which are the source of bank profits, since in the pure
credit economy banks can extend loans only by issuing liabilities. Both the demand
and supply of bank credit are zero and hence the interest rate is zero as well.
As the bank leverage gradually grows from its lower bound, the equilibrium growth
rate also rises as (ii) in proposition 4 suggests. Graphically, a rise in λ lowers the
slope of the BM curve, which thus pivots clockwise thereby pushing up g∗. Growth in
this case can be characterized as bank leverage–led. On the other hand, the response
of ω∗ is more complicated. This is stated in (iii) in proposition 4. A formal proof of
this is moved to appendix E, and here let us explain it graphically.
First see figure 2.5b. Due to the inverted–U shape of the GM curve, there exists
a unique value of λ, denoted by λ¯, that corresponds to the maximum level of the
equilibrium spread denoted by ω¯. Depending on whether λ is smaller or larger than
λ¯, a change in the bank leverage will have a distinctive impact on ω∗. Figure 2.6
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Figure 2.6: Differential effects of bank leverage on the model equilibrium depending
on the level of bank leverage
(a) 1 < λ < λ¯ (b) λ > λ¯
illustrates this. In the case of 1 < λ < λ¯ which is reflected in the line BM1 in
figure 2.6a, the BM curve crosses the upward–sloping segment of the GM curve, and
consequently a rise in λ will shift BM1 to BM2, and ω∗ will increase. The reverse is
true in the case of λ > λ¯, which is reflected in the line BM3 in the figure 2.6b. The
BM curve crosses the downward–sloping segment of the GM curve. Consequently,
an increase in λ will shift BM3 to BM4 and thus ω∗ will be reduced. Hence (iii) in
proposition 4 is confirmed. Note that g∗ keeps rising in both cases for the range of λ.
The differential response of ω∗ to a change in λ can be explained by looking at
the bank credit market, i.e. by examining how a change in λ is transmitted through
affecting the demand and supply of bank credit. In the partial equilibrium analysis of
the bank credit market in section 3.4.5 the bank leverage is a parameter that affects
the supply of bank credit only (compare equations (2.19) and (2.24)). However, it is
already known from the general equilibrium analysis in section 2.3.3 that a change in
λ will bring out a change in g, which was taken as exogenous in the bank credit market
analysis. Since g affects both demand and supply of bank credit, once the analysis
moves from a partial equilibrium to a general equilibrium, thereby the endogenous
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change in g being considered, a change in λ will affect both the demand and supply
curve.
To formally understand this full dynamics of the bank credit market, the demand
and supply function of bank credit in equations (2.19) and (2.24) should be expanded
by substituting g∗, which yields
B′D =
λb(Ω− 1)(q + 1)
(Ω− 1)(λ− b) + λbω
B′S =
λ2b(1 + q)ω
(Ω− 1)(λ− b) + λbω
(2.25)
where Ω =
(
λ−b
λ(1−b)
) 1
τ . These expanded functions of B′D and B′S then can be taken a
derivative with respect to λ. The consequent partial derivative results would reflect a
dynamic impact of a change in the bank leverage on the demand and supply curve of
the normalized bank credit; dynamic in the sense that it incorporates an endogenous
change of g.15 See lemma 1.
Lemma 1. A sign of ∂B
′
D
∂λ
and ∂B
′
S
∂λ
is determined as
i) ∂B
′
D
∂λ
≷ 0 if ω ≷ ωˆD where ωˆD = (Ω−1)
2(λ−b)τ
Ωλb ,
ii) ∂B
′
S
∂λ
≷ 0 if ω ≷ ωˆS where ωˆS = 1Ωλτ +
(Ω−1)(λ−2b)
Ωλb .
which can be easily proved by examining the sign of ∂B
′
D
∂λ
and ∂B
′
S
∂λ
. Lemma 1 states
that, for a given ω, the sign of the dynamic impact of a bank leverage on the demand
and supply of the normalized bank credit changes at some threshold point ωˆD and
ωˆS, respectively. As displayed in figure 2.7, in response to a rise in λ, the demand and
supply curve would pivot clockwise with pD(Bˆ′D, ωˆD) and pS(Bˆ′S, ωˆS), respectively, as
a pivot point.
15Accordingly, the results will differ from the comparative static analysis of the bank credit market
examined in proposition 1.
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Figure 2.7: A dynamic impact of a rise in bank leverage on the demand and supply
curves of normalized bank credit
(a) Demand curve B′D (b) Supply curve B′S
In which direction the demand and supply curve will actually move and hence
how an equilibrium will subsequently change depend on the configuration of the two
pivot points. Figure 2.8 illustrates two possible cases. First, figure 2.8a displays a
pD−pS configuration where the segment of the demand and supply curve on the left
of the pivot points are intersected with each other at E to the effect that a rise in λ
ultimately generates an rightward shift of the demand curve and a leftward shift of
the supply. As a result, the equilibrium moves to E ′, obtaining a higher ω∗ while B′∗
remains the same.16 Let us conveniently call the pD−pS configuration described here
type I.
On the other hand, figure 2.8b illustrates a pD−pS configuration that produces
the opposite result regarding the change in ω∗. The segments of the demand and
supply curves on the right of the pivots cross each other at E so that a rise in λ
effectively generates an leftward shift of the demand curve and a rightward shift of
the supply curve. As a consequence, the equilibrium shifts to E ′, thereby obtaining
16To formally see the result regarding B′∗, substitute the expression for g∗ in proposition 3 into
the one for B′∗ in proposition 1 to obtain B′∗ = b(1 + q), with which ∂B′∗∂λ = 0 can be verified.
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Figure 2.8: Comparative dynamic analysis of the bank credit market with respect to
λ
(a) type I pD−pS configuration (1 < λ <
λ¯) (b) type II pD−pS configuration (λ > λ¯)
a lower ω∗ while B′∗ remains the same. In comparison to type I configuration, let us
conveniently call the pD−pS configuration described here type II.
In sum, in the case of type I pD−pS configuration, on the one hand, an increase
in λ, which enhances growth, eventually expands the demand curve and shrinks the
supply curve of the bank credit market, thereby raising ω along with g. On the other,
in the case of type II pD−pS configuration, a rise in λ strengthens growth by shrinking
the demand curve while expanding the supply curve. Consequently, ω falls although
g rises.
Proposition 5 states the analytical result regarding the condition under which each
of the pD−pS configurations will take place.
Proposition 5. Conditions for the two types of pD−pS configuration:
i) if 1 < λ < λ¯, type I pD−pS configuration will be the case (hence the bank
leverage–led growth emerges through facilitating credit demand);
ii) if λ > λ¯, type II pD−pS configuration will be the case (hence the bank leverage–
led growth emerges through facilitating credit supply).
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where λ¯ is λ that maximizes ω given a GM curve.
Graphically, proposition 5 suggests a correspondence between figure 2.6a and fig-
ure 2.8a, and that between figure 2.6b figure 2.8b. This implies that the growth
initiated by a rise in the bank leverage emerges through facilitating credit demand
when the bank leverage is low, whereas it is through facilitating credit supply when
the bank leverage is high.
Then what explains the shifts of the B′D and B′S curve in response to a parameter
change, in this case a change in λ? This question can be answered by investigating
the behavioral specification of the demand and supply of the normalized bank credit,
expressed in (2.18) and (2.23) and reproduced below.
B′D = bZ ′ = b(1 + Π′K)(1 + g)−τ
B′S = λΠ′B
(2.26)
Regarding the demand, its behavioral specification B′D = bZ ′ is further expanded by
using the expression for Z ′ in (2.2). In this way, it is highlighted that, ceteris paribus,
the bank credit demand is linked, through investment Z, to the firm sector’s net profit
ΠK , while the bank credit supply is linked to the banking sector’s profits ΠB.
Under assumption 4 the expression for Π′K and Π′B, specified in (2.6) and (2.11),
is reduced to, respectively,
Π′K = q − Π′B
Π′B = ωL′
(2.27)
according to which bank profits are interest earnings from the outstanding stock of
loans L, which in this model reflects a size of the banking sector balance sheet, and
the firm sector’s net profits are total profits qR net of bank profits.
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From equations in (2.27), a dynamic impact of λ on Π′K and Π′B is obtained as
∂Π′K
∂λ
= ∂Π
′
K
∂g︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊕
∂g
∂λ︸︷︷︸
⊕
> 0
∂Π′B
∂λ
= ∂Π
′
B
∂g︸ ︷︷ ︸
	
∂g
∂λ︸︷︷︸
⊕
< 0
(2.28)
∂Π′K
∂g
> 0 and ∂Π
′
B
∂g
< 0 can be easily verified by using equations in (2.27) and ∂L′
∂g
< 0,
which in turn directly follows from the solution for L′. These partial derivatives with
respect to g reflect that, compared to the economy on a lower steady–state growth
path, in the economy on a higher steady–state growth path the weight of the banking
sector, measured by its balance sheet size and its net revenue, will be smaller while
the weight of the firm sector, measured by its net revenue, will be larger.
Eventually, with the help of equations in (2.26) and inequalities in (2.28), a dy-
namic impact of λ on the B′D curve and the B′S curve can be established in the
following way. First, regarding the B′D curve, since a rise in λ will have both a pos-
itive impact through raising Π′K and a negative impact through raising g, an overall
result depends on the relative magnitude of the two opposing forces. Second, regard-
ing the B′S curve, since a rise in λ has a directly positive impact while it also has
an indirectly negative impact through lowering Π′B, an overall result depends on the
bank leverage elasticity of the normalized bank profits. These are summarized in
proposition 6.
Proposition 6. For a given ω,
i) if a dynamic impact of the bank leverage on the firm sector’s normalized net
profits is sufficiently large (sufficiently small), i.e. ∂Π
′
K
∂λ
> θ (∂Π
′
K
∂λ
< θ) where
θ = τ(1+Π
′
K)
1+g
∂g
∂λ
−1, then a rise in λ will dynamically shift the B′D curve rightward
(leftward), i.e. ∂B
′
D
∂λ
> 0 (∂B
′
D
∂λ
< 0);
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ii) if a response of the banking sector’s normalized net profits to the bank leverage
is elastic (inelastic), i.e. ξλΠB > 1 (ξ
λ
ΠB < 1) where ξ
λ
ΠB = −
∂Π′B
∂λ
λ
Π′B
, then a
rise in λ will dynamically shift the B′S curve leftward (rightward), i.e.
∂B′S
∂λ
< 0
(∂B
′
S
∂λ
> 0).
These statements can be easily proved by verifying the sign of ∂B
′
S
∂λ
and ∂B
′
S
∂λ
, using
(2.26), (2.27), and (2.28). With ω given, while B′D and B′D depend on Π′K and Π′B,
respectively, and a rise in λ leads to, a rise in Π′K and a fall in Π′B, proposition 6
shows that the ultimate impact of λ on the B′D and B′S curve depends on how strong
the response of these profits are. By combining proposition 5 and 6, the mechanism
underlying the two different cases of the bank leverage–led growth can be clarified as
follows.
If 1 < λ < λ¯, for a given ω, the response of Π′K to a rise in λ is sufficiently
strong so as to raise B′D while the response of Π′B is elastic so that B′S falls. The
bank leverage–led growth in this case takes place through facilitating credit demand
and consequently the spread rises along with the growth rate. This is depicted in
the combination of figure 2.6a and 2.8a. If λ > λ¯, the response of Π′K is sufficiently
weak so as to decrease B′D while the response of Π′B is inelastic so that B′S rises. The
bank leverage–led growth in this case takes place through facilitating credit supply,
and hence the spread is pushed down even when growth rate rises. A combination of
figure 2.6b and 2.8b illustrates this.
Lastly, the growth led by the bank leverage is not without bound. Increasing the
bank leverage forever does not lead to an infinite growth. This can be easily verified
with figure 2.4. It can be seen that, given τ and b and hence given GM curve, g∗ will
be maximized when λ is maximized, which makes the BM curve flat. Proposition 7
states this result formally.
Proposition 7. The bank leverage–led growth has a limit, i.e. limλ→∞ g∗ =
(
1
1−b
) 1
τ −
1
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See appendix E for a proof.
The comparative dynamics with respect to λ as discussed so far is informative
about the role of bank leverage in the economy on a steady–state growth path. In
particular, since the essence of financial innovations lies in liability management of
the bank, the bank leverage can be broadly considered as reflecting the status of
development of financial technology.17 In this respect, in the economy without de-
veloped financial technologies, reflected in a low bank leverage, a growth initiated by
bank borrowing affects the structure of profitability of the firm sector and the banking
sector in a way that ultimately boosts the excess demand for bank credit and hence
tightens the market.
However, such pressure on the bank credit market does not take place in the
economy with the banking system characterized by developed financial technologies,
reflected in a high bank leverage. Rather, as the banks borrow more, the structure of
profitability is affected in a way that favors the banking sector and consequently the
bank credit market becomes slack. In this way, financial innovations, which allow the
banking sector to maintain its leverage high, make it possible to achieve a regime of
high growth and low interest rate.
On the other hand, the growth led by financial innovations and bank leverage is
limited by an upper bound as suggested by proposition 7.
2.4.2 Firm leverage–led growth
In comparison to the nonlinearity of the impact of bank leverage in equilibrium,
the rest of the parameters affect the model equilibrium in a unilateral way. This can
be very easily understood by looking at figure 2.4 and recalling that only λ shifts
17The parameter n denoting financial innovation has been excluded from the model under as-
sumption 4. It can be restored in the future research and be examined together with bank leverage.
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BM curve while the other parameters shift GM curve. The consequent comparative
dynamic analysis results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 8. Comparative dynamic analysis with respect to q, τ , b
i) ∂g∗
∂q
= 0, ∂g∗
∂τ
< 0, ∂g∗
∂b
> 0
ii) ∂ω∗
∂q
= 0, ∂ω∗
∂τ
< 0, ∂ω∗
∂b
> 0
These results can be easily proved by using the expression for g∗ and ω∗. Statement
(i) suggests that a faster investment, reflected in a lower τ , and a higher borrowing
ratio of the firm, reflected in a larger b, generate a stronger growth, which is econom-
ically intuitive. Since these investment and borrowing behaviors increase the firm
sector’s leverage ratio as shown in proposition 2, growth initiated by decreasing τ
and increasing b can be characterized as firm leverage–led. On the other hand, since
q does not shift the GM curve because of the absence of realization problem associ-
ated with worker household consumption (which is due to the classical assumption
of immediate consumption of wage income), the markup has no impact on growth in
equilibrium.
The parameters’ impact on the equilibrium spread suggested in statement (ii) can
be understood by looking at the bank credit market dynamics, similarly to the case of
λ as done in the previous subsection, especially in lemma 1.18 And depending on how
the demand and supply curve of bank credit are shifted, the firm leverage–led growth
in statement (i) can be either a growth that takes place through facilitating credit
demand, which raises the spread, or a growth that takes place through facilitating
credit supply, which lowers the spread. Rather than presenting the whole process
which is similar to the case of λ, here only the result is reported as follows.
18Caution: the results regarding ω∗ in (ii) of proposition 8 are different from those in (iii) of
proposition 1 as the former is the general equilibrium analysis with g being endogenous while the
latter is a partial equilibrium analysis with g being exogenous.
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Proposition 9. The firm leverage–led growth takes place through stimulating credit
demand–led in the following ways:
i) In the case of growth initiated by a rise in markup q, B′D and B′S in equilibrium
increase equally, i.e. ∂B
′
D
∂q
= ∂B
′
S
∂q
when ω = ω∗, and consequently there is only
quantity effect but no price effect; hence no change in ω∗.
ii) In the case of growth initiated by a fall in investment lag τ , the B′D curve shifts
right while the B′S curve shifts left, i.e.
∂B′D
∂τ
< 0 and ∂B
′
S
∂τ
> 0; hence ω∗ rise.
iii) In the case of growth initiated by a rise in the firm sector’s borrowing ratio b,
the B′D curve shifts right while the B′S curve shifts left under the condition that
b is sufficiently high, i.e. ∂B
′
D
∂b
< 0 and ∂B
′
S
∂b
> 0 as long as b > τ
τ+1 ; hence ω
∗
rise.
These results can be easily proved by verifying the sign of the partial derivative of B′D
and B′S, expressed in (2.25), with respect to each of the three parameters in question.
It is already known from the discussion in proposition 6 that a dynamic impact of λ
is transmitted onto the demand and supply curve of the bank credit through affecting
the profits of the firm and the banking sector. Corresponding cases regarding each
of the three firm sector parameters, i.e. q, τ , and b, can be analyzed in the similarly
way, which is omitted here due to page limit.
On the other hand, contrarily to the bank leverage–led growth which has a limit
as stated in proposition 7, the firm leverage–led growth is unbounded.
Proposition 10. The firm leverage–led growth faces no limit, i.e. limτ→0 g∗ = ∞
and limb→∞ g∗ =∞.
Using the fact that g∗ =
(
λ−b
λ(1−b)
) 1
τ − 1, the above result can be easily proved alge-
braically.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, an extended circuit of capital model with the banking sector has
been developed to endogenize credit creation by identifying demand and supply of
bank credits. This allowed to introduce a taxonomy of firm leverage–led vs. bank
leverage–led growth in a way that highlights financial aspects of growth. The main
findings of the model analysis can be summarized as follows:
(1) The firm leverage–led growth, taking place either by a decrease in the in-
vestment lag or by an increase in the firm’s borrowing in financing investment, is
unbounded. (2) However, it emerges through stimulating the excess demand for bank
credits, thereby tightening the market and thus increasing the interest rate spread
alongside the growth rate. (3) The bank leverage–led growth is bounded by an upper
limit. (4) However, the bank leverage–led growth can possibly takes place through
stimulating excess supply of bank credits, thereby enable to achieve a regime of high
growth and low interest rate under the condition that the banking sector leverage
is in a high range, reflecting a developed financial technology; otherwise, the bank
leverage–led growth takes place through facilitating excess demand for bank credits, in
which case a regime of high growth accompanied by high interest rate is unavoidable
as in the case of the firm leverage–led growth.
The extended circuit of capital model provides a theoretical framework to under-
stand economic regimes distinguished by firms’ investment and the status of banking
system, and to make a prediction for each of the regimes regarding growth rate and
interest rate. First of all, a distinction can be made between an economic regime
characterized by strong borrowing and investment by firms with a less developed
banking system and an economic regime where the banking system is more developed
but borrowing and investment by firms are weak.
In figure 2.9, the first case is depicted by GM1 with a low τ and BM1 with a low
λ achieving an equilibrium at E1 with g∗1 and ω∗1. And the second case is depicted
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Figure 2.9: A comparison among three distinctive economic regimes
(Note: E1 describes an economic regime characterized by strong borrowing and investment by
firms with a less developed banking system; E2 describes an economic regime characterized by
weak borrowing and investment by firms with a developed banking system; E3 describes a
economic regime characterized by strong borrowing and investment by firms with a developed
banking system.)
by GM2 with a large τ and BM2 with a large λ achieving an equilibrium at E2 with
g∗2 and ω∗2. According to the framework of the model presented in this chapter, the
growth in the first economic regime can be characterized as firm leverage–led. Hence,
it is predicted that this economy will experience high interest rates alongside strong
growth; high growth–high interest rate regime. On the other hand, the second regime
is characterized by a bank leverage–led growth coupled with a large λ and a shrank
GM curve due to a very large τ . Accordingly, it is predicted that this economy will
suffer from a sluggish growth despite low interest rates; low growth–low interest rate
regime.
The contrast between these two hypothetical regimes is analogous to a widely–
discussed contrast between two historical regimes, i.e. the so–called Golden Age
regime in the 1950s until the early 1970s and the neoliberal regime that followed. It
is now an established fact that the Golden Age regime experienced strong growth,
which was supported by robust capital investment by the firm sector while its bank-
ing system was mainly characterized by traditional commercial banking with strong
80
regulation. Contrarily, the neoliberal regime is marked by financial innovations and
weak capital investment by the firms.
Note that the correlation between growth rate and interest rate predicted by the
contrast between the economy at E1 and the economy at E2 corresponds to the
standard economic theory, which demonstrates that the two variables will converge
to each other in a steady–state (von Neumann, 1945, e.g.). However, historical data
suggest otherwise. Even though the Gold Age period experienced strong growth and
the neoliberal regime underwent sluggish growth as predicted by the model, data
show that the prediction regarding interest rates of the two economic regimes does
not hold true. Even by a quick observation, it is hard to miss that regardless what
interest rates we look at the interest rate on average was lower in the Golden Age
regime than that in the neoliberel period. Furthermore, recent empirical research
finds no strong correlation between growth rate and interest rates; rather, a negative
correlation is reported in some cases(Bosworth, 2014; Hansen and Seshadri, 2013).
On the other hand, however, these empirical works do not directly address the issue
regarding Golden Age vs. neoliberal periods, and the correlation between growth rate
and interest rates in these two economic regimes is an area where more works need
to be done.
On a positive side, the model presented in this chapter does not always predict
a positive correlation between growth rate and interest rates. Consider the third
economic regime with strong borrowing and investment by firms, reflected in GM1,
coupled with a developed banking system, reflected in BM2. An equilibrium is estab-
lished at E3 with g∗3 and ω∗3. A transition from E1 to E3 involves a rise in the growth
rate and a fall in the interest rate spread; a negative correlation. In this way, the
model of this chapter allows various possibilities regarding the correlation between
growth rate and interest rates in a way that would be not possible in a model that
does not incorporate a banking sector.
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The model of this chapter can also be assessed in comparison to some of the recent
growth theories. For instance, from the perspective of the categorization of debt–led
vs. debt–burdened growth regimes in Nishi (2012), the extended circuit of capital
model would belong to the debt–led regime as it has growth positively related to
both the firm’s and the bank’s leverage. This is due to technical details of the model.
Recall that a fall in τ , which reflects a faster investment, increases not only growth
(proposition 8) but also the firm sector leverage (proposition 2), and this conforms
to a Minskian idea that with capital accumulation the firm’s financial position will
become fragile. In this circumstance, a debt–burdened growth regime could possibly
emerge if the rising firm leverage negatively affects investment (raising τ) by reducing
the difference between the firm’s profits and interest payment, which is the margin of
safety.
However, in the model τ is a constant parameter and hence does not respond
to changes in the other parameters or variables. This is why the debt–burdened
growth regime cannot emerge in the model of this chapter. Therefore, in order to
account for economic problems arising from intensification of financial fragility, it
would be desirable to endogenize τ . A possible behavioral specification along the line
of Minskian proposition would be to make τ as a negative function of the margin of
safety. The latter could be measured within the model by the net profits of the firm
sector ΠK since it is already defined by netting interest payments from the aggregate
profits.19 This would be a major extension of the model that would contribute to
developing a macro–finance model within the circuit of capital framework.
19A theoretical issue involved in modeling the margin of safety is whether to compare the profits
and interest payments either as a ratio or as a difference.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURITIZED BANKING, PROCYCLICAL BANK
LEVERAGE, AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
3.1 Introduction
Adrian and Shin (2010) have recently documented an empirical observation that
banking sector leverage is procyclical; the financial intermediary leverages up its bal-
ance sheet during upturns of cycles marked by asset price appreciation while shedding
risk exposures by deleveraging during downturns. As the banking sector’s total bal-
ance sheet size implies credit flows through the real economy, a direct consequence of
the procyclical bank leverage is an amplification of an asset price cycle and hence an
aggravation of financial instability. Motivated by this finding, a literature is now grow-
ing in two directions. The first is to provide a theoretical explanation for procyclical
bank leverage and the second is to examine its macroeconomic consequences.1 The
main purpose of this chapter is to contribute to this emerging literature by addressing
both of these issues.
Underlying the procyclical pattern of financial intermediaries is the transformation
of banking to the ‘originate and distribute’ model, which characterizes the run–up
period to the 2007-2008 disruption and has decisively aggravated the financial fragility
of the system (Brunnermeier, 2009, e.g.). Contrary to the traditional banking model
where bank loan creation is financed primarily by FDIC–insured deposits and the
issuing banks hold the loans until maturity, in the new intermediation model, banks
offload risks via securitization and the security broker–dealers finance their portfolio
1I will discuss this literature in greater detail below.
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through collateralized short-term borrowing such as repurchase agreements (repo).
Gorton and Metrick (2012) label this type of banking business model ‘securitized
banking’. While macro–models incorporating the banking sector have been growing in
number since the recent financial turmoil, those which distinguish between commercial
banks and investment banks are relatively few. As a way to fill this gap, my model
explicitly incorporates the securitized banking system.
In particular, I explore the logic underpinning the endogenous development of
boom–bust cycles of asset price, bank leverage, and liquidity which have become more
severe in the securitized banking system. A central aspect of this intermediation
system is the change in the bank funding source from deposits to repos. In repo
transactions, collateral replaces the government insurance. As the collateral value
is directly affected by the price of underlying assets, repo creditors are typically
exposed to counter–party risk and collateral value risk. On the other hand, repo
maturities are in most cases overnight and this creates liquidity risk as borrowers
have to continuously roll–over debts. When asset prices are on the rise, repo investors
have little concern about these risks and allow broker–dealers to borrow not only at a
lower rate but also with a lower haircut,2 which enables the borrowers to leverage up
further. However, in times of stress the investors quickly pull back from the market
as the probability of default increases. Both the repo rate and haircut surge, which
forces securitized banks to deleverage sharply.3
This chapter reveals the connection between such an unstable repo market dy-
namics and the procyclicality of the securitized bank’s leverage. For this purpose, I
first provide a theoretical explanation for the procyclical leverage of the securitized
2Haircut is the value of equity measured against the market value of an asset that is being used
as collateral; it is ‘skin in the game’. Haircut is an inverse of leverage ratio.
3This is a situation comparable to the tradition bank run. Repo investors’ rejection to rollover is
analogous to retail depositors’ cash withdrawal. When a herd behavior emerges, each of these can
put commercial banks and investment banks, respectively, into a liquidity crisis. This is the run on
repo as analyzed in Gorton and Metrick (2012) and Martin et al. (2014).
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bank by using a banking model of repo transaction. It compares to, among others,
Adrian and Shin (2014)’s contracting model where banks follow the Value–at–Risk
rule and the main friction is risk–shifting moral hazard. A distinctive aspect of the
Adrian and Shin model is that it adopts Extreme Value Theory to study extreme
and rare events that match the repo market disruption. In contrast, my approach
adopts a more generalized framework where the bank is simply characterized by stan-
dard profit–maximizing behavior without necessarily invoking the extreme outcome
specification as in the Adrian and Shin model.
Particularly, my model focuses on repo rate, instead of haircuts as in Geanakoplos
(2009) and Adrian and Shin (2014), as a channel through which an asset price cycle
is transmitted to the bank leverage cycle. This reflects Smith (2012)’s finding that
for the 2008 crisis episode the repo rate is a superior measure of market stress in
the form of collateral value risk. Accordingly, in my model the repo rate moves
in a way that reflects risks faced by repo lenders, who are risk–neutral. That is,
when asset prices rise, which strengthens the collateral value, counter–party risk and
collateral value risk of the repo lenders will fall and consequently the repo rate will
fall as well. In this environment the borrowers, i.e. security broker–dealers, will be
able to achieve maximum profitability by raising leverage. On the contrary, in times
of market stress when assets serving as collateral experience loss the repo rate will
rise. As a consequence, the profit–maximizing repo borrowers will have to lower the
leverage. In this respect, optimal leverage of the securitized bank is shown to be
positively related to asset prices, i.e. procyclical.
In order to examine macroeconomic implications of the procyclical bank leverage,
I then build a macrodynamic balance sheet model consisting of a nonfinancial sector
and a financial intermediary sector. The intermediary sector is subdivided into three
subsectors including traditional banks that extend loans to the real economy and two
other nonbank financial firms, i.e. broker–dealers that purchase the securitized bank
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loans by issuing repos and asset managing firms that provide funds to the repo market.
The main analytical result of the model derives from the Hopf bifurcation theorem,
and accordingly it is shown that under plausible conditions the model exhibits a limit
cycle behavior, generating a persistent cycle of asset price and bank leverage.
More specifically, on the one hand, from balance sheet identities demand and
supply of bank loans are derived as a positive function of the nonfinancial sector’s
leverage and the securitized bank’s leverage, respectively. On the other hand, the
leverage of each sector is specified as a positive function of asset prices. In this setup,
procyclical bank leverage is defined as emerging when the coefficient that captures
asset prices’ impact on the securitized bank’ leverage is sufficiently large so that in
effect the supply curve of bank loans is more responsive than the demand curve is to
a asset price fluctuation. This definition differs from the one suggested in Adrian and
Shin (2010) where leverage is said to be procyclical when growth rate of total assets
and that of leverage are the same.
The analytical definition of procylical bank leverage presented in this chapter
is theoretically rewarding in two ways. First, it allows to see that underlying the
dynamics of leverage cycle and asset price cycle is the supply–led credit expansion
and collapse. In the case of asset price appreciation, the bank loan will be in excess
supply, which will lead to a fall in interest rates, which in turn will further boost
the asset price rise; the same process will take place in the opposite direction in
the case of asset price depreciation. Second, it also allows to quantify the degree of
procyclicality of leverage by using the marginal impact of asset pries on leverage as a
proxy. Accordingly, it is shown that the stronger the procyclicality of the securitized
bank’s leverage, the more severe and more intense will be cycles of asset prices and
bank leverage.
This chapter relates to two strands of the contemporary macro-finance literature.
First, there are a group of papers that incorporate the financial intermediary sector
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in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (Christiano et al., 2010; Gerali
et al., 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011, e.g.). While in these papers leverage constraints
the bank face develop endogenously due to various forms of agency problems, they
require exogenous shocks to actually generate leverage cycles. For instance, one of the
main findings of Nuño and Thomas (2012) — which is one of the few recent papers
that explicitly formalizes procyclical bank leverage in the DSGE framework — is
that cross–sectional volatility shocks, instead of the standard total factor productivity
shocks, are responsible for the bank leverage fluctuations. Additionally, in most of
the models in this literature the household sector does not borrow but only lends to
the firms through intermediation; and there is no securitization. On the contrary, my
model does not require exogenous disturbances to generate a cycle; it is an entirely
endogenous phenomenon. Also, the firms and households both borrow and lend via
the banking sector, which securitizes the loans.
Second, there is a small but growing literature that studies bank behavior in
the macrodynamic modeling and stock–flow consistent approach (Chiarella et al.,
2012; Hartmann and Flaschel, 2013; Nikolaidi, 2014; Ryoo, 2013, e.g.). A key result
commonly emerging from these papers is that the endogenous development of the
bank’s financial position tends to destabilize the system. However, in most cases
little attention is paid to the liability constraint facing banks due to the change
in their funding sources. In constrast, my model looks carefully into the changing
liability structure of the intermediaries and therein the government insured debts
versus collateralized short–term borrowing plays an important role.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents empirical data
on sectoral leverage to see in what sense the securitized banking sector’s leverage is
procyclical. In section 3.3, by relying on a model of repo transaction, a theoretical
explanation of the procyclical bank leverage is provided. Using the result of section
3.3 as a microfoundation, section 3.4 develops a macrodynamic model to examine the
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consequence of procylical bank leverage within a broader macroeconomic context.
The model is analyzed in in section 3.5. I conclude the chapter in section 3.6.
3.2 Empirical observation on leverage and asset prices
The main empirical finding in Adrian and Shin (2010) is that in the case of the
broker–dealer sector, its asset and leverage grow in step while equity is constant.
Asset growth is entirely driven by growth of debt, not of equity; hence the procycli-
cal leverage and what they call ‘sticky’ equity. Following this approach, leverage
is measured as a ratio of total assets over equity throughout this chapter. Figure
3.1 visualizes the mechanics underlying Adrian and Shin (2010)’s observation. It
shows how, in marking–to–market accounting system, balance sheet variables change
in response to asset price developments. In panel (a), a rise in asset prices initially
increases the book value of equity along with the total asset size, thereby lowering
the leverage ratio. The leverage is counter–cyclical. However, in panel (b) the con-
sequent financial slack is used to issue more debts, thereby purchasing more assets
and hence increasing an exposure to risks. Moreover, the equity is maintained at its
initial level through capital policies such as dividend payments and share buybacks,
etc. Consequently, the leverage ratio more than restores its initial level. In this case,
the leverage is procyclical and equity is sticky.
Adrian and Shin (2010) illustrate the relation between the total asset and leverage
in growth terms. From a slightly different angle, I define cyclicality of leverage in
regard to asset prices in level terms. The data collected below motivate this approach.4
Figure 3.2 plots the asset price–leverage relation for the broker–dealer sector. As
mortgage–related securities constitute a substantial part of the broker-dealer’s assets,
I used a housing price. It is clear that the leverage rises with the asset price. The case
4Data presented in the figures below are collected from Z.1 Financial Accounts of the United
States released by the Federal Reserves.
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Figure 3.1: Distinctive leverage management
(A: total assets, D: total debts, E: equity)
for the commercial bank is depicted in figure 3.3. It plots the leverage in relation to
both a housing price and a stock market index. In either case, while the asset prices
change widely the leverage trend is quite stable despite a few outliers.
Figure 3.4a describes the positive relation between the asset price and leverage for
the household sector. However, when compared with the case of securitized banks as
shown in figure 3.4b, we can see that changes in leverage are much less pronounced,
almost negligible. The case for nonfinancial corporate business is presented in figure
3.5. The first panel covers the entire period of 1975–2013. It shows that the leverage
was procyclical when the stock market price was low and, when it has become higher
the leverage has changed to be counter-cyclical. The turning point is around 1990.
The asset price–leverage relation for the period of 1990–2013 is separately plotted in
the second panel and the counter–cyclical leverage is more manifest.
An interesting observation emerging from these data is that for the broker–dealer
sector the positive correlation between asset prices and leverage is quite consistent
over time, while for the other sectors the correlation is either weak or inconsistent.
By implication, this sector borrows more in the case of asset price appreciation and
deleverages when asset prices fall. This is what is implied by ‘procyclical leverage’ in
this chapter.
89
Figure 3.2: Asset prices and leverage of the securitized bank (1975-2013)
Figure 3.3: Asset prices and leverage of commercial banks (1975–2012)
(a) Housing price and leverage (b) Stock price and leverage
In the next section, I will provide a theory that explains procyclical leverage of
the securitized bank in relation to its repo financing.
3.3 A model of repo transaction
A repo contract stipulates that a borrower sells security to lenders with an agree-
ment that she will repurchase it at a later date. In effect, the difference between
the repurchase price and original price constitutes interest, called repo rate, and the
borrower’s security acts as collateral. In the event of the borrower’s default on her
obligation, the lender keeps the security and liquidates it to recover her initially lent
cash. However, the liquidation will be difficult, possible only at a fire-sale price, if the
90
Figure 3.4: Asset prices and leverage of households (1975–2012)
(a) Households (b) Households and securitized bank
Figure 3.5: Asset prices and leverage of nonfinancial firm (1975-2013)
(a) 1975-2013 (b) 1990-2013
securities market is under stress. In order to mitigate such credit risk, repos are often
overcollaterized the degree of which is dictated by haircut; in addition, the repo rate
includes a credit risk premium over and above the interest rate for insured deposits.
However, empirical research on the movement of haircut during the recent financial
crisis produces mixed evidence depending on the types of repo markets and quality
of collateral. In the bi–lateral repo market for low–grade collateral, haircuts surged
during the financial crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). In the tri–party repo market,
however, haircuts changed very little during the same period (Krishnamurthy et al.,
2014). On the other hand, Smith (2012) finds that the repo rate gives a consistent
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measure of market stress in the form of collateral value risk. This chapter adheres
to Smith’s finding and, accordingly, the repo market dynamics will be reflected in
the movement of the repo rate. Haircut is only implicit in the determination of the
securitized bank’s leverage.
Consider a securitized bank, as a leveraged investor, that finances its asset position
in securities, denoted by A, through own equity E and repo borrowing D at a repo
rate rp, using the securities as collateral. The associated credit risk is formalized as
follows: At the repo maturity date, the rate of return on A is high at rH with a
probability θ, satisfying 0 < θ < 1, and the bank is able to honor the contract by
paying (1 + rp)D. With a probability 1 − θ the return on A is rL which is too low
for the bank to carry out the obligation. The bank defaults and the lender keeps
the collateral. The repo rate includes a risk-premium over risk-free rate rf and is
lower than the high yield on risky investment. Accordingly, the order of magnitude
of interest rates is the following:
rL < 0 < rf < rp < rH < 1 (3.1)
Regarding the asset value, a distinction is made between notional value, which is
computed by the expected, or average, return, and liquidated value, which is a realized
price when liquidated. First, the average return on the securitized bank’s total asset
is θrH + (1 − θ)rL. Thus, its notional value would be
(
1 + θrH + (1 − θ)rL
)
A. On
the other hand, when the asset is liquidated, its notional value may or may not be
realized in full depending on the market conditions. I use q, with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, to
denote the degree of realization of the notional value in case of asset liquidation.
Accordingly, the liquidated value would be expressed q
(
1 + θrH + (1 − θ)rL
)
A. By
examining the derivative of the asset value with respect to θ, it is easy to see that
the probability of high asset return positively affects the asset value whether it be
notional or liquidated.
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Since the securitized bank’s assets are posted as collateral, when it defaults on its
repo contract the collateral is obtained by the repo lender, who will most probably
attempt to sell it to recover the initially invested cash. However, when the default
rate is high in the repo market, the number of repo lenders attempting to liquidate
collateral will be large and consequently the liquidation can take place only at a loss.
This circumstance will be reflected in q being small. More specifically, in the case of
the borrower’s default on repo contract due to the asset return being low, the notional
value of the collateral the lender obtains would be (1 + rL)A and its liquidated value
q(1 + rL)A where it holds that q(1 + rL)A < (1 + rp)D.5 A greater indebtedness
of borrowers in the economy increases their financial burden and therefore raises the
probability of debt default. Hence q can be specified as a decreasing function of the
borrower’s leverage ratio, which is defined as λ = A/E as before.
q = q(λ), q′ < 0 (3.2)
The repo lender’s return, denoted by rc (superscript c indicating ‘creditor’), can
be measured as
rc = θ(1 + r
p)D + (1− θ)(1 + rL)Aq −D
D
(3.3)
The first term of the numerator is the repo lender’s payoff for lending D in case of the
higher asset return. The lender’s payoff in case of the low asset return is the liquidated
value, not the notional value, of the borrower’s asset as reflected in the second term
of the numerator. The lender is risk-neutral and therefore it is required that rc equals
the alternative risk–free rate rf . The repo rate rp should be determined at a level
that guarantees rc = rf , which is a participation constraint of the repo lender. As a
5If q(1 + rL)A = (1 + rp)D holds, the defaulted borrower would not have had to default in the
first place.
93
consequence, using the definition of leverage ratio, the required rate repo is obtained
from rc = rf as
1 + rp = 1 + r
f
θ
− 1− θ
θ
λ
λ− 1(1 + r
L)q (3.4)
Equation (3.4) regards the determination of repo rate. It demonstrates that, other
things being equal, the repo rate depends on θ and λ. Proposition 11 summarizes the
relations.
Proposition 11. Repo rate movements:
i) rp rises (falls) as λ increases (decreases).
ii) rp rises (falls) as θ decreases (increases).
iii) The impact λ has on rp as described in (i) becomes weaker (stronger) as θ gets
larger (smaller).
Proof is moved in H. On the one hand, since borrowers’ leverage λ incurs risks
on the part of lenders, its rise will increase the repo rate. This is stated in (i). On
the other hand, θ affects the repo rate in two ways. First, it is positively related
to the value, both notional and liquidated, of the asset that serves as collateral.
Consequently, when θ is higher the repo lender will allow the securitized bank to
borrow at a lower rate. This is stated in (ii). Second, while a rise in λ will lead to
an increase in rp as in (i), the increase will be smaller when the asset value improves
with a rise in θ. This is because the enhancement of collateral value weakens the
lender’s counter–party risk. This is stated in (iii).
In the case of the low asset return rL, the borrower’s loss would be her asset’s
notional value while the lender’s payoff would be the liquidated value of collateral,
which is the borrower’s asset. In this respect, the securitized bank’s expected net
revenue can be measured as
Πb = θ(rHA− rpD)− (1− θ)(1 + rL)A (3.5)
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The first term is the bank’s net revenue in the case of the high asset return, and the
second term is the loss in the case of default. Then the bank’s expected return on
equity, denoted by rb = Πb
E
(superscript b indicating borrower), can be obtained as
rb = θ
(
rHλ− rp(λ− 1)
)
− (1− θ)(1 + rL)λ (3.6)
Substituting the incentive constraint, expressed in equation (3.4), into (3.6) yields
rb = θrHλ− (1 + rf − θ)(λ− 1)− (1− θ)(1 + rL)(1− q)λ (3.7)
Now, let us take λ as an endogenous variable, chosen by the bank to maximize rb.
Accordingly, it solves the following optimization problem:
max
λ
θrHλ− (1 + rf − θ)(λ− 1)− (1− θ)(1 + rL)(1− q)λ
Optimal leverage is obtained by the first–order condition as:
λ∗ = 1
q′
(
1− q + 1 + r
f − θ(1 + rH)
(1− θ)(1 + rL)
)
(3.8)
Since q′ < 0 is assumed, in order to avoid a degenerate case of negative leverage,
an additional condition is adopted that requires the expression in the bracket to be
negative. The result yields
1 + rH > 1− θ
θ
(1− q)(1 + rL) + 1 + r
f
θ
(3.9)
which requires rH to be sufficiently large. Under this condition, it can be verified
how the optimal leverage changes along with a variation of asset prices reflected in θ.
Proposition 11 states the result.
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Proposition 12. The optimal leverage λ∗ rises (falls) as θ rises (falls).
Proof. It is enough to verify the sign of the partial derivative of λ∗, expressed in
equation (3.8), w.r.t. θ.
∂λ∗
∂θ
= − (1 + r
L)(rH − rf )
q′(1− θ)2(1 + rL)2 > 0 (3.10)
due to rH > rf and q′ < 0.
Proposition 12 implies that the securitized bank’s leverage is procyclical. A change
in θ, which determines the asset value, imparts an impact on the bank’s leverage
behavior in two ways. First, a rise in θ, for instance, lowers rp as demonstrated in (i)
of proposition 11. In the environment of a higher average asset return and a lower
borrowing cost, a debt–financed investment would be more profitable; hence, λ will
rise. Second, the consequent rise in the leverage ratio pushes the repo rate up as
shown in (ii) of proposition 11. However, this feedback effect of λ on rp becomes
smaller as the asset value strengthens, as in (iii) of proposition 11, so that it does not
fully offset the initial reduction of rp. Through these two processes, a rise (fall) in θ
leads to a fall (rise) in rp, which in turn increases (decreases) λ; hence, procyclical
behavior of the securitized bank’ leverage.
3.4 A balance sheet model
In this section, I build a macrodynamic model and examine the consequence of
procyclical bank leverage within a macro context. The model is built by first specify-
ing distinctive leverage behaviors of financial and nonfinancial sectors in response to
asset price developments, then, from these, deriving the demand and supply of bank
loans; notice that the nonfinancial sector’s leverage shapes the demand for credit
while the financial sector’s leverage shapes the supply of credit since financial firms
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borrow in order to lend. Lastly, the model describes how the procyclical bank lever-
age generates supply–led boom and bust of credit and, consequently, determines the
credit market interest rate in a way that amplifies asset price cycles. A central behav-
ioral specification of the model is founded upon the empirical and theoretical findings,
presented in section 3.2 and 3.3 respectively, that the securitized bank’s leverage has
a sufficiently strong correlation with asset prices.
Nonfinancial sector includes nonfinancial firms and households which are consoli-
dated into one sector, which I call real sector. Financial sector is divided into three
subsectors, i.e. commercial bank, investment bank, interchangeably called securitized
bank, and asset managing firm. Notations for the real sector and the three financial
sectors in order are R, B, X, and N . Notations for the balance sheet variables are
used in the same way as in the previous section; A for asset, D debt, E equity, and
λ leverage ratio. The sectors associated with these balance sheet variables will be
indicated as a subscript. For instance, leverage ratio of the securitized banking sector
is denoted by λX . A list of the notations can be found in appendix F.
3.4.1 Real sector: firms and households
The real sector’s asset, AR, consists of both real and financial assets. First, there
are two types of financial assets; deposit accounts, denoted byMB, at the commercial
bank – cash is included in this category – and nondeposit accounts, denoted by MN ,
at insurance company, pension funds, mutual funds, etc., which are managed by
asset managers. The real asset, denoted by K, includes the firms’ capital and the
households’ housing, and PR is some consolidated price index of these real assets.
The real sector’s assets are financed by a mix of own funds, i.e. equity, ER, and
debts, DR. It is assumed that the real sector’s debt exclusively consists of bank loan,
denoted by L, i.e. DR = L, and particularly that the bank loan finances this sector’s
positions in the real assets only. In sum, the real sector’s balance sheet identity
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(AR ≡ DR + ER) is expressed as
PRK +MB +MN ≡ L+ ER (3.11)
The first behavioral assumption of the model regards the real sector’s leverage
ratio in relation to asset prices. Reflecting the empirical observations in section 3.2
where the real sector’s leverage is almost flat in relation to housing price and stock
market index, it can be specified as a simple linear function of PR.
λR = α0 + α1PR, α0, α1 > 0 (3.12)
where α1 is close to zero. For the sake of convenience, α1 will be set to zero, which
implies that the real sector’s leverage is constant at α0. On the other hand, the real
sector’s equity value will vary, by the accounting definition, along with asset price
fluctuations. Hence, when the real sector’s equity is specified similarly as a simple
linear function of PR as
ER = δ0 + δ1PR, δ0, δ1 > 0 (3.13)
Asset price determination is modeled with regard to two channels, i.e. expec-
tations channel and funding cost channel. First, when asset prices are expected to
rise, asset investors will increase their demand for the assets while the supply will fall
since, from the perspective of sellers, the assets can be sold at a higher price in the
subsequent periods. Second, obviously a funding cost negatively affects the asset de-
mand through while the asset supply is not affected significantly. In this setting, PR
is an increasing function of its expected future value, denoted by P eR, and a decreasing
function of the bank lending interest rate, denoted by rl.6
6An alternative way to motivate equation (3.14) is to rely on the present valuation asset pricing,
where interest rate is negatively correlated to asset price while expected asset price has a positive
impact on the latter.
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PR = 0 + 1P eR − 2rl, 0, 1, 2 > 0 (3.14)
Regarding the determination of P eR, suppose the case where investors reckon that
asset prices cannot rise permanently. There is a certain level of the asset price which
is perceived by the market as too high. When the current asset price is below this
level, investors expect its future value to rise, but as the current price reaches this
level the market sharply adjusts its expectation downward. This type of nonlinear
relation between the expected asset price and current asset price can be captured by
formalizing a change in the former as a nonlinear function of the latter. A possible
shape of this function, named g, is depicted in figure 3.6. P ∗R is the level of current
asset price which is perceived by the market as unsustainable. When PR is below
this level, investors expect it to increase further but at a slower pace as PR becomes
higher.7 As PR reaches the threshold level, investors expect it to undergo a free fall
in the near future.8 Formally,9
P˙ eR = g(PR), g′ < 0, PR ≶ P ∗R ⇔ g ≷ 0 (3.15)
This specification of asset price expectations, along with equation (3.14), excludes
a degenerate case where asset prices permanently explode. The dynamics of asset
price expectation channel is a stabilizing factor of the model. On the other hand, as
will be shown in detail below, the contribution of the interest rate channel to the asset
7Reflecting this, the two flat segments of the curve is slightly downward sloping.
8In modeling the euphoria and pessimism in the asset market, it is more appropriate to endogenize
the threshold P ∗R. In this chapter, P ∗R is treated as constant only as a first approximation.
9The nonlinear curve in figure 3.6 can be approximated by the following function, which is adopted
from Ryoo (2010) with a slight change:
g(x) = −(g0 + g4) + g1 + g01 + e−g2(x−g3)
where g0, g1, g2, g3, g4 > 0.
99
Figure 3.6: Changes in the expected asset price as a nonlinear function of the current
asset price
price stability depends on a specify type of the banking system. More specifically, the
interest rate channel operates as a stabilizing factor in the traditional banking system
but as a destabilizing factor in the securitized banking system. Consequently, in the
securitized banking system, the model will avoid a degenerate case of permanent
explosion only when the destabilizing channel, reflected in 2, is sufficiently small.
3.4.2 Commercial bank
The commercial bank’s total asset, AB, includes reserves, denoted by HB, and
loans, denoted by L. Bank loans are extended to the real sector. Part of them is
taken off from the loan book and packaged into asset–backed securities (ABS). This
share is denoted by ω, a securitization rate, which satisfies 0 < ω < 1. It is assumed
that the ABS is purchased only by the securitized banking sector. Therefore, ω is
determined by the securitized bank’s activity, which will be discussed shortly.10 Bank
loans mainly finance real assets such as housing and firms’ capital and, consequently,
the securitized loans will be backed by the performance of these real assets. Hence,
the real assets are, in this model, underlying assets for the ABS.
10The unspecified assumption here is that ω positively affects profitability of the commercial bank
and the latter, therefore, is willing to securitize its loan as much as possible.
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Commercial banks’ debt, DB, is FDIC–insured deposit held by the real sector;
hence DB ≡MB. Its balance sheet identity (AB ≡ DB + EB) would be expressed
L(1− ω) +HB ≡MB + EB (3.16)
Liquidity ratio, or reserve ratio, denoted by hB, is measured as hB ≡ HBDB . Reflecting
the fact that the commercial bank is highly regulated, its liquidity ratio and leverage
ratio, λB, are taken as fixed at a certain policy level.11
3.4.3 Securitized bank
For simplicity, it is assumed that ABS is the only asset of the securitized banking
sector. The number of the security and its price are denoted by X and PX , respec-
tively. The securitized bank’s asset position is financed by issuing debts in the repo
market, using the ABS as collateral. Accordingly, the securitized bank’s debt, DX ,
consists of repos, denoted by Q. Its equity is denoted by EX and is taken as con-
stant, reflecting Adrian and Shin (2010)’s finding of ‘sticky equity’. The balance sheet
identity, (AX ≡ DX + EX), can be expressed as
PXX ≡ Q+ EX (3.17)
As the investment bank operates outside of regulatory control, it is supposed that
it does not hold reserves. Therefore, the total asset size of this sector equals the total
11Standard credit supply curve is increasing with respect to the lending interest rate: ∂L
∂rl
> 0.
But in the case of the ‘originate and distribute’ model, bank revenues are produced mostly out of
fees incurred in various stages across the loan securitization process rather than interest earnings.
Consequently, the more the loans are securitized, as measured by a higher ω, the less concerned the
banks would be about the level of loan interest rate. The standard credit supply curve will become
flatter as securitizeation rate rises: ∂2L
∂ω∂rl
< 0.
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volume of outstanding bank loans that are packaged into ABS, i.e. λXEX = ωL.
From this, an expression for ω follows as
ω = λXEX
L
(3.18)
which shows that securitization rate is determined by, given total bank loans, balance
sheet policy of the securitized bank, i.e. the latter’s equity and leverage. Intuitively, a
rise in the securitized bank’s leverage, given its sticky equity, enables the commercial
bank to securitize more of its existing loans.12
In parallel to the real sector leverage in equation (3.12), the leverage behavior of
the securitized banking sector can be specified as a simple linear function of the ABS
price.
λX = β0 + β1PX , β0, β1 > 0 (3.19)
The central behavioral assumption underpinning the main analytical result of the
model regards the value of β1 which will be discussed shortly.
Determining the value of ABS is not an easy task. The initial aim of designing
these derivatives so as to spread and mitigate risks through pooling and tranching
has made it extremely difficult to see the properties of underlying assets. This is
particularly true in the case of mortgage–backed securities and even more so in the
case of subprime segment (Fender and Scheicher, 2008). I take a simpler and intuitive
approach to specify the price of ABS as an increasing function of the underlying asset
value13 and a decreasing function of the repo rate:
PX = µ0 + µ1PR − µ2rp, µ0, µ1, µ2 > 0 (3.20)
12As will be shown in section 3.4.5, ω has a positive impact on the commercial bank’s lending
capacity.
13This assumption is based on the recent experience of the correlation between housing price and
price of mortgage–related securities during the subprime mortgage turmoil.
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Equation (3.20) reflects the recent observation regarding the housing market boom
that the economic environment with low rates of interest led to an appreciation in
the underlying assets market and subsequently in the ABS market by drastically
increasing the demand for these assets while the asset supply was relatively stable
(Perraudin, 2008).
Leverage–asset price correlation for the securitized banking sector can be examined
with either type of asset, i.e. the ABS or the underlying assets. The securitized bank’s
leverage behavior in response to the ABS price is reflected in β1 while that in response
to the underlying asset price is reflected in β1µ1 due to ∂λX∂PR =
∂λX
∂PX
∂PX
∂PR
from equations
(3.19) and (3.20). In this setup, the securitized bank’s procyclical leverage will be
reflected in the value of β1µ1 being sufficiently large or, if µ1 is taken as given, β1
being sufficiently large. A specific level of these parameters will be discussed more
rigorously in section 3.5.1.
3.4.4 Asset managing firm
An asset managing firm is an unleveraged entity. It manages the real sector’s
nondeposit funds at insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds,
etc. These institutional investors’ funds are voluminous much beyond the deposit
insurance limit. Thus, they are invested in the repo market where funds are secured
by collateral. Asset managers hold cash as well. Suppose a share, denoted by hN , of
the asset manager’s total asset, AN , is held in cash and the rest is held in reverse–
repo, Q.14 Accordingly, this sector’s balance sheet identity (AN ≡ EN) is expressed
as
Q+ hNAN ≡ EN (3.21)
Asset managers set repo rate. The repo rate determination is modeled as a com-
bined effect of two sets of dynamics as follows:
14In this model, the run on repo will be reflected in a surge in hN .
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r˙p = κ1(rp − rp∗)− κ2P˙R, κ1, κ2 > 0 (3.22)
The second term reflects a collateral value risk. Recall the second statement of propo-
sition 11, according to which asset price appreciation, by enhancing collateral value,
leads to a reduction in repo rate. In line with this result, the second term formalizes
a change in the repo rate as a decreasing function of a change in the underlying as-
set price. Let us further consider a feedback effect a change in the repo rate might
possibly have on asset prices. A lower repo rate relaxes a funding cost burden on the
part of the securitized bank and this will raise the demand for assets and hence their
prices.
Combining these two mechanisms, it follows that a fall (rise) in rp will increase
(decrease) the securities price, which in turn will reduce (raise) rp further, and so on.
Such destabilizing tendency of the repo rate dynamics is captured by the first term of
equation (3.22). It is supposed that there is some normal level of repo rate, denoted
by rp∗. When the repo rate is lower than this, it tends to fall further, while when it
is higher there is a tendency to increase.
This type of unstable dynamics of the repo rate can be justified from the recent
disruption of the repo market — so-called the repo run — especially related to low
quality collateral. Before the subprime mortgage crisis emerged the spread in the repo
market over the federal funds rate was close to 1% point even when the leverage of
the borrowers, i.e. broker–dealers, was exceptionally high. However, with the rising
mortgage default rate and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the spread surged and
liquidity dried, which pushed up the repo rate even further.
In sum, the repo rate movement is a combined result of these two dynamics, re-
flected in the two terms of the above equation. While the first component, when
considered alone, renders the repo rate unstable, the second component acts as a
stabilizing factor that prevents a permanent explosion of the repo rate. In this frame-
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work, a sudden spike of rp from its record low, as observed in the recent episode of
repo run, can be explained by a sharp drop in PR, causing P˙R < 0 sufficiently enough
to bring rp over and above rp∗, which in turn, along with P˙R < 0, will intensify r˙p > 0.
For this scenario to be effective, the response of the repo rate to the underlying
asset price fluctuations should be sufficiently sensitive so as to reverse the course of
the destabilizing force. That is, κ2 should be sufficiently large. This condition will
play an important role in characterizing the full dynamics of the model (see section
3.5.2).
3.4.5 Bank credit market
Now let us illustrate bank credit market, determining quantities and prices in this
market. First, from the balance sheet specifications of each sector presented so far, the
demand and supply of bank loans can be easily derived. Second, the lending interest
rate and the interest rate spread will be determined by the demand and supply rule.
In the model, the real sector’s outstanding debt constitutes the total demand for
bank loan, which is denoted by LD; henceDR ≡ LD15 Using the balance sheet identity
of the real sector, AR ≡ DR + ER, and the definition of leverage ratio, the following
can be easily obtained.
LD ≡ (λR − 1)ER (3.23)
On the other hand, the outstanding loans in the balance sheet of the commercial
bank shape the total supply of bank credit, which is denoted by LS. It can be derived
from the balance sheet identity of the commercial bank in equation (3.16) and the
definition of its leverage and liquidity ratios as follows:
LS ≡
 λBλB−1 − hB
1− ω
MB (3.24)
15Note that the demand and supply of bank lending are considered in stock terms.
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The above expression presents a couple of interesting aspects of the commercial bank’s
lending capacity. First, deposit fund, MB, obtained from the real sector, is a funding
source for the bank in supplying loans. It is determined by portfolio behavior of the
real sector. The bank, therefore, cannot directly control it. The multiplier involved
in this loan creation process is captured by the bracketed term, which is denoted by
m.16 Its determination can be easily verified. Most interestingly, ∂m
∂ω
> 0 reflects that
securitization definitely enhances banks’ lending capacity, which is what financial
innovations are all about. The traditional commercial bank without securitization
will have ω = 0.17
Let us introduce a new parameter vB which denotes a portfolio coefficient of the
real sector, reflecting the share of its total asset held in bank deposits. Then by
definition it holds vBAR ≡MB. Using this and the expression of ω in equation (3.18)
and the identity AR ≡ λRER, equation (3.24) can be rearranged into
LS = mvBλRER + λXEX (3.25)
where m = λB
λB−1 − hB. In comparison to equation (3.24), the above equation shows
how the total outstanding bank loans, originally extended by the commercial banks,
are divided between commercial banks and securitized banks through loan securiti-
zation. The two terms in the equation represent each of these.18
By definition, the excess demand for bank loans, denoted by Φ, is
16It is different from the conventional money multiplier, which converts central bank money into
commercial bank money.
17A higher liquidity ratio has the opposite effect, i.e. ∂m∂hB < 0. But
∂m
∂λB
< 0 appears to contradict
what we know about bank leverage. With given equity, a higher bank leverage ratio should imply
larger bank asset, which is nothing but more bank lending. However, since what is given in equation
(3.24) is bank liability, i.e. deposits, a higher λB has the opposite effects.
18In obtaining this expression, the securitization rate ω in the money multiplier m has been
resolved into the second term.
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Φ ≡ LD − LS (3.26)
Suppose that the loan rate, rl, is determined by interest rate spread over the repo
rate.19
rl = rp + ξ (3.27)
where ξ denotes the interest rate spread. The spread is determined by an interaction
between the demand and supply forces in the bank loan market. Hence it is an
increasing function of the excess demand for bank credit.
ξ = τ0 + τ1Φ, τ0, τ1 > 0 (3.28)
τ0 is a constant equilibrium level of the spread where the demand and supply equili-
brate with each other. When the bank credit market is in excess demand, i.e. Φ > 0,
the spread will rise above τ0 and in case of excess supply it will fall below τ0. The
spread will be at its equilibrium level, τ0, only when Φ = 0. Introducing a constant
level of equilibrium spread can be justified within the context of this chapter which
describes a short–run fluctuation without a long–run trend.20
3.4.6 Summary of the model
The model consists of twelve endogenous variables and twelve equations, which
are reproduced in appendix G. As the basic aim of the model is to explain a persistent
boom–bust cycle of asset prices, the underlying asset price PR is modeled as a function
of its expected future value P eR and a borrowing cost rl. More importantly, PR feeds
19The repo rate acts a short-term interest rate in this model.
20A more economically intuitive way to model the spread would be to have ξ˙ = τ2 + τ3Φ rather
than equation (3.28). In this case, the model will be reduced to a three–dimensional differential
equations system. As will be seen below, by adopting equation (3.28), it becomes possible to reduce
the model to a two–dimensional differential equations system, which is much more convenient to
deal with. My approach can be compared to the existing models of cycles where the bench mark
rate such as the federal funds rate is taken as constant.
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back into both P eR and rl, thereby generating endogenous loops as depicted in figure
3.7a. The PR → P eR link is modeled simply as a nonlinear relation as in figure 3.6.
On the other hand, the other feedback mechanism, the PR → rl link, which is
the heart of the model, is much more complicated. Figure 3.7b illustrates the key
causal relations of that link. The main thrust is the underlying asset price affecting
the leverage behavior of the real sector and that of the securitized banking sector,
which in turn shape, respectively, demand and supply of bank loans, which, finally,
affect the loan rate. Section 3.5.1 discusses this in great detail.
The model’s full dynamics as a combined result of all of the four links in figure
3.7a is presented in section 3.5.2. The twelve equations and identities of the model
are reduced to two differential equations in P eR and rp, which are two state variables of
the model. Once the model is solved, therefore, all the variables will be expressed as
a function of P eR and rp, which reflect the two channels of asset price determination,
i.e. expectations channel and interest rate channel. The full solution of the model
is presented in appendix G.21 The main analytical result of the model, discussed in
section 3.5.2, regards the conditions under which the system exhibits a limit cycle
behavior.
3.5 Model analysis
3.5.1 Analytics of procyclical bank leverage
Let us formalize the PR → rl link. It will be shown that this link exhibits a peculiar
pattern depending on the procyclicality of bank leverage. The key mechanism here
is that each of the nonfinancial and financial sector’s leverage behavior shapes the
demand and supply of bank credit, respectively. To see this, expand the identities
21All the mathematics involved in solving and analyzing the model in the rest of the chapter are ob-
tained with Mathematica as they are somewhat messy to be obtained simply by hand. Mathematica
codes will be available directly from the author upon request.
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Figure 3.7: Causal links of the model
(a) Dynamics of the underlying asset price PR in relation to its expected future value P eR
and the bank lending interest rate (funding cost) rl
(b) Details of the PR → rl link
of LD and LS in equations (3.23) and (3.25) by using behavioral equations (3.12),
(3.13), (3.19), and (3.20).
LD = δ0(α0 − 1) + δ1(α0 − 1)PR
LS = vBmα0δ0 + β0 + β1µ0 − β1µ2rp + (vBmα0δ1 + β1µ1)PR
(3.29)
The demand and supply of bank credit are now expressed as a linear function of PR.
By comparing the demand response to the asset price, i.e. ∂LD
∂PR
= δ1(α0− 1), and the
supply response, ∂LS
∂PR
= vBmα0δ1 +β1µ1, an interesting analytical result regarding the
procyclicality of the securitized bank leverage is obtained as demonstrated in lemma
2. Remember β1 is the marginal response of the securitized bank’s leverage to the
ABS price.
Lemma 2. The level of β1 and the relative response of the demand and supply of
bank loan to the asset price are related in the following way:
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∂LD
∂PR
<
∂LS
∂PR
⇐⇒ β1 >
(
α0(1− vBm)− 1
)
δ1
µ1
⇐⇒ W1 > 0
∂LD
∂PR
>
∂LS
∂PR
⇐⇒ β1 <
(
α0(1− vBm)− 1
)
δ1
µ1
⇐⇒ W1 < 0
where W1 = β1µ1 −
(
α0(1− vBm)− 1
)
δ1.
Lemma 2, which can be proved by a simple algebra, states that β1 being sufficiently
large so as to have W1 > 0 is analytically equivalent to the supply response to the
asset price being stronger than the demand response; if β1 is not so large thatW1 < 0
is the case, then this is analytically equivalent to the demand response being stronger.
This result provides a useful gauge to rigorously determine how large β1 should be
in order to say the leverage is procyclical. Accordingly, the following definition is
adopted.
The leverage ratio is said to be procyclical when β1 >
(
α0(1−vBm)−1
)
δ1
µ1
holds so
as to generate W1 > 0. The securitized banking system is characterized by having
this property and therefore, due to lemma 2, by ∂LD
∂PR
< ∂L
S
∂PR
. On the contrary, the
traditional banking system is characterized by the opposite, i.e. β1 <
(
α0(1−vBm)−1
)
δ1
µ1
so that W1 < 0 holds, and hence ∂L
D
∂PR
> ∂L
S
∂PR
.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the difference between the two distinctive banking systems in
terms of the demand and supply responses to the underlying asset price. In order to
see how this difference affects the bank lending interest rate, let us use the expressions
for demand and supply of bank loan in (3.29) to obtain the excess demand as a
function of the underlying asset.
Φ = −β0 +
(
α0(1− vBm)− 1
)
δ0 − β1µ0 + β1µ2rp −W1PR (3.30)
By examining the response of the excess bank credit demand to the asset price, i.e.
∂Φ
∂PR
= −W1, it easily follows that
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Figure 3.8: Demand and supply of bank loan as a function of the underlying asset
price in the two different banking systems
(a) Traditional banking system (b) Securitized banking system
Lemma 3. If W1 > 0, then ∂Φ∂PR < 0; if W1 < 0, then
∂Φ
∂PR
> 0
According to lemma 3, in the traditional banking system the excess bank loan
demand rises (falls) when the underlying asset price rises (falls), which is normally
expected, and the opposite is true in the securitized banking system; that is, when
the asset price rises (falls)the excess bank loan demand falls (rises).
The impact the excess loan demand has on the lending rate can be obtained from
equations (3.27) and (3.28) as ∂rl
∂Φ = τ1 > 0. Combining this result with lemma 3, it
follows that, using ∂rl
∂PR
= ∂rl
∂Φ
∂Φ
∂PR
,
Lemma 4. If W1 > 0, then ∂r
l
∂PR
< 0; if W1 < 0, then ∂r
l
∂PR
> 0.
Lemma 4 characterizes the PR → rl link in figure 3.7a. Similarly to lemma 3, it
states that while in the traditional banking system the lending interest rate moves
in the same direction with the underlying asset price movement, which is normally
expected, in the securitized banking system it moves in the opposite direction; i.e.
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the lending rate fluctuates counter–cyclically, rising in case of asset price depreciation
and falling in case of appreciation.
When this result is combined with the rl → PR link, it can be seen that the interest
rate channel operates as a stabilizing factor in the traditional banking system while
as a destabilizing factor in the securitized banking system. On the other hand, the
specifications for the PR → P eR link and the P eR → PR link ensure that the expectations
channel operates as a stabilizing factor, regardless of a specific type of banking system.
Consequently, the stability properties of the securitized banking system will depend
on the effectiveness of these channels while the traditional banking system will always
be stable.
3.5.2 Full dynamics: limit cycle
In order to understand the full dynamics of the model, let us reproduce the model
in 2D system.
P˙ eR = g(PR)
r˙p = g1κ2 + (r
p − rp∗)κ1W2
W3
(3.31)
where from appendix ?? we know that PR is solved as
PR = −U2 + 1P
e
R − (2 + β12µ2τ1)rp
W2
with22
W1 = β1µ1 −
(
α0(1− vBm)− 1
)
δ1
W2 = −1 + 2τ1W1
W3 = W2 + 2κ2(1 + β1µ2τ1)
(3.32)
22See appendix ?? for the expression of U2, which is omitted here since it is inessential for the
following discussion.
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The Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady–state, denoted with an upper bar,
is obtained as
J =

∂P˙ eR
∂P eR
∂P˙ eR
∂rp
∂r˙p
∂P eR
∂r˙p
∂rp
 =
 −
1g¯′
W2
2(1+β1µ2τ1)g¯′
W2
− 21κ2g¯′
W2W3
κ1
W2
W3
+ 1g¯′
(
1
W2
− 1
W3
)

where g¯′ = ∂g
∂PR
∣∣∣
PR=P¯R
< 0, the sign of which is due to the shape of the function g,
i.e. g′ < 0.
These expressions show that the stability of the system depends on the signs
of W1, W2, and W3. It is already known from lemma 2 that W1 is related to the
securitized bank’s leverage behavior. It will be further shown that W2 is related to
the effectiveness of the interest rate channel and that W3 regards the repo market
behavior. By implication, the existence of limit cycle in the model of securitized
banking system depends on the conditions regarding these three aspects.
In studying the limit cycle behavior of the model, I rely on Hopf bifurcation
theorem (Gandolfo, 2010). According to this theorem, a bifurcation occurs when the
system shifts from stable fixed point to stable cycle as a system parameter gradually
changes. The change in the system parameter underpins the shift in the dynamic
stability properties of the model. In the model κ1 will be used as the bifurcation
parameter. Remember κ1 is the coefficient that captures the destabilizing force in
the repo market expressed (see equation (3.22)). The central result of the model is
presented in proposition 13.
Proposition 13. Under the conditions ofW2 < 0 andW3 > 0, the system undergoes
a bifurcation at κ1 = κ∗1 = 1g¯
′
W2
. When the bifurcation parameter κ1 passes through
its critical value κ∗1, a limit cycle emerges by way of Hopf bifurcation theorem.
Proof of proposition 13 is moved to appendix H. Here, let us consider economic
implications of each of the three conditions for the existence of limit cycle. Regarding
the first condition W2 < 0, consider the following sign relations.
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Lemma 5. Since W2 = −1 + 2τ1W1,
1. in the case of W1 > 0,
(a) W2 > 0 holds as long as 2 > 1τ1W1 and
(b) W2 < 0 holds as long as 2 < 1τ1W1 .
2. In the case of W1 < 0, W2 < 0 holds always.
Remember 2 is the marginal response of the asset price to the bank lending rate,
thus reflecting the strength of the interest rate channel. According to lemma 5, in the
securitized banking system (W1 > 0) the sign of W2 depends on the strength of the
interest rate channel, while it is always negative in the traditional banking system
(W1 < 0).
As the focus of this chapter is to understand a more recent banking system char-
acterized by securitized banking, the analysis below will be confined to the case of
W1 > 0. In this context, the first condition, W2 < 0, states that for the existence
of the limit cycle in the securitized banking system the interest rate channel should
be sufficiently weak. Since in the securitized banking system the interest rate chan-
nel has a destabilizing tendency as discussed in the previous subsection, limiting its
strength to a certain level helps the system avoid a permanent explosion.
The other two conditions of proposition 13 regard the two elements in the repo
rate dynamics. Let us reproduce the equation for the repo rate movement:
r˙p = κ1(rp − rp∗)− κ2P˙R
Remember the first term reflects a destabilizing force characteristic in the repo rate
movement and the second term captures the sensitivity of the repo investors to the
underlying asset price development.
By using the expression for W3 in (3.32) it can be seen that the second condition,
W3 > 0, imposes, given the other parameters, a certain restriction on κ2:
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κ2 > − W2
2(1 + β1µ2τ1)
This requirement demonstrates that for the existence of limit cycle the repo investors
have to be sufficiently sensitive to changes in the underlying asset price, adjusting
the repo rate quite drastically. It is in line with the second result of proposition 11
according to which the repo rate adjusts in the opposite direction from the value of
assets that serve as collateral. On the other hand, the last condition κ1 = 1g¯
′
W2
, which
regards Hopf bifurcation point, requires that in order for the system to generate a
limit cycle, the destabilizing force in the repo market has to be neither too small nor
too large but be near the neighborhood of a critical value κ∗1 = 1g¯
′
W2
.
These two conditions require κ1 and κ2 to be at a proper range so that they
together shape the repo market dynamics in a way that induces the system to generate
a limit cycle. For instance, a sufficiently large κ2 will ensure that in the environment
of low repo rate — being below the normal rate rp∗ so that it tends to keep falling
and stay lower — a substantial drop in PR will change the course of rp by pushing it
up above rp∗, which will now force rp to rise further. The similar drastic change in
the direction of the repo rate movement will take place when there is a rise in PR in
the high repo rate environment.
If, on the contrary, κ2 is relatively small and, accordingly, the repo investors are
not sufficiently sensitive to asset price developments, i.e. W3 < 0, then there would
be no such mechanism that reverses the destabilizing tendency in the repo market,
and thus the repo will keep rising or keep falling (in which case the stability property
of the system will be an unstable node). Similarly, if κ1 is too larger or too smaller
compared to the critical value κ∗1 = 1g
′
W2
, the system will cyclically converge to the
steady–state (stable focus) or cyclically diverge (unstable focus), respectively.
In all, proposition 13 states that the securitized banking system will experience
persistent boom–bust cycles of asset prices, bank leverage, and liquidity under the
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three conditions: i) underlying asset market is driven primarily by self–realizing ex-
pectations rather than being constrained by funding cost conditions, ii) in setting the
repo rate, lenders are sufficiently sensitive to the asset price developments regarding
the collateral value, and iii) there is a certain degree of destabilizing tendency in the
repo rate movement.
With the signs of W1, W2, and W3 required for the existence of limit cycle and
the critical value of the bifurcation point κ∗1 = 1g¯
′
W2
, the Jacobian matrix of the system
now obtains definite signs:
J =

∂P˙ eR
∂P eR
∂P˙ eR
∂rp
∂r˙p
∂P eR
∂r˙p
∂rp
 =
 − +− +

These signs clearly reflect that while the repo rate is behaving in a destabilizing way
∂r˙p
∂rp
> 0, the dynamics of asset price expectation operates as a stabilizing mechanism in
the system ∂P˙
e
R
∂P eR
< 0. Due to the risk in collateral value, the repo market is susceptible
to widely fluctuating asset price expectations, thus lowering (raising) the change in
the repo rate when expectations enhance (deteriorate); ∂r˙p
∂P eR
< 0. On the other hand,
the asset price appreciation reinforced by a fall in the repo rate23 cannot continue
without bound due to the nonlinearity in the asset price expectation dynamics. The
decrease in the repo rate will ultimately lower the rise in the expected asset price;
∂P˙ eR
∂rp
> 0.
Figure 3.9 depicts the limit cycle behavior of the full model linearlized around
the steady–state. While the 2D system is in P eR and rp, since PR is what is actually
observed in the market, I have presented the limit cycle in PR and rp. Starting from
some arbitrary initial values for PR and rl near the steady–state, the model eventually
generates a limit cycle. The two episodes that are characteristic to the repo market
23This can be seen by verifying from the solution for PR that ∂PR∂rp < 0 holds.
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Figure 3.9: The limit cycle of the underlying asset price and repo rate
cycle is immediately observable; the one where the repo rate falls with asset price
appreciation and the other where the repo rate rises with asset price depreciation.
Since the two state variables P eR and rp exhibit cyclical behavior, all the other
variables of the model, which are solved as a function of the state variables, will
also evolve cyclically. Their complete descriptions are illustrated in appendix ??.
To clarify the intuition, let us use the solution of the model listed in appendix ??
and examine the partial derivative of each with respect to the two state variables.
With the conditions W2 < 0 and W3 > 0 which are required for the existence of
a limit cycle, these partial derivatives obtain definite signs which otherwise would
have been ambiguous. Therefore, the relations that emerge from this exercise provide
important insights regarding the mechanism underlying the limit cycle. The result
is demonstrated in table 3.1. The first two columns correspond to the signs of the
Jacobian matrix. It can be easily verified that the rest of the signs are exactly as
expected.
A central element that drives these results is the leverage behavior of the securi-
tized banking sector. A rise in the expected asset price, through raising the current
underlying asset price (∂PR
∂P eR
> 0) and hence asset–backed securities price (∂PX
∂P eR
> 0),
ultimately induces the securitized banks to increase their leverage (∂λX
∂P eR
> 0). This
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Table 3.1: Comparative dynamic analysis: partial derivatives of the endogenous vari-
ables with respect to the two state variables, P eR and rp.
P˙ eR r˙
p PR PX λX Φ ξ rl
P eR – – + + + – – –
rp + + – – – + + +
type of procyclical movement of bank leverage shapes the total bank credit supply to
be more responsive to asset market developments than the total bank credit demand
is. As a consequence, the improvement in the market expectation will increase the
bank credit supply more than the demand, resulting in a fall in the excess demand
( ∂Φ
∂P eR
< 0), which in turn will suppress the interest rate spread ( ∂ξ
∂P eR
< 0) and thus
the lending interest rate ( ∂rl
∂P eR
< 0).
This mechanism is visualized in simulations in figure 3.10. Panel 3.10a displays
that the underlying asset price drives and hence leads the bank leverage with the two
variables moving in close step. However, the bank leverage moves in the opposite
direction from the funding cost measured by the repo rate as shown in the second
panel. Impacts of the procyclicality of bank leverage on the bank credit market are
depicted in the lower two panels. First, a rise in the bank leverage enhances the market
condition by increasing the supply while its fall decreases the supply. As a result, the
excess demand for bank credit moves in the opposite direction from the bank leverage
as depicted in panel 3.10c. Such changes in the demand and supply condition would
be reflected in changes in the bank lending interest rate and consequently the latter
will also move in the opposite direction from the bank leverage as shown in panel
3.10d. Ultimately, the changes in the lending rate will impart an impact on the asset
price in a way that reinforces its cyclical movement.
This is in contrast to the traditional banking system where the banking sector
has little, or less, incentive to manage its balance sheet in step with asset price
fluctuations. Consequently, the total supply of bank credit will be less sensitive to
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Figure 3.10: The relation of the securitized bank leverage with
(a) underlying asset price (b) repo rate
(c) excess demand for bank credit (d) bank lending interest rate
asset prices than the total demand is. Asset price appreciation will thus raise the
excess demand for bank loans, which in turn will increase the spread and the market
interest rate. The initial asset value appreciation will eventually be suppressed.
The key difference is that in the securitized banking system the interest rate does
not develop procyclically and hence in a way that stabilizes the credit market as it
does in the traditional banking system; rather, the interest rate falls with asset price
appreciation and rises with depreciation, i.e. counter–cyclically, thereby amplifying
the asset price fluctuation further. The main thrust of the discussion thus far has
been that this is due to the procyclical leverage of the securitized banking sector.
However, recall from proposition 13 that W1 > 0, which implies sufficiently large
β1 and thus procyclical bank leverage, is not a necessary condition for the existence
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Figure 3.11: Amplifying effect of procyclical bank leverage
of the limit cycle. Then what is the role of the procyclical bank leverage regarding
the limit cycle?
A close look at the specific expressions of the solution of the model laid out in
appendix G shows that an increase in β1 reinforces the effect of interactions among
the endogenous variables thereby amplifying the ups and downs of the cycle.24 Nu-
merically, this will be reflected in an intensification of the result of the comparative
dynamic analysis in table 3.1. For instance, from the solution for PR we can easily
see that the impact P eR has on PR becomes stronger when β1 is larger, by verifying
that the absolute value of ∂PR
∂P eR
= − 1
W2
increases when β1 rises.
Figure 3.11 visualizes the amplifying effect of procyclical bank leverage on asset
prices. Note that here the procyclical bank leverage is measured by the marginal
impact of PR on λX , i.e. β1µ1, instead of by that of PX on λX , i.e. β1, which are
two alternative measures adopted in this chapter. It is clear that the procyclicality
of securitized bank’s leverage with larger β1µ1 magnifies the asset price cycle.
24This result resonates with the main thesis of financial accelerator model where financial frictions
amplify external shocks and thus aggravate the impact on the real economy (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989, e.g.).
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3.6 Conclusion
I have presented a macrodynamic balance sheet model that replicates the high
drama of 2008 marked by securitization, housing market trouble, the run on money
markets, etc. The main drivers of persistent cycles of asset prices, bank leverage, and
liquidity are the dynamics of asset price expectation and repo rate behavior. First,
while the market for underlying assets exhibits an inflationary spiral led by self–
realizing expectations, asset prices do not explode without bound but finally collapse
as investors at some point reckon that the current asset price is too high thereby
sharply adjusting their expectations.
Second, as the repo transactions are secured by collateral and as the collateral
value is directly affected by the underlying asset price, repo investors are typically
exposed to counter–party risk and collateral value risk. Consequently, repo rate is set
in a highly unstable way, falling when asset prices appreciate and rising when they
depreciate. More importantly, this provides an incentive for the securitized bank to
manage its leverage procyclically in a way that ultimately aggravates the asset price
cycle.
While the model contains a number of crucial features of the recent financial cri-
sis and replicates them analytically, it simplifies some other related aspects. First,
the real sector dynamics has not been dealt with sufficiently. Nonfinancial firms and
households demand bank loans to finance their portfolios and hence shape the total
demand for bank loans. However, income generation of the real sector is not consid-
ered in the model. Second, while the asset price expectation changes endogenously
to the current asset price, a specific degree of the change is exogenous to the model,
given by the specific form of function g (see figure 3.6). This makes the asset price
expectation not endogenous enough.
One possible way to address these two issues simultaneously is to make the expec-
tation formation as a function not only of the current price but also of profitability
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and cash flows in the real sector. As for the specific shape of the function g, the
parameters g3 and g4 are particularly crucial.25 The former determines P ∗R which is
the level of a current price perceived by the market as unsustainable. On the other
hand, g4 shapes the vertical segment of the curve, which determines the speeds of
expectation adjustment. In order to highlight the connection between the financial
cycle and the economic performance of the real sector, it may be desirable to endoge-
nize these two parameters in relation to, for instance, income share, debt–to–income
ratio, and corporate profitability.
Regarding the repo market dynamics, my result suggests that its vulnerability to
asset price fluctuations makes it a key causal factor to the severity of the financial
cycle. Since repo funds are not supported by the government guarantee, investors
in this market tend to pull back in times of market stress, either requiring higher
returns or even withdrawing funds. It raises a question on regulating this segment of
financial markets.
Recently–implemented macroprudential regulations such as minimum capital and
liquidity requirements have made short–term funding more expensive. As a result,
tri–party repo contracts in the U.S. have fallen from its peak of $2,800bn in early
2008 to about $1,600bn in October 2014. However, not only is repo borrowing still
the largest source of funding for broker–dealers but the core vulnerability has not
gone away. The key problem of repo transaction is that there is no third–party that
guarantees the deal credible during the market stress. Accordingly, the possibility
of investors not being able to receive their cash back or to sell collateral even at a
firesale price still lingers. Hence, it is highly probable that lenders will panic again
and run on repo at the first sign of disaster thereby bringing about another crisis.
25See footnote 9 for the mathematical form of g.
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A fundamental way to address the problem, other than directly limiting repo
activity, would be to extend implicit and explicit public backstop such as FDIC
insurance or low–cost loans from the Fed discount window to the short–term money
market. In fact, these measures were what the Fed had adopted temporarily in 2008.
In terms of my model, they will lower κ2 which captures the degree of the repo
market’s susceptibility to asset price movements. Consequently it becomes possible
that the system exhibits stable focus, which is a stable dynamics, instead of limit
cycle.
While the significant role played by repo transactions in the fall–down of two
giant investment banks in 2008 has been well recognized, Rosengren the Boston Fed
president has recently commented “[u]nfortunately that potential for problems has
not been fully addressed since the crisis” (Rosengren, 2014). The key result of my
model echoes this observation.
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CONCLUSION
The current status of macroeconomic theory especially on the topic of finance and
banking has evolved from those evidenced in the statements by Gertler (1988) and
Lavoie (1995) quoted at the beginning of this dissertation. Remarkable attempts are
taking place from both New Keynesian and Post Keynesian traditions to explicitly
incorporate a financial system in macroeconomics models, and this dissertation has
aimed to contribute to this notable trend.
Then what is an explanatory power of the macro models presented in this disserta-
tion that makes them distinctive from those that do not include finance? What have
we gained from them? The extended model of circuit of capital in chapter 1 enables us
to see how the relation between growth and profitability captured in the Cambridge
equation changes when profit–making financial capitalists are incorporated. Among
others, it allows to examine profitability of capitalist economy with a distinction not
only between gross profit rate and net return on equity but also between profit rate
of industrial capital and profit rate of financial capital.
From this we see that when finance is considered, the Cambridge equation holds
in regard to the net return on equity of industrial capital rather than to the gross
profit rate. An implication is that what matters for economic growth is not gross rate
of profit but the net return on equity. In particular, the model demonstrates that
when the interest payments burden is heavy, growth capacity of the system could
be undermined. These findings contrast to the baseline model of circuit of capital
and the original Cambridge model which were derived by abstracting from a profit–
making financial intermediary sector and by assuming an equality between the rate
of profit and the rate of interest.
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On the other hand, the extended circuit of capital model in chapter 2 shows how
growth rate and interest rate are determined in equilibrium in relation to demand–
side and supply-side factors of the bank lending market. By identifying nonbank firms
that demand for bank credit and the banking firms that supply loans, the model
allows to distinguish and compare between growth led by the leverage of nonbank
firms and growth led by the levarege of banks. In particular, this approach provides
a distinctive theoretical framework in explaining distinctive economic regimes with
various combinations between growth rate and interest rate where the correlation
between the two could be either positive or negative.
The categorization of firm leverage–led vs. bank leverage–led growth regimes
presented in chapter 2 compares to that of profit–led vs. wage–led growth which
relates growth to income distribution. It also compares to the categorization of debt–
led vs. debt–burden growth that relates growth to indebtedness. While the latter
approach that focuses on debt examines a financial aspect of growth which is absent
in the former approach that focuses on income distribution, it does not pay attention
to an important distinction between indebtedness of nonbank sectors and that of the
bank. On the other hand, by explicitly formalizing the banking sector in the model,
chapter 2 enables us to see distinctive growth impacts of firm leverage and bank
leverage.
A distinction between demand and supply of bank lending is an important setup
in the model in chapter 3 as well. In addition to this, chapter 3 divides the bank-
ing sector into three subsectors and formalizes nontraditional banking such as loan
securitization and collateralized short–term borrowing. While the number of macro
models that include a banking sector is growing, those that distinguishes between
commercial banks and investment banks are only a few in number. By specifying
three different financial firms, the model in chapter 3 allows to theorize the changed
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nature of financial intermediation and explain why the financial system has become
more unstable compared to the traditional commercial banking system .
There are several points to be made for further development of this dissertation
and for the future research. There are three ways chapter 1 can be further developed.
First, simulation exercises in chapter show the convergence of the model to a steady–
state for given parameter values. It would be interesting to add exogenous shocks and
see how the model response over time. Second, we can check if the modified version
of the Cambridge equation–type result, i.e. rk = gpk , and the decomposition of the net
return on equity of nonfinancial firms, i.e. rk = rλk(1− 1η ), and the decomposition of
the bank profit rate, i.e. rb =b iL, match empirical data. Third, while the extended
model with a banking sector reveals that the bank profit rate is positively related to
interest rate and the bank leverage, the interest rate is taken as constant. It would be
interesting to see how the Cambridge equation would be modified when the interest
rate is endogenized as in chapter 2.
Regarding chapter 2, while it provides a novel perspective of growth in terms of
leverages of those who demand credit and those who supply credit, which is absent
in the debt–burden vs. debt–led growth framework, it does not capture negative
consequences of financial fragility associated with an increasing indebtedness. This is
because the finance lag is taken constant, which does not allow the nonbank firm sec-
tor’s investment behavior to respond positively or negatively to the changing fragility
of the system. In order to address this issue, it would be desirable to add a behavioral
specification of the finance lag to the model. Minsky’s works on financial instability
and fragility could be a helpful theoretical resource for this.
The model in chapter 3 faces a similar issue. In analyzing the contemporary
financial system by providing a macro model that includes a three–tier banking system
and in focusing on the financial behavior of the banking sector, I had to highly simplify
investment and financial behaviors of the nonbank sectors. In this sense, financial
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cycles of asset prices and bank leverage derived in the model are financial sector–
driven. This makes it difficult to sufficiently investigate the role of the nonbank sector,
either nonfinancial firms or households, in driving the boom–bust financial cycles.
Therefore, it would be desirable to formalize, at least, investment and consumption
behaviors in response to financial fluctuations.
In all, it turns out that establishing a realistic investment function that incorpo-
rates an influence of financial variables such as leverage ratio and margin of safety as
well as those variables that are considered in the existing models such as profit rate
and capital utilization rate seems to be one of the most pressing issues in building a
macroeconomic model with finance. This is among the top in the list of topics for
the future research.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF NOTATIONS IN CHAPTER 1
Notation Definition Notation Definition
P final output measured at cost iL loan interest rate
R sales measured at cost iD deposit interest rate
Z capital outlay η margin of safety
U productive capital a share of variable capital in capital
outlays
X commercial capital e exploitation rate
Q productive and commercial capital q markup
Fk financial capital of firms pk recapitalization rate of firms
Fs financial assets of entrepreneur
households
pb recapitalization rate of banks
Fw financial assets of worker households τF finance lag
Fm financial assets of banker households τP production lag
Bk net bank credits for firms τR realization lag
Bw net bank credits for worker house-
holds
τw consumption lag of worker house-
holds
Lk liabilities of firms τs consumption lag of entrepreneur
households
Lw liabilities of worker households τm consumption lag of banker house-
holds
Πk net profits of firms bk share of capital outlays financed by
net bank credits
Πb net profits of banks bw share of worker households’ con-
sumption financed by net bank cred-
its
Ys income of entrepreneur households λk leverage ratio of firms
Yw income of worker households λb leverage ratio of banks
Ym income of banker households rk net profit rate of firms
D aggregate demand rb net profit rate of banks
Ds consumption of entrepreneur house-
holds
r gross profit rate
Dw consumption of worker households
Dm consumpiton of banker households
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APPENDIX B
SOLUTIONS OF THE MODEL IN CHAPTER 1
B.1 Solution of the baseline model in section 1.3.1
The model, summarized in section 1.2.3, becomes the baseline model of circuit of
capital under assumption 1. The simultaneous equations system, normalized by R, is
solved with the help of Mathematica. Interested readers can acquire the Mathematica
code from the author upon request. A single prime implies a normalization by R.
Q′ = (1 + g)
−τF (1 + pkq)− 1
g
Z ′ = (1 + g)−τF (1 + pkq)
F ′k =
(
1− (1 + g)−τF
)
(1 + pkq)
g
F ′s =
(
1− (1 + g)−τs
)
(1− pk)q
g
F ′w =
a(1 + g)−τF
(
1− (1 + g)−τw
)
(1 + pkq)
g
Π′k = q
Y ′s = (1− pk)q
Y ′w = a(1 + g)−τF (1 + pkq)
D′s = (1 + g)−τs(1− pk)q
D′w = a(1 + g)−τF−τs(1 + pkq)
D′ = (1− pk)q(1 + g)τs +
(1− a)(1 + pkq)
(1 + g)τF +
a(1 + pkq)
(1 + g)(τF+τw)
(B.1)
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B.2 Solution of the extended model with the Classical as-
sumption in section 1.3.2
The model, summarized in section 1.2.3, is solved under assumption 2 with the
help of Mathematica. Interested readers can acquire the Mathematica code from the
author upon request. Variables are normalized by R and are denoted with a single
prime.
Z ′ = g(1 + q)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
Q′ = (1 + q)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL −
1
g
F ′k =
(1− bk)(1 + q)
(
(1 + g)τF − 1
)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
B′k =
gbk(1 + q)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
L′k =
bk(1 + q)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
Πk = q − bk(1 + q)iL
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
Πb =
bk(1 + q)iL
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
Y ′w =
ga(1 + q)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
D′w =
ga(1 + q)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
D′ = g(1 + q)
g(1 + g)τF (1− bk) + bkiL
(B.2)
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF NOTATIONS IN CHAPTER 2
Notation Definition Notation Definition
Q productive and commercial capital a share of variable capital in capital
outlays
F financial capital of firms e exploitation rate
R final sales measured at cost q markup
Z capital outlay p recapitalization rate of firms
B equilibrium net bank credits τ finance lag
BS supply of net bank credits rk net profit rate of firms
BD demand for net bank credits rb net profit rate of banks
L liabilities of firms iL loan interest rate
LS supply of bank loans in stock term iD deposit interest rate
Lb loans held in private banks’ balance
sheet
ω interest rate spread
Lc loans held in central bank’s balance
sheet
γ reserve requirement ratio
Eb equity of banks n share of nondeposit liabilities in
banks’ total liabilities
D aggregate demand δ share of bank deposits in firms’ total
financial assets
Πk net profits of firms b share of capital outlays financed by
net bank credits
Πb net profits of banks λ leverage ratio of banks
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APPENDIX D
SOLUTIONS OF THE MODEL IN CHAPTER 2
The model, presented in 2.2, is reduced under assumption 4 to a simplified model
consisting of seven equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), and (2.11) and eight
endogenous variables R, Z, Q, F , L, B, ΠK , and ΠB. The simultaneous equations
system, normalized by R, is solved with the help of Mathematica and its solution is as
follows. Interested readers can acquire the Mathematica code from the author upon
request. A single prime implies a normalization by R.
Z ′ = g(1 + q)
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω
Π′K =
gq(1− b)(1 + g)τ − bω
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω
B′ = bg(1 + q)
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω
Q′ = 1 + q
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω −
1
g
F ′ =
(1− b)(1 + q)
(
(1 + g)τ − 1
)
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω
L′ = b(1 + q)
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω
Π′B =
b(1 + q)ω
g(1− b)(1 + g)τ + bω
(D.1)
In section 2.3, g and ω are endogenized. Substituting the consequent solution for
g and ω, expressed in proposition 3, into the above solution will generate a complete
solution.
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APPENDIX E
PROOFS IN CHAPTER 2
Proof of (iii) in proposition 4. This will be proved with the help of lemma 6 and
lemma 7. The derivative of ω∗ with respect to λ is obtained as
∂ω∗
∂λ
=
(λ− b)τ −
(
(λ− b)τ − b
)(
λ−b
λ(1−b)
) 1
τ
λ2(λ− b)τ
Since λ > 1 and 0 < b < 1 by definition, a sign of ∂ω∗
∂λ
depends on a sign of the
numerator. Accordingly, four possible cases will emerge as summarized in lemma 6.
For a convenience, let Ω =
(
λ−b
λ(1−b)
) 1
τ and Φ = (λ−b)τ(λ−b)τ−b .
Lemma 6. A sign of ∂ω∗
∂λ
is determined as follows in four different cases:
i) in case λ > b
(
τ+1
τ
)
: if Ω < Φ, ∂ω∗
∂λ
> 0, and if Ω > Φ, ∂ω∗
∂λ
< 0
ii) in case λ < b
(
τ+1
τ
)
: if Ω > Φ, ∂ω∗
∂λ
> 0, and if Ω < Φ, ∂ω∗
∂λ
< 0
which logically follows from the expression for ∂ω∗
∂λ
(hence does not require a separate
proof).
Now, in order to verify which of the above four cases regarding the sign of ∂ω∗
∂λ
holds, relative value of the two functions Ω and Φ — as a function of λ — needs
to be compared with each other, i.e. we have to check whether Ω(λ) < Φ(λ) or
Ω(λ) > Φ(λ). This is done in lemma 7.
Lemma 7. With b < b
(
τ+1
τ
)
< λ¯ holding true, Ω(λ) and Φ(λ) can be compared as
follows.
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i) in case b < λ < b
(
τ+1
τ
)
: Ω > Φ,
ii) in case b
(
τ+1
τ
)
< λ < λ¯: Ω < Φ,
iii) in case λ > λ¯: Ω > Φ,
Proof of lemma 7. Lemma 7 can be easily proved by verifying the diagram of the two
functions Ω(λ) and Φ(λ).
First, Ω(λ) is a function monotonically increasing at a decreasing rate starting at
x–intercept (b,0) as in figure E.1. This can be verified by confirming the following:
a) Ω(λ) > 0
b) Ω(b) = 0
c) First derivative of Ω is positive, i.e. ∂Ω
∂λ
= bΩ
λτ(λ−b) > 0
d) Second derivative of Ω is negative, i.e. ∂2Ω
∂λ2 =
b
(
b(1+τ)−2λτ
)
Ω
(λ2τ2(λ−b)2) < 0
which all follow from the given conditions that 0 < b < 1, τ > 1, and λ > 1.
Second, Φ(λ) is a hyperbolic function with asymptotes λ = b
(
τ+1
τ
)
and Φ = 1
with x–intercept at (b,0) and y–intercept at (0, τ1+τ ) as in figure E.1. This can be
verified by confirming the following:
a) lim
λ→b
(
τ+1
τ
)
+
Φ = +∞ and lim
λ→b
(
τ+1
τ
)
−
Φ = −∞ yield an asymptote λ =
b
(
τ+1
τ
)
.
b) By l’Hôpital’s rule, it holds that limλ→∞+ Φ = limλ→∞+ (λ−b)τ(λ−b)τ−b = limλ→∞+
τ
τ
=
1 and limλ→∞−Φ = limλ→∞− (λ−b)τ(λ−b)τ−b = limλ→∞−
τ
τ
= 1, which consequently
yields an asymptote Φ = 1.
c) Two intercepts are obtained by Φ(0) = τ1+τ and Φ(b) = 0.
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Figure E.1: Diagram for a proof of proposition 4 and lemma 9
(Note: With Ω and Φ as a function of λ, this diagram displays the conditions of λ under which
either Ω > Φ or Ω < Φ holds, which matters in proving both proposition 4 and lemma 9.)
which all follow from the given conditions that 0 < b < 1, τ > 1, and λ > 1.
Now, from the diagram of the two functions Ω(λ) and Φ(λ) in figure E.1 derived
as above, it can be seen that there are two solutions for Ω(λ) = Φ(λ), i.e. b and λ¯
where λ¯ is λ that satisfies Ω(λ) = Φ(λ) other than b. That is, one of the two solutions
cannot be obtained as closed–form but only as an implicit function.
From these, it can be seen that b < λ¯ as confirmed by the diagram. Furthermore,
from the fact that τ > 1 and with an assumption that b > τ
τ+1 , it holds that b <
b (1+τ)
τ
< λ¯.1
Finally, the diagram of the two functions Ω(λ) and Φ(λ) with an order of magni-
tude τ1+τ < b < 1 < b
(1+τ)
τ
< λ¯ is obtained as in figure E.1.
The results in (i), (ii), and (iii) of lemma 7 can be proved by the diagram in figure
E.1
Lemmas 6 and 7 combined together prove (iii) in proposition 4.
1The reverse case, i.e. b < ττ+1 , does not change the result since an economically meaningful
range of λ is the right–hand side of 1 due to the definition of leverage ratio being larger than unity.
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Proof of proposition 5. This proposition can be proved in two steps. Each of these is
in lemma 8 and lemma 9.
Lemma 8. The condition for type I and type II pD−pS configuration:
i) type I configuration of pD(Bˆ′D, ωˆD) and pS(Bˆ′S, ωˆS) is obtained if ωˆS > ωˆD
ii) type II configuration of pD(Bˆ′D, ωˆD) and pS(Bˆ′S, ωˆS) is obtained if ωˆS < ωˆD.
Proof of lemma 8. In addition to the two pivots pD(Bˆ′D, ωD) and pS(Bˆ′S, ωS), consider
B′S that corresponds to ωˆD and denote it by B˜′S, and by the same manner, consider
B′D that corresponds to ωˆS and denote it by B˜′D.
It can be graphically verified with figure E.2 that type I pD−pS configuration is
obtained as long as the following three conditions are met simultaneously, i.e. a) ωˆS
> ωˆD; b) Bˆ′S > B˜′D; c) Bˆ′D > B˜′S. Using the equations in (2.25), it can be shown that
the mathematical condition for each of the three inequalities is exactly identical to
one other. To prove this, we can verify the following.
a’) Using the expression for ωˆS and ωˆD in lemma 1 yields
ωˆS − ωˆD > 0⇐⇒ τ1 + τ < Ω < Φ
b’) Substituting ωˆS into expressions forB′D andB′S in (2.25) yields Bˆ′S =
λ(1+q)
(
bΦ+τ(Φ−1)(2b−λ)
)
b(Φ+τΦ−τ)
and B˜′D =
λ(1+q)(Φ−1)τ
Φ+τΦ−τ . From these it can be verified that
Bˆ′S − B˜′D > 0⇐⇒
τ
1 + τ < Ω < Φ
c’) Substituting ωˆD into expressions for B′D and B′S in (2.25) yields Bˆ′D =
bλ(1+q)Φ
(λ−b)(Φ+τΦ−τ)
and B˜′S =
λ(1+q)(Φ−1)τ
Φ+τΦ−τ . From these it can be verified that
Bˆ′D − B˜′S > 0⇐⇒
τ
1 + τ < Ω < Φ
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It is readily seen that the results in (a’), (b’), and (c’) prove that the mathematical
conditions for each of (a), (b), and (c) are all identical with each other. This implies
that under the condition where ωˆS > ωˆD holds — whatever that condition might be
— the other two conditions, i.e. those in (b) and (c) will also hold.2 This proves
statement (i) of lemma 8.
The condition for type II pD−pS configuration stated in (ii) of lemma 8 can be
verified in the similar way. It can be shown that type II pD−pS configuration is
obtained as long as the following three conditions are met simultaneously, i.e. d) ωˆS
< ωˆD; e) Bˆ′S < B˜′D; f) Bˆ′D < B˜′S. Using the equations in (2.25), it can be shown that
the mathematical condition for each of the three inequalities is exactly identical to
one other. To prove this, we can verify the following.
d’) Using the expression for ωˆS and ωˆD in lemma 1 yields
ωˆD − ωˆS > 0⇐⇒ Ω > Φ
e’) Substituting ωˆS into expressions forB′D andB′S in (2.25) yields Bˆ′S =
λ(1+q)
(
bΦ+τ(Φ−1)(2b−λ)
)
b(Φ+τΦ−τ)
and B˜′D =
λ(1+q)(Φ−1)τ
Φ+τΦ−τ . From these it can be verified that
B˜′D − Bˆ′S > 0⇐⇒ Ω > Φ
f’) Substituting ωˆD into expressions for B′D and B′S in (2.25) yields Bˆ′D =
bλ(1+q)Φ
(λ−b)(Φ+τΦ−τ)
and B˜′S =
λ(1+q)(Φ−1)τ
Φ+τΦ−τ . From these it can be verified that
B˜′S − Bˆ′D > 0⇐⇒ Ω > Φ
It is readily seen that the results in (d’), (e’), and (f’) prove that the mathematical
conditions for each of (d), (e), and (f) are all identical with each other. This implies
2Lemma 9 discusses the condition for ωˆS > ωˆD.
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Figure E.2: Diagram for a proof of lemma 8
(Note: The two pivot points, pD and pS , are configured as in this diagram so that, effectively, the
demand curve shifts right and the supply curve shifts left in response to a rise in λ as long as the
following three conditions are met: i) ωˆS > ωˆD; ii) Bˆ′S > B˜′D; iii) Bˆ′D > B˜′S .)
that under the condition where ωˆD > ωˆS holds — whatever that condition might be
— the other two conditions, i.e. those in (e) and (f) will also hold.3 This proves
statement (ii) of lemma 8.
Lemma 9. The condition of λ for an inequality between ωˆD and ωˆS:
i) ωˆS > ωˆD if 1 < λ < λ¯ and
ii) ωˆS < ωˆD if λ > λ¯,
where footnote 14 can be referred to for the expression for λ¯.
Proof. Case (i): Using the expressions for ωˆD and ωˆS in lemma 1, the condition for
ωˆS > ωˆD to hold is obtained as follows:
– in case λ > b
(
τ+1
τ
)
: τ
τ+1 < Ω < Φ
– in case λ < b
(
τ+1
τ
)
: Ω < Φ or Ω > τ
τ+1
3Lemma 9 discusses the condition for ωˆD > ωˆS .
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where Ω =
(
λ−b
λ(1−b)
) 1
τ and Φ = (λ−b)τ(λ−b)τ−b . By examining the above two cases with figure
E.1, it follows that ωˆS > ωˆD holds when 1 < λ < λ¯.
Case (ii): Similarly, using the expressions for ωˆD and ωˆS in lemma 1, the condition
for ωˆS > ωˆD to hold is obtained as follows:
– in case λ > b
(
τ+1
τ
)
: Ω < τ
τ+1 or Ω > Φ and
– in case λ < b
(
τ+1
τ
)
: Φ < Ω < τ
τ+1 .
By examining the these two cases with figure E.1, it follows that ωˆS < ωˆD holds when
λ > λ¯.
A combination of lemma 8 and lemma 9 logically leads to proposition 5.
Proof of proposition 7. With g∗ =
(
λ−b
λ(1−b)
) 1
τ − 1, since g∗ is monotonically increasing
in λ−b
λ(1−b) , limλ→∞ g
∗ is obtained when λ−b
λ(1−b) is at its limit. By l’Hôpital’s rule,
lim
λ→∞
λ− b
λ(1− b) = limλ→∞
1
1− b =
1
1− b
Hence, it follows limλ→∞ g∗ =
(
1
1−b
) 1
τ − 1.
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APPENDIX F
LIST OF NOTATIONS IN CHAPTER 3
Notation Definition Notation Definition
K consolidated real index for housing
and firms’ capital
PR consolidated index of housing price
and stock market index
AR assets of the real sector P eR expected PR
DR debts of the real sector PX price of asset–backed securities
ER equity of the real sector λR leverage ratio of the real sector
MB deposits of the real sector λB leverage ratio of commercial banks
MN nondeposit funds of the real sector λX leverage ratio of securitized banks
L bank loans hB liquidity ratio of commercial banks
LD demand for bank loans hN liquidity ratio of asset managing
firms
LS supply of bank loans vB share of bank deposits in the total
assets of the real sector
Φ excess demand for bank loans ω securitization rate
AB assets of commercial banks rl loan interest rate
DB debts of commercial banks rp repo rate
EB equity of commercial banks rp∗ normal repo rate
H reserves rf risk–free rate
AX assets of securitized banks rc required return of repo lenders
DX debts of securitized banks rb securitized banks’ return on equity
EX equity of securitized banks rL low return
Q total volume of repos rH high return
X total quantity of asset–backed secu-
rities
 interest rate spread
AN assets of asset managing firms θ probability of high return
DN debts of asset managing firms q degree of realization of notional
value of assets when liquidated
EN equity of asset managing firms
(Note: (a) m ≡ λBλB−1 − hB
(b) For the coefficients α0, α1, δ0, δ1, β0, β1, 0, 1, 2, µ0, µ1, µ2, τ0, τ1, κ0, κ1, see appendix G.)
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APPENDIX G
A SUMMARY AND SOLUTION OF THE MODEL IN
CHAPTER 3
In reproducing the equations here, all the balance sheet variables are normalized
by the securitized banking sector’s sticky equity EX . But the same notations are used
in order to avoid complication in the notations. For example, Φ, which is the excess
bank loan demand, actually represents Φ
EX
.
G.1 Summary
The model consists of twelve variables and twelve equations. The twelve variables
are LD, LS, Φ, λR, λX , ER, PR, PX , P eR, rl, rp, ξ with P eR and rp being two state
variables of the model. The behavioral specification of the two state variables is
represented as a differential equation.
<Identities and equations>
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LD ≡ (λR − 1)ER
LS ≡ mvBλRER + λX
Φ ≡ LD − LS
λR = α0 + α1PR
ER = δ0 + δ1PR
λX = β0 + β1PX
PR = 0 + 1P eR − 2rl
PX = µ0 + µ1PR − µ2rp
rl = rp + ξ
ξ = τ0 + τ1Φ
(G.1)
<Differential equations>
P˙ eR = g(PR)
r˙p = κ1(rp − rp∗)− κ2P˙R
(G.2)
G.2 Solution
The twelve equations system summarized above is solved under the assumption
that α1 = 0 with the help of Mathematica. Interested readers can acquire the Math-
ematica code from the author upon request. The resulting solution of the model is
presented below.
As can be seen, all the solution is expressed as a function of the constant param-
eters and the two state variables, i.e. P eR and rp. Since the evolution of the two state
variables is given by the two differential equations, once their initial value is known
along with the parameter values, concrete values for the entire twelve variables over
time will be obtained.
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λR = α0
ER = δ0 −
δ1
(
U1 + 1P eR − (2 + β12µ2τ1)rp
)
W2
λX = β0 + β1µ0 −
β1
(
U1µ1 + 1µ1P eR − (2µ1 −W2µ2 + β12µ1µ2τ1)rp)
W2
PR = −U2 + 1P
e
R − (2 + β12µ2τ1)rp
W2
PX = µ0 − U1µ1 + 1µ1P
e
R − (2µ1 −W2µ2 + β12µ1µ2τ1)rp
W2
rl = τ0 +
U2τ1 +W11τ1P eR +
(
W2 − (W12 + β1µ2)τ1
)
rp
W2
ξ = τ0 +
τ1
(
U2 +W11P eR − (W12 + β1µ2)rp
)
W2
Φ = U1 + 1W1P
e
R − (2W1 + β1µ2)rp
W2
P˙ eR = g(PR), g′ < 0
r˙p = g1κ2 + (r
p − rp∗)κ1W2
W3
(G.3)
where
W1 = β1µ1 −
(
α0(1− vBm)− 1
)
δ1
W2 = −1 + 2τ1W1
W3 = W2 + 2κ2(1 + β1µ2τ1)
U1 = (1− α0 + α0vBm)(δ0 + 0δ1 − 2δ1τ0) + β0 + β1(µ0 + 0µ1 − 2µ1τ0)
U2 = δ0 + 0δ1 − 2δ1τ0 + 2(β0δ1 + β1δ1µ0 − β1δ0µ1)τ1
(G.4)
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APPENDIX H
PROOFS IN CHAPTER 3
Proof of Proposition 11. Each of the three statements can be proved by exam-
ining the relevant partial derivative as follows:
1. ∂rp
∂λ
= −1−θ
θ
(1+rL)
(
q′ λ
λ−1− q(λ−1)2
)
> 0 due to 0 < θ < 1, q′ < 0, and λ > 1. The
last condition reflects a simple fact that the broker–dealer sector is leveraged.
2. ∂rp
∂θ
= 1
θ2
(
λ
λ−1(1 + r
L)q − (1 + rf )
)
< 0 due to 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, rL < rf , and λ
λ−1 ≈ 1
with λ being substantially large.
3. ∂2rp
∂θ∂λ
= (1+rL)
θ2
(
q′ λ
λ−1 − q(λ−1)2
)
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 13. According to Hopf bifurcation theorem, if the differen-
tial equations system with a system parameter ρ obtains the Jacobian matrix, which,
evaluated at the steady state, has the following properties: i), it possesses a pair of
simple complex conjugate eigenvalues x(ρ)±y(ρ)i that become pure imaginary at the
critical value ρ∗ of the parameter — i.e. x(ρ∗) = 0, while y(ρ∗) > 0 — and no other
eigenvalues with zero real part exist at the steady state at ρ∗; ii) dx(ρ)
dρ
∣∣∣
ρ=ρ∗
6= 0; then
the system has a family of periodic solutions.
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Regarding the first property, on the one hand, it needs to be shown that there
exists ρ∗ > 0 such that J |ρ=ρ∗ = 0 and det J |ρ=ρ∗ > 0. Trace and determinant of the
Jacobian matrix are:
J = −1g
′
W2
+ κ1
W2
W3
+ 1g¯′
( 1
W2
− 1
W3
)
det J = −1κ1g
′
W3
κ1 is the system parameter. Its critical value can be obtained from setting J = 0
and solving it for κ1. The result is κ∗1 = g
′1
W2
which is the Hopf bifurcation point. In
this way, we have J |κ1=κ∗1 = 0 automatically. Using κ∗1 generates det J |κ1=κ∗1 = −
g′221
W2W3
.
SinceW3 > W2 by definition ofW3, the only conditions for det J |κ1=κ∗1 > 0 to hold are
W2 < 0 and W3 > 0. This addresses the first property of Hopf bifurcation theorem.
Moreover, this result generates κ∗1 > 0, remembering g′ < 0, which satisfies the basic
assumption of the model that that all the parameters are positive.
Regarding the second property, on the other hand, it can be easily verified that
∂J
∂κ1
∣∣∣
κ1=κ∗1
= W2
W3
6= 0 as long as W2 6= 0 and W3 6= 0.
Consequently, W2 < 0 and W3 > 0 guarantee that the two conditions of Hopf
bifurcation theorem are satisfied.
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APPENDIX I
PARAMETER VALUES IN CHAPTER 3
Table I.1: Parameter values
α0 α1 δ0 δ1 β0 β1 hB λB vB 0 1 2 µ0
1.5 0 600 5.4 -5 1 0.1 10 0.1 -5 1.2 2 75
µ1 µ2 κ1 κ2 τ0 τ1 r
p∗ g0 g1 g2 g3 g4
2.3 6.66 5 4 1 0.001 5 -35 2 2 100 32
146
APPENDIX J
CYCLES OF THE ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES IN
CHAPTER 3
(a) expected asset price (b) current asset price (c) ABS price
(d) securitized bank leverage
(e) excess bank credit de-
mand (f) equity of the real sector
(g) bank lending interest rate (h) repo rate (i) interest rate spread
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